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The leaders of the Confederate States of America proved eager and 
desirous of the power of the federal government. Rather than constituting an 
anomalous, ironical, or revolutionary episode in American political history, the 
Confederacy sought to conserve their definition of American liberty and 
democracy, with its racial grants, privileges, and sanction of slavery, through the 
power of government. The embrace of federal power was an intentional, central, 
and desirable feature of government, and one that Confederates embraced in 
order to sustain and project their nation and its vision of American democracy. 
1	  
INTRODUCTION 
At a reunion of the Stonewall Brigade in 1892 former commanding 
General James Walker looked back and observed, “In fact if you take out of the 
Confederate history the deeds of her armies and the devotion and the sacrifices of 
the Southern women there is nothing left.”1 Walker’s comment usefully illustrates 
the overwhelming degree of attention afforded to the battlefield, with its 
seemingly innate allure attested to by the unrelenting legion of volumes 
published on the Civil War. Walker’s observance also highlights the vital 
contributions and varying roles of women in the Civil War. There is, however, a 
notable omission in Walker’s preferred rendering of the Confederate past - the 
complete absence of politics. In memoriam Walker renders the memory of the 
Confederate government invisible.  
Walker’s quote also usefully highlights the degree to which Confederate 
nostalgia has influenced scholarly interest. Modern scholarship continues to 
enrich our understanding of the Civil War, with ongoing inquiry resulting in the 
field’s remarkable and vital diversification. From medicine and death to gender, 
destruction, and environment, scholarship on the Civil War has never been more 
exciting and dynamic.2 Despite scholars’ rich historical explorations, the question 
1 South Branch Intelligencer (Romney, W.V.) September 9, 1892 quoted in 
2 Kathryn Shively Meier, Nature’s Civil War: Common Soldiers and the 
Environment in 1862 Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2013); Megan Kate Nelson, Ruin Nation: Destruction and the American 
Civil War (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011); Jim Downs, Sick From 
Freedom: African-American Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and 
Reconstruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); George Rable, Civil 
Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism (Champaign: University 
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of how the Confederate government functioned remains misunderstood. While 
scholars have broadened our understanding of the Confederacy, most works that 
discuss politics explain why the Confederate government failed rather than how it 
functioned. As a result there is a tendency to approach Confederate federalism 
and central state organization as evidence of a venture gone wrong. According to 
scholars’ varying conclusions, the betrayal results from either the failure of 
leadership, the shortcomings of political culture, the general depravity of 
planter’s parochial worldview, an insistence on state’s rights, or merely the irony 
of unintended consequence. Shifting the analytical approach away from 
culpability yields important insights.  
Confederate leaders embraced federal power and government, viewing its 
control essential to protect and advance the grants of American liberty as defined 
by the Constitution. By asserting that eighteenth-century definitions of political 
liberty were essential to American democracy, Confederates claimed to preserve 
constitutional liberty and to affix its definitions for all time. Linking racial 
hierarchy, economic prosperity, and political power through the auspices of 
federal power constituted the central thrust of Confederate desire. They desired 
federal control to affix the Constitution’s sanction of slavery in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Illinois Press, 1989) Drew Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the 
Slaveholding South in the American Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004); Anne Sarah Rubin A Shattered Nation: The Rise 
and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2007); Leeann Whites and Alecia P. Long eds., Occupied Women: 
Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2009); Stephanie McCurry, Confederate 
Reckoning, Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2010); Nina Silber, Daughters of the Union: Northern Women 
Fight the Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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perpetuate and project their vision of the nation across the continent and into the 
future. They did not desire to revolutionize, reject, or transform the government 
or the political culture of the American state, but to embrace its powers and 
cement slavery’s status as a vital elucidation of white liberty. They sought to 
conserve and control rather than to transform or revolutionize. 
The Constitution’s political grants of liberty, according to the breakaway 
Southerners, were rooted in racial division, which defined the body politic 
according to race and afforded white citizens the privilege to own slaves and 
command black labor. Indeed, Confederates argued, this makeup was necessary 
and essential to creating unity and the model of classical republican virtue set 
forth by the Founding generation. As Alexander Stephens explained in his vast 
apologia, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, what some 
viewed as farce, a definition of liberty that rested upon slavery, instead 
constituted an essential component of the white South’s understanding of liberty. 
Judge Bynum, Stephens’ synthetic Republican, interrupted the Sage of Liberty 
Hall in his fictional salon as he recalled a speech spelling forth this belief: “How 
can you say any of this?” Bynum interrupts. “‘Liberty and Equality’ seems to me 
but a mockery…when we know that what he meant was, not the advancement of 
Liberty at all, but the perpetuation of slavery.” Stephens calmly corrects his 
friend. The Confederacy’s object “was the perpetuation of that liberty and 
equality which was established by the Constitution of the United States…It was 
the same liberty and equality that the men of 1776 had periled their lives, their 
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honor, and all that they held, to establish.”3 What Bynum perceived as mockery, 
Stephens believed constituted the white South’s paramount political conviction. 
For the maintenance of that vision of American liberty, with the entwining roots 
of slavery and classical republicanism, Confederates sought the auspices of the 
powerful federal government to preserve, protect, and facilitate the prosperity of 
their vision of American democracy. Their chief aim lay not in forsaking or 
revolutionizing, but preserving. And for that, they required control of the 
government. 
The role of federal power in the Confederacy has long beguiled scholars. 
Richard Bensel’s noteworthy study of the origins of central state development in 
American political life noted that the Confederacy, not the Union, embraced more 
federalized and centralized policies. In Bensel’s estimation the embrace of such 
powers owed to expediency and irony. In lacking a dynamic marketplace, the 
Confederacy was forced to turn to the federal government for solutions. The 
seemingly staid, hesitant federal powers of the United States Constitution were 
thus unwillingly thrust into execution through the Confederacy’s efforts at 
imitation.4 Emory Thomas similarly studied the Confederacy’s envelopment in 
federal authority and found that the experiences of war necessitated an 
unforeseen and unlikely revolution of values. The experience of war unexpectedly 
transformed the Confederacy, turning it away from its roots in localism to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Alexander Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the 
States… (Philadelphia, 1870) Volume II, 126. 
 
4 Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in 
America, 1858-1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), x. 
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awkward embrace of big government, a development most at odds with its 
founding purpose.5 By the late nineties two essay collections on the Confederacy 
appeared, Why the South Lost the Civil War and Why the Confederacy Lost. 
Both collections introduced readers to historical reassessments of Confederate 
nationalism, emancipation, black enlistment, and military strategy, all of which 
attempted to explain the Confederate failure. In 2005 Anne Sarah Rubin’s work A 
Shattered Nation chronicled the Confederacy’s attempt at defining a nationalist 
ideology. Rubin argued for the relative ease with which Southerners identified 
slavery as a cause for independence, yet created a national identity separate from 
the institutions of their national life. The Confederacy, in Rubin’s work, achieved 
a powerful cultural symbolism independent of politics, which allowed separatist 
sentiments to linger long after the political institutions of the Confederacy had 
failed.6  
In 2006 Bruce Levine reignited interest in Confederate emancipation, long 
a key problem in historical investigations of the national experiment. Not since 
Robert Durden’s 1972 The Gray and the Black has scholarship focused so intently 
on the issue. Then, Durden chronicled what he saw as an evolution in thinking on 
the part of the Confederacy’s leaders who demonstrated flexibility in envisioning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Emory Thomas, The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall Incorporated, 1971). 
 
6 Charles B. Dew, Apostles of Disunion: Southern Secession Commissioners and 
the Causes of the Civil War (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001); 
George Rable, The Confederate Republic: A Revolution Against Politics (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Anne Sarah Rubin, A 
Shattered Nation: The Rise and Fall of the Confederacy, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2005). 
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a South with a malleable racial line. The very fact that white Southerners turned 
to black Southerners to achieve Confederate independence, in Durden’s 
estimation, offered evidence of lingering interracial goodwill in the South, and 
the possibility of a different future.7 Levine’s reassessment instead highlights the 
agency of slaves to demonstrate how their actions drove the policy and ultimately 
resulted in the Confederate policy’s failure. Levine does not intuit any willingness 
of white Southerners to forego racial control in their scheme for emancipation 
and argues that preserving slavery ruled Confederate motives from first to last. 
That emancipation failed, Levine argues, owed to clear-eyed rationality on the 
part of the South’s enslaved who understood their best hope for freedom lay in 
Confederate ruin.8 The field continues to produce new works apace, as two new 
collections of scholarly essays appeared in 2009, offering scholars’ recent 
findings on memory, meaning, and motivations for North and South during the 
Civil War.9 Stephanie McCurry’s most recent treatment of political power in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Robert F. Durden, The Gray and the Black: The Confederate Debate on 
Emancipation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972). Durden 
writes, “Yet Jefferson Davis, Robert E. Lee, and Judah Benjamin, and a host of 
less famous Southerners displayed greater flexibility about an willingness to 
begin modifying slavery than most accounts have ever admitted…The tragedy of 
the unturned or half-turned corner lay not, surely, in the military outcome of the 
war, for the North would probably have won in any event. The whole episode 
shows, however, that there was yet a reservoir of good will between the white and 
black races in the South, which reservoir was very nearly tapped by the 
Confederacy.” xii. 
8 Bruce Levine, Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and Arm 
Slaves During the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
9 David H. Donald, ed., Why the North Won the Civil War (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1960); Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, 
Archer Jones, and William N. Still Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1986) particularly chapter ten, which addresses 
state’s rights; Gabor S. Borritt, ed., Why the Confederacy Lost (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992); William J. Cooper and James M. McPherson eds., 
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Confederacy focuses on the ways that white masters concentrated power among 
the male elite, denying legitimacy to women and slaves, and in taking such loyalty 
for granted embarked on a course of ironic ruin.10 
From the Confederacy’s inception to its last gasp attempt to enlist 
bondsmen as soldiers, federal power played a central role in the history of the 
Confederate States of America. Confederate leaders pursued the course of 
independence through the medium of a powerful, centralized, federally supreme 
government. They built an avowedly imitative nation proclaiming to protect time-
honored and defined rights of liberty, by recapitulating the United States 
Constitution and creating a powerful, central government. From the convention 
in Montgomery, Alabama to the last general order of Jefferson Davis, 
Confederates executed federal power with intent. Indeed, the history of the 
Confederacy reveals that from the executive to the legislative and judicial branch, 
the Confederacy enjoyed broad grants and wide-ranging instrumentalities of 
central power.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Writing the Civil War: The Quest to Understand (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press: 1998); William J. Cooper and John M. McCardell, eds., In the 
Cause of Liberty: How the Civil War Redefined American Ideals (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2009) see Chapter Six “Why Did Southerners 
Secede?” Wilentz writes, “Lincoln’s election, in full compliance with the 
Constitution, directly threatened the future of southern slavery, meaning that the 
Constitution, for decades slaveholders’ friend, was now their enemy. As a direct 
result of Lincoln’s election and of his actions upon taking office, eleven southern 
states seceded – and the war came.” 39; Joan Waugh and Gary W. Gallagher, 
eds., Wars Within a War: Controversy and Conflict Over the American Civil 
War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
 
10 Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil 
War South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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As historian Max Edling’s work on the United States Constitution 
illuminates, the Constitution’s provisions to raise and maintain armies, including 
state militias, in addition to the power to tax and borrow money, contradicts 
historical interpretations of the United States Constitution as a document of 
governmental restraint.11 The provisions for a strong, central government, Edling 
argue, laid the groundwork for a central state based on the European model, 
whose support of national armies and grants to tax and borrow intended to 
project and execute power from a consolidated, national center. The Founders 
were very much concerned with government, which is reflected by the 
arrangements, grants, and broad instrumentalities to carry out the powers 
contained within the United States Constitution. The Confederate Constitution’s 
intentional mimicry of the United States demonstrated its own desire to possess 
the power of a strong, centrally administered government. Indeed, the Davis 
administration rooted administration’s policies that executed federal power in 
American historical precedent and legal code, an often-overlooked feature that 
the Confederacy continued in force. The war did not transform the Confederacy’s 
relationship to federal power, but made their desire for power evident. 
  
The first chapter chronicles the experience of secession, laying out the fact 
that by their words and deeds, secessionists struggled to wrestle the South out of 
the Union in order to maintain control of the government to conserve slavery, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the United 
States Constitution and the Making of the American State (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
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upon which rested their economic, social, and political system. Indeed, their 
articulations for resuming the power of the government in an independent South 
repeatedly proclaimed the purpose of embracing government to sustain their 
region’s makeup. Attempting to affix select Founders’ definitions of liberty, with 
its emphasis in classical republicanism, constituted the motive of secessionist 
delegates. Their goal was not a revolution, as they made evidently clear, but 
rather the preservations of conservative liberty. The experiences of Jefferson 
Davis, Alexander Stephens, William Lowndes Yancey, and Joseph Brown provide 
a rich intersection of ideological, institutional, and philosophical viewpoints. 
Politicians all, these men hailed from different parts of the South and represented 
different levels of government. Despite their varying approaches to the wisdom of 
secession, all exhibited a clear desire for a strong federal government to secure 
and perpetuate their articulated understanding of liberty. They sought not to 
overthrow government or to repudiate its power, but to harness that power. 
The second chapter tells the story of the Montgomery Convention, which 
revealed the desire of secessionist delegates to preserve the Constitution of the 
United States and to continue the laws of the United States in force. The 
delegates’ efforts were avowedly imitative. The few reforms adopted resulted not 
from an attempt to make the government more Southern, but rather to make it 
more efficient. The wellspring of reform lay not in desires to erect a proslavery 
empire, but to clarify grants of liberty and to eradicate future dissention based on 
previous political tribulations. In a fitting example of the convention’s wish to 
clarify the Confederacy’s conventional aims, the Montgomery delegates turned to 
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Jefferson Davis and Alexander Stephens to head the executive. The Confederacy 
did not mark a radical departure, but rather sought to secure and perpetuate 
eighteenth-century conventions of liberty and democracy. Even before the first 
battle, the Confederate Congress looked to the Constitution to nationalize the 
nation’s response to the ongoing crisis at Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, 
South Carolina. Before the first shots, the national government owned the 
supreme power to decide on the issue of war or peace, not the states. The war did 
not transform the state, but made its grants of federal power clear. 
Chapter three chronicles the Confederacy’s use of federal power to respond 
to the exigencies of wartime. The debates over conscription and suspension of 
habeas corpus reveal Confederate leaders following their Constitution, which a 
majority of Southern politicians supported – even inveterate foes of Davis. The 
ultimately unresolved issue of Confederate politics remained the establishment of 
a Supreme Court, the power of judicial review. A topic of considerable debate 
with antebellum antecedents, the row over the court’s ability to invalidate state 
legislation and to interpret the will of Congress provided a divisive episode and 
revealed the conditional approach to federal politics among the Confederacy’s 
more singularly interesting politicians. In the end, William Yancey, in a 
remarkable display, sought to harmonize state and federal action, to make 
government function more harmoniously, and that included defending the 
prerogatives of the national congress and state legislatures against the scheme for 
an all powerful Supreme Court.  
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The fourth chapter follows the legal response to challenges of federal 
power over the areas of conscription and habeas corpus. Owing to absence of a 
Supreme Court, decisions remained in state courts. In overwhelming fashion, the 
Davis administration won every case concerning the supremacy of the federal 
government. Even North Carolina’s Supreme Court, where the most significant 
and sustained legal challenge to the Confederacy’s executive power was 
sustained, eventually ruled in favor of the administration to the detriment of 
state’s rights proponents. The federal government owned a clear and sovereign 
grant of power. 
The fifth chapter covers the most radical extension of federal power in the 
Confederacy, slave enlistments into the army. The policy demonstrates the 
farthest reaches of the Davis administration’s use of its executive power. The 
policy was not without opposition, but in the end Davis, by building an effective 
coalition to secure its passage comprised of a unique assemblage of state leaders 
and military officials. That such a coalition proved possible revealed the degree to 
which politicians and military leaders looked to federal power to further their 
goals. Using the power of the executive, Davis even amended the legislation to 
afford bondsmen who enlisted the rights of freedmen and the promise of 
emancipation. With the Confederacy’s collapse arriving just weeks after the 
policy’s passage, the full social ramifications of Davis’s actions remained 
unfulfilled. And in defeat, the Confederacy’s former political elite took to the pen 
with vigor in an effort to salvage their legacy and to rescue the memory of the 
Confederacy from the opprobrium of its failure. By exalting state’s rights, Davis 
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and Stephens thrust off accusations of treason by claiming secession a legitimate 
constitutional recourse. They also conflated the cause of the Confederacy as the 
pursuit of self-government, a favorable endeavor for so-called redeemers who 
sought to restore white rule in the Reconstruction South. Such efforts rendered 
the Confederacy largely distinct from its history, making it a safe vessel for 
nostalgic sentiments that obscured a sustained belief in American democracy’s 
essential racial definition. 
As an intellectual project, I focused on the writings and speeches of the 
main actors. I chose Alexander Stephens and Jefferson Davis because they were 
the Confederacy’s premier political leaders, but also included William Lowndes 
Yancey and Joseph Brown because of their illuminating historical importance, 
and due to varying scholarly interpretations of their legacies. These subjects 
provide a variety of perspectives between national and state politicians, and 
conventional political actors and maverick politicians. They also offer a broad 
geographic perspective. Because I was focused on the words, actions, and 
deliberations, I used newspapers in limited fashion, to either provide a broad 
context to events, demonstrate evidence of an existing sentiment such as the call 
for slave enlistments, or in the case of figures of like Robert Barnwell Rhett, to 
give voice to his dissenting, anomalous ideas. 
The Confederacy did not secede to repudiate government, but rather to 
enshrine racial hierarchy in a government that protected American democracy’s 
purportedly immutable, original grants of liberty. The Confederate elite 
tenaciously clung to time-honored definitions of the body politic, and to achieve 
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their farthest desires, they embraced federal, central control. By incorporating 
the past, with its purportedly immutable definitions of liberty and democracy, the 
Confederacy hoped to project their vision of American democracy across the 
continent and into the future. To accomplish this goal, the Confederates required 
a federal government strong enough to defend the nation, safeguard its values, 
and spread its institutions. The Confederates believed that they were rescuing 
American democracy and its form of government, not forsaking it. As the 
delegates at Montgomery repeatedly stated, they sought to save American 
democracy by adopting the United States Constitution and to continue its legal 
code in force. President Jefferson Davis’ inaugural pronouncements elucidated 
an energetic policy with ebullient language, which provided an early and clear 
example of Confederate leaders favorable and desirable application of federal 
power. Contrary to some scholars who have treated the Confederacy as a 
revolutionary, aberrant, or transformational moment, the war proved instead 
revelatory of Confederates’ desire to conserve their definition of American liberty 
through the power of the federal government. From conscription through the 
suspension of habeas corpus, federal power was greeted warmly, even by some of 
Davis’ most inveterate critics. The main frictions over federal power occurred not 
as a result of their application, but rather disagreements over the mechanism of 
their enforcement. Throughout, Confederates remained committed to the notion 
of a strong central government, which they believed necessary to preserving and 
eventually projecting their vision of American democracy across the continent. 
The Confederates conceived of their project as saving American constitutional 
government, not forsaking it.




 In the fall of 1796, George Washington announced his resignation from the 
presidency after two terms. His farewell appeared in the American Daily 
Advertiser on September 19 and presented the country with advice for remaining 
committed to founding principles. “The unity of government which constitutes 
you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the 
edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your 
peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so 
highly prize.”1 Washington, in short, counseled citizens to look after their 
institutions and commitments. Particularly inveighing against the burgeoning 
party and sectional loyalties threatening to divide the country, Washington 
beseeched the young nation to remain committed to the principle of united 
government. It was a remarkable crystallization of the Founders generally 
fatalistic view of history. Washington implicitly feared that such disruptive forces 
would prove lethal to the country. 
 Sixty-four years after Washington’s counsel, South Carolina secessionists 
gathered in Charleston. At Institute Hall on Meeting Street, the assembled 
listened for the verdict of their deliberation, “Slowly and solemnly it was read 
unto the last word - ‘dissolved…’” The Union was no more. At this, the delegates 
bellowed “a shout that shook the very building, reverberating, long-continued, 
rose to Heaven, and ceased only with the loss of breath.” The Charleston Mercury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 2 
Letterbooks, September 17, 1796 Farewell Address 222-3. 
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declared the moment a righteous response to the threat of Republican rule: 
“Conservative liberty has been vindicated…South Carolina has resumed her 
entire sovereign powers, and unshackled, has become one of the nations of the 
earth.”2 Washington’s fear materialized merely two generations after his 
admonition. 
  
The Charleston Mercury announced that secession constituted a 
clarification of the conservative principles of constitutional liberty. As white 
Southerners embarked upon a course of independence, they sought to affix their 
understanding of liberty as the immutable, essential feature of American political 
democracy. Quite literally, the Confederate elite desired to conserve eighteenth-
century definitions of political liberty, with its racially restricted body politic and 
the Constitution’s sanction and even incentivizing of slave ownership. This 
conservative interpretation of American democracy viewed racial inequality as an 
essential feature of constitutional democracy. With the goal of fixing liberty in 
mind, secessionists looked to conserve a selective interpretation of the Founding 
Era’s definitions and understanding. Nascent Confederates claimed Washington, 
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their interpretation of constitutional 
liberty as their own. The Mercury elucidated the continuity between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Charleston Mercury, December 21, 1860. 
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Confederate and the Founders when it hailed, “conservative liberty has been 
vindicated.”3  
This was no exercise in revolution, but in preservation. As secessionists 
explained, the election of Abraham Lincoln constituted a grave threat to the 
South. The Republican ideology of free soil and free men not only endangered the 
economic makeup of Southern society, but the party’s resort, in the words of 
William Henry Seward, to a “higher law” than the Constitution frightened and 
enraged white Southerners.4 Indeed, it appeared as though the victorious 
Republican Party sought not only to confine slavery, but also to eradicate it 
through a moral appeal in disregard of any constitutional limits. As John Daniel, 
the editor of the Richmond Daily Examiner, argued that, “To escape revolution 
in fact we must adopt revolution in form. To stand still is revolution – revolution 
already inflicted on us by our fanatical, unrelenting enemies.”5 Unlike the 
Republican Party, which prized individual advancement and societal innovation 
the Confederacy retained a belief in ordered, fixed, stable societies. Secessionists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Charleston Mercury, December 21, 1860. 
 
4	  George	  Baker,	  ed.,	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  Works	  of	  William	  H.	  Seward	  (New	  York:	  1853).	  In	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that	  the	  Constitution	  “does	  not	  recognize	  property	  in	  man,”	  Seward	  advanced,	  “But	  
there	  is	  a	  higher	  law	  than	  the	  Constitution,	  which	  regulates	  our	  authority	  over	  the	  
domain,	  and	  devotes	  it	  to	  the	  same	  noble	  purpose.”	  Vol.	  I,	  72-­‐4.	  On	  the	  attempts	  to	  
limit	  and	  destroy	  slavery,	  see	  James	  Oakes,	  The	  Scorpion’s	  Sting:	  Antislavery	  and	  the	  
Coming	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton	  and	  Company,	  2014).	  In	  particular,	  
Oakes’	  argument	  in	  chapter	  one,	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  a	  Scorpion	  Girt	  by	  Fire,”	  over	  abolitionist	  
desires	  to	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  freedom”	  of	  free	  states	  to	  first	  confine	  and	  then	  suffocate	  
slavery.	  
	  
5 Richmond Daily Examiner, March 6, 1861. 
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desired not to advance a new definition of liberty, but rather to fix eighteenth-
century standards, and their organization of society, for all time. 
Jefferson Davis expressed astonishment at the recent growth of 
revolutionary attitudes toward equality when he resigned from the United States 
Senate. A wary secessionist, Davis nevertheless spoke to the overarching hope of 
white Southerners to preserve political liberties and economic prosperity, both of 
which he argued were entwined in racial inequality. Before Abraham Lincoln 
turned to the Declaration of Independence as a hallmark of Union purpose, 
Jefferson Davis staked the South’s claim to this document as an affirmation of 
white Southerners understanding of American liberty. In harkening to the iconic 
words of his namesake Thomas Jefferson, Jefferson Davis argued that the 
Declaration of Independence limited the boundaries of the political community. 
“No man was born – to use the language of Mr. Jefferson – booted and spurred to 
ride over the rest of mankind,” Davis explained, before elucidating the crucial fact 
that when Jefferson claimed “that men were created equal” he meant “men of the 
political community.”6  This was a government against monarchy, not in favor of 
racial equality. White Southerners, he avowed, seceded to protect this 
understanding. Later, as provisional president, Davis proclaimed that the 
Confederacy possessed a “light” that revealed the Constitution’s true meaning. 
“We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our Government,” 
Jefferson Davis affirmed. “The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The Congressional Globe, 36th Congress, 2d Session, 487. 
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Confederate States, in their exposition of it, we have a light which reveals its true 
meaning.”7 To begin anew, secessionists affixed the old.   
Studying the motivations and aspirations of secessionists has resulted in a 
diverse historiographical tradition. Traditionally, most historians focus on the 
role of states’ rights and slavery in explaining the motives for the Confederacy. 
Frank Owsley’s classic work, State Rights in the Confederacy, set the standard by 
arguing that the commitment to states’ rights constituted a fundamental motive 
and inherent flaw in the Confederacy. A legion of arguments followed. Two 
studies of politics focused on the Confederate cabinet, Statesmen of the Lost 
Cause and Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet, and both sought either to ascribe 
blame or exculpate the Confederacy’s executive leadership for the responsibility 
of defeat.8 At the centennial, David Donald edited an essay collection, Why the 
North Won the Civil War, which offered readers a succinct collection of scholarly 
essays offering various interpretations for the motives and outcome of the war. 
David Potter’s essay in particular introduced a profound explanation for 
Confederate defeat, the lack of political parties. His argument helped reignite 
interest in the political histories of the Union and Confederate governments. 
Reassessing this crucial period began with the appearance of Paul Escott’s After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lynda Crist, ed., The Papers of Jefferson Davis, Volume 7, 66. 
8	  Frank Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1925). Burton Kendrick writes, “The fact always to be kept in mind 
is that the South which started the Confederacy, and dominated its government 
for four years, was not the South that wrote the Declaration of Independence, 
play so important a role in framing the Constitution, and provided so much 
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(New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1939) 7. Rembert Patrick’s Jefferson 
Davis and His Cabinet (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Stat University Press, 1961), 
refutes Kendrick.	  
	   19	  
Secession. Escott argues Jefferson Davis, the reluctant secessionist, attempted to 
forge unity along racial lines but ultimately suffered from an elitist disaffection. 
Into the void stepped figures such as Joseph Brown, whose populist roots were 
more attuned to the needs of Confederate yeomen. In Escott’s telling Davis’ 
popular disaffection results in an insufficient and ultimately unpersuasive 
expression of national vision. Emory Thomas’ The Confederacy as a 
Revolutionary Experience advances the thesis that the Confederacy started out 
staid, but the trials of war necessitated discarding the tenets of conservatism, a 
fundamental refashioning of purpose.9 The notion of a strong Confederacy is also 
one part of the overarching interest of Richard Bensel’s Yankee Leviathan, which 
traces the development of political institutions. In tracing the genesis of “central, 
state authority” in American government, Bensel finds that fighting the Civil War 
lead to the centralized organization of American government. Intriguingly, he 
concludes the South was just as centralized, if not more so, than its northern 
counterpart owing to its forced reliance on state organization rather than a robust 
market economy.10 The war, in his estimation, rendered the antebellum 
government an anachronism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Paul Escott, After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate 
Nationalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979); Emory 
Thomas, The Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Incorporated, 1971). 
 
10 Richard F. Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority 
in America, 1858-1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) x. Later, 
Bensel writes, “…the all-encompassing economic and social controls of the 
Confederacy were in fact so extensive that they call into question standard 
interpretations of southern opposition to the expansion of federal power in both 
the antebellum and post-Reconstruction periods.” 95. 
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George Rable’s insightful The Confederate Republic explored the political 
culture of Southern and Confederate politics. In assessing the political culture of 
the Confederacy on its own terms rather than as a probing explanation for defeat, 
Rable argues that the Confederacy marked a revolutionary attempt to purify 
politics by returning to an earlier antiparty age. With an emphasis on the 
revolution in political culture, Rable sees the Confederate Constitution as a 
document of reform that accompanies the Confederacy’s other changes. Despite 
Confederate politicians’ best efforts, however, political divisions emerged along 
lines of national unity versus libertarianism as the stresses of war mounted. In 
the end, Rable concludes that the antiparty framework in no way seriously 
hamstrung Davis, although the divisions that developed proved petty and 
ultimately pointed toward the failure of the Confederacy’s political culture. In 
turning to the motivations for war, in 2001 Charles Dew’s Apostles of Disunion 
provided the most succinct case for slavery and racism as the motive behind 
secession. By assembling the secession commissioners’ speeches, Dew advances 
his argument with clarity.  
Most recently, Stephanie McCurry’s provocative Confederate Reckoning 
argues that the Confederate experiment constituted a remarkable historical 
anomaly. Studying the Confederacy through a compelling blend of contexts, 
McCurry argues that the Confederate elite forged a slave owner’s republic. The 
Confederate experience repudiated the emancipatory trajectory of the 
hemisphere by constituting an undemocratic and revolutionary experience. 
McCurry argues: “This short-lived Confederate States of America was a signal 
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event in the history of the Western world. What secessionists set out to build was 
something entirely new in the history of nations: a modern proslavery and 
antidemocratic state, dedicated to the proposition that all men were not created 
equal.” In the end, the revolutionary attempt to deny legitimacy to women and 
slaves forged a “reckoning” that revealed the poverty of the Confederate vision. 
The Confederacy in McCurry’s assessment emerges as a rudely stamped offshoot 
of American democracy whose final act exposes the faults of the white republic.11 
 
Important aspects of the Confederacy’s political system and intentions 
remain misunderstood. The Confederacy was anything but an anomalous event in 
American history. On the eve of secession both North and South shared a single 
government, common definitions of suffrage, racial inequality, and democratic 
politics. As the Confederate elite articulated, they desired to retain conservative 
definitions of American liberty, not advance novel ones. Alexander Stephens’s 
“Cornerstone Speech” elucidated the ways in which the Confederate Constitution 
preserved longstanding legal and philosophical divisions. As Stephens argued, it 
was not the Confederates who embedded such notions into the American 
government, but the Founders. The Confederates sought to perpetuate and 
sanction such a selective vision of the Founders’ worldview for all time.  
To preserve American democracy, and its racially unequal grants of 
liberty, secessionists and Southern politicians moved along broadly conservative 
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War South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 1. 
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lines, protecting the authority and power of the Constitution, evincing a belief in 
the necessity of government to perpetuate racial inequality. They acknowledged 
the utility of government as a valuable and desirable instrument. In the act of 
secession, the South removed impediments to their vision of governing and what 
followed was not an unforeseen or unintended response, but rather the logical 
extension of their clearly articulated desires, values, and beliefs. The 
Confederates sought a government powerful enough to defend their claims and to 
preserve their vision of American democracy’s grants of liberty. 
 
Jefferson Davis inherited the mantle of Southern leadership from none 
other than the last of the South’s political philosophers, John Caldwell Calhoun. 
Uniting Southern political interest under constitutional protections proved the 
longstanding wish of the eagle eyed scion of South Carolina. Long a champion of 
Southern interests, Calhoun exhibited a peculiar nationalism that used federal 
power to protect the political, economic, and social interests of the South. 
Modeling a prospective Southern nation upon South Carolina’s distinct racial 
democracy, Calhoun’s attempt to unite his region under a common political 
banner constituted the broad sweep of his intellectual and political legacy. With 
Nullification the central event in his political life and that of the antebellum 
history of the Palmetto State and perhaps the South, Calhoun learned invaluable 
lessons about the danger of political isolation.12 The master of Fort Hill emerged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Historian William Freehling writes that by “August 1827 [Calhoun] had 
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from the Nullification crisis with a novel notion of divided sovereignty within the 
American republic.13 Seeking to protect a conception of the people of the state as 
sovereign, yet desiring the power and influence of the federal government, 
Calhoun developed a line of political thinking that attempted to preserve 
Southerner’s grasp of federal power through minority veto. In this respect, as 
Michael O’ Brien argues, “the South Carolinians showed themselves more 
interested in possessing power than in denying its necessity.”14 Indeed, at the 
heart of Calhoun’s concurrent majority existed the desire to respect federal 
power, for it provided, in his estimation, a clear sanction of slavery. Calhoun did 
not repudiate government, but eagerly sought to embrace its favorable benefits to 
strengthen its legitimacy, and to influence its aims. 
Influenced by Thomas Hobbes and Southern philosophers John Taylor of 
Caroline and Thomas Cooper, Calhoun incorporated a variety of philosophical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
effectual remedy, a veto on the part of the local interest, or under our system, on 
the part of the states.’ By accepting the principle of state veto, Calhoun turned 
away not only from his earlier faith in expansive nationalism but also from his 
former commitment to government by majority rule.” William Freehling, Prelude 
to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New 
York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968) 154. 
 
13 Calhoun biographer John Niven writes, “Drawing on Madison’s Federalist 51 
(which he incorrectly attributed to Hamilton), his report of 1800 on the Alien and 
Sedition Act to the Virginia Legislature, Jefferson’s Kentucky resolution of 
1798...and Barthold Niebuhr’s History of Rome, Calhoun focused his attention on 
the problem of sovereignty. Originally, the states had been completely sovereign 
but had delegated certain enumerated powers to the national government. These 
were all specified and hence circumscribed while those retained to the states and 
the people were not. If the sovereign power were divided, what entity was to be 
the judge of where the boundaries lay?” John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the 
Price of Union (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988) 159-60.  
 
14 Michael O’ Brien, Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 203. 
	   24	  
and economic tenets into his thoughts on how to preserve the South’s interests. 
Taylor’s philosophy proved particularly influential. Inquiry into the Principles 
and Policy of the Government of the United States (1814) disparages power, 
wealth, and patronage and argues that individuals ought to remain sovereign. 
The independence of man, Taylor asserts, leads to a virtuous community since 
atomized members look to individual interests without a corrupting, external 
force. Taylor’s late Enlightenment thinking holds a dismissive view of state and 
national sovereignty, which he denigrated as “fictitious compacts.”15 Thomas 
Cooper, the president of South Carolina College, echoed Taylor by quarreling 
with the notion of political allegiance. Cooper dismissed, “the terms nation, state, 
community” as “words merely…”16 The professor argued that the only true 
subject is the individual, for it is they who are real. Unsurprisingly, Cooper does 
not believe man can transfer sovereignty. Man, having built states and nations, 
can at any time withdraw support to build another. Such ideological 
contributions to Calhoun’s thinking proved foundational. 
Calhoun took to Taylor and Cooper’s musings, yet always felt the pull of 
national political allegiance. Speaking of Calhoun’s interest in federal power, 
James Henry Hammond thought he exhibited a “superstitious attachment to the 
Union.”17 Calhoun’s report on the tariff of 1824 explained this affection and 
advanced a vision for preserving Southern interests while maintaining national 
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loyalty. As the country expanded and diversified, Calhoun wrote, “…The more 
difficult it is to equalize the action of the government.” Blending the philosophical 
with the economic, Calhoun sought the interposition of the states to preserve 
Southern regional interests. Without interposition he feared the abeyance of 
constitutional guarantees, for “there is no means by which minorities could 
compel the major party to observe the restrictions.”18 The restrictions, of course, 
meant non-interference with slavery. For Calhoun, the Constitution provided the 
greatest bulwark of slavery. 
In order for his vision to work most effectively, Calhoun desired to unite 
the region under a single political loyalty. His explained the rationale for his 
reasoning to a patron in the fall of 1838. Praising the Palmetto State’ single-party 
system, Calhoun championed his state’s makeup. As a result of its unique single-
party politics, he boasted: “We are now enjoying the benefit of so liberal and 
prudent a course, by being more united than the State has ever been….” 
Extending such logic to the South writ large, he pleaded: “Would to God that the 
whole South (the weak and exposed portion of the Union) had adopted the same 
course, and merged all of their local, and passed differences in one general effort 
for their common interest.” Calhoun understood that through regional unity, the 
South would possess a remarkable power to wield outsized influence in the 
national government. As he claimed, “…if we stand fast on our own ground, with 
the understanding, that we shall either take no part at all, or throw our weight, 
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where it will be the most effective to advance our own interests, our control will 
be felt to the last with powerful effect.”19 Calhoun’s vision for a lasting and 
significant South rested upon its ability to control the authority of national 
institutions. 
 
The appreciation for national institutions was not true for all political 
actors in the South, particularly those who acquired the label “fire-eaters.” 
Calhoun’s fellow South Carolinian, Robert Barnwell Rhett, called by many the 
“Father of Secession” for his vitriolic attacks upon Abraham Lincoln, the 
Republican Party, and the Union, yearned to destroy the Democratic Party in the 
South so as to bring about secession and Southern independence. “The South,” 
Rhett wrote to fellow sympathizer William Porcher Miles, “must dissever itself 
from the rotten northern element.”20 Once independent, Rhett desired to secure a 
slaveholding republic to last well into the modern age. Harnessing the power of 
the press from the pages of his family newspaper, The Charleston Mercury, Rhett 
blasted away at the bonds of unity between North and South. Setting up an 
independent Southern government remained his longing desire, and he believed 
that few were more qualified than he to lead such a prospective nation. 
Impulsive and unrestrained, Rhett exhibited a lack of discipline that at 
times undermined his cause. In 1851, just after the death of Calhoun, Rhett 
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attempted to drive South Carolina out of the Union in response to the 
Compromise of 1850. When he failed to do so, he lost his composure and sullenly 
took to the senate floor in Columbia to howl, “I am a secessionist – I am a 
disunionist.” Still opposed to his state’s submission to what he condemned as an 
odious compromise, Rhett thundered, “Others may submit: I will not.…I will 
secede, if I can, from this Union.”21 Adding to this display, Rhett brazenly called 
for reopening the slave trade, but in a rare moment of awareness, Rhett caught 
himself and urged reconsideration after secession. His exhibition placed him on 
the fringe. For the remainder of the decade, Rhett set about to bring his slave 
empire visions to fruition. In the run-up to the election of 1860, Rhett termed 
John Brown’s raid the “legitimate fruit of the Union” and scolded his state for 
failing to heed his warning.22 Finally, in December of 1860, Rhett sensed his 
moment at hand. He urged South Carolina to secede and called upon fellow 
Southern states to meet at Montgomery, Alabama, to join in the creation of a new 
Southern confederacy. Even Rhett, the inveterate opponent of the Union, sought 
a Southern government to facilitate his expansionist empire of slavery. Unlike his 
fellow South Carolinian Calhoun, Rhett did not exhibit any “mystical” attachment 
to the Union. What he desired was power to erect an unabashed slave empire. 
 If anyone matched Rhett’s hatred of Union, it was William Lowndes 
Yancey. Enjoying the title the “Prince of Secession” for his sterling looks and 
silver tongue, Yancey sought to destroy party attachments believing national 
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loyalties fatal to the South. Yancey established a United League of Southerners to 
foster regional ties and loyalty, which enjoyed the enthusiastic support of Rhett. 
Yancey, however, proved far more dangerous than Rhett or other fire-eaters like 
Edmund Ruffin, who exhibited an undisciplined, undirected hatred. Ruffin, a 
Virginian by birth and South Carolina transplant, described his life’s impulse as 
driven by “…unmitigated hated to Yankee rule.”23 Ruffin, like Rhett, proved 
impulsive, and their lack of restraint reduced their influence. Yancey stood apart 
from such undisciplined stridency and had a clear vision to break up the Union. 
Wary of the loyalty demanded by political parties, he railed against political 
institutions as corruptive. 
 Yancey’s hatred for institutional parties and the Union began early on in 
his career. Selected in 1844 to fill a vacant congressional seat in Alabama, Yancey 
soured on the bargains made by Democratic Southerners to advance national 
legislation. In protest, he resigned just one year into his term in 1845. 
Henceforth, Yancey viewed the Democratic Party and the Union with derision. 
He hoped as early as 1848 that “the foul spell of party which binds and divides 
and distracts the South can be broken.”24 Pennsylvania Democrat David Wilmot’s 
proviso that no land acquired in the war with Mexico could be open for slavery 
presented Yancey a platform to demonstrate the corrosive effects of party loyalty 
to Southern interests. The Alabaman responded by proposing his own proviso at 
the national party’s convention in Baltimore. Calling for a prohibition of 
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Congressional interference with slavery in the territories, Yancey attempted to 
foist his policy upon his party’s presidential candidates. No candidate agreed to 
the impolitic stipulation. Upon this singular defeat, Yancey stormed out of a 
convention for the first but not last time. 
As the Democratic Party convened in Charleston, South Carolina, a decade 
later, Yancey, at the head the Alabama delegation, sensed opportunity. In one of 
the more famous speeches of his career, Yancey spelled forth the rights of the 
South that he desired to protect. In bold, suggestive language Yancey proclaimed 
racial inequality as a benefit bestowing power on the white race. His reputation 
preceding him, Yancey declared, “There is no disunionist that I know of...there is 
no disruptionist.” Instead, he claimed to have come to the convention “to save the 
South by the best means present to us,” which he duplicitously characterized as 
through the “organization of the Democratic party, if we shall be able to persuade 
it to adopt the constitutional basis upon which we think the South alone can be 
saved.”25 The crucial stipulation, “upon which we think” explains Yancey’s 
attachment to institutions. Despite professing goodwill, Yancey made clear that 
his loyalty depended on the party’s willingness to accede to his demands. 
Yancey believed racial inequality reinforced constitutional liberty and 
signaled providential blessing. In attempting to highlight this fact for all present, 
Yancey spoke of the national delegates’ evident enjoyment of southern 
hospitality. Yancey remind them such enjoyment owed to slavery: “I have no 
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doubt, gentlemen, that each of you here enjoys most pleasantly the hospitalities 
of this city - even such hospitalities as you pay for so magnificently.” As the 
delegates laughed, Yancey seized the levity to press his complaint. Forwarding his 
argument in favor of white mastery, Yancey proclaimed: “Your relations towards 
them would be just the same in the Territories as they are here. The institution 
does not interfere with you. It does not belong to you to put your hands upon it. 
You are the aggressors when you injure it.” Yancey’s point was clear. It was not 
white Southerners who exhibited rapacious desires. Rather, it was Northerners 
who sought dominance over another man’s institutions. Appealing to the unity of 
white supremacy, Yancey closed by speaking of the divine sanction of racial 
inequality and the South’s amiable vision for the future identity of the nation: “If 
we beat you, we will give you good servants for life and enable you to live 
comfortably, and we will take your poor white man and elevate him from the 
office of boot-black, and from other menial offices which belong to the highest 
order of civilization – we will elevate him to a place amongst the master race and 
put the negro race to do this dirty work which God designed they should do.”26 If 
northern compatriots did not come around to this vision, Yancey urged his 
Southern compatriots to see through this vision. “Be true to your constitutional 
duties and rights,” he commanded his regional counterparts. “Yield nothing of 
principle for mere party success.”27 Such sentiment revealed Yancey, contrary to 
Davis and Calhoun, as a conditional party loyalist. Yancey remained an adherent 
of party loyalty only so long as the party held the promise to further his agenda. 
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Party affiliation was but a means to an end, and any attachment to it only held so 
long as it promised to benefit his vision.  
Yancey pressed exclusively Southern claims throughout the remainder of 
the convention. When Northern Democrats overrode the intemperate plan to 
embed the Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott ruling into their platform, Yancey 
lead fifty delegates from throughout the Deep South out of the convention. The 
remaining delegates pushed forward with nominations, but Douglas could not 
secure the necessary two-thirds to win nomination. Exasperated, the convention 
adjourned without having selected a candidate. The delegates agreed to 
reconvene in Baltimore later that year, but as a result of the political chaos, 
Stephen Douglas, John C. Breckenridge, and John Bell all vied for Democratic 
votes. The results of a splintered Democratic ticket proved predictable. On 
November 6, Abraham Lincoln carried the election with 1.9 million popular 
votes. His nearest opponent, Douglas, tallied 1.4 million votes, while the 
Southern Democrat, John C. Breckenridge, won 850,000 votes. John Bell, the 
Constitutional Candidate, recorded just shy of 600,000, mostly in the Upper 
South. In the Electoral College Lincoln won a resounding 180 votes, in 
comparison to the total 123 votes of all of his opponents combined. In response, 
South Carolina seceded on December 20.  
 
Throughout the secession crisis, Jefferson Davis remained in Washington, 
D.C., with his Senate colleagues. Exhibiting a shared sense of the Calhoun’s 
mystical attachment to Union, he strenuously worked to arrive at a last minute 
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compromise that would upset the fire-eaters. The effort marked, Davis said, “my 
willingness to make any sacrifice to avert the impending struggle.”28 Uniting with 
other Southern men like Georgia’s Robert Toombs behind Kentucky relic John J. 
Crittenden, who still claimed to be a Whig despite the party’s nonexistence, Davis 
and Toombs gave Crittenden a final chance at a last ditch compromise to placate 
Deep South secessionists. In the end, the Republican Party, carried to victory on 
its free soil platform, refused to palliate its policies before assuming control of the 
government. Mississippi joined South Carolina on January 9. With his position in 
the Senate no longer tenable, Jefferson Davis appeared before his colleagues on 
January 10 to expound on his state’s action. Davis defended secession as a 
reaction to the fundamental overturning of American liberty. Davis believed the 
time for compromise had passed, “To-day…it is my purpose to deal with events,” 
he enunciated.  The Mississippian called the preservation of present liberties the 
goal of a Southern Confederacy. Davis expressed disbelief at the unfolding of 
events in Charleston, where “perfidious” actions were leading the nation to war 
against a state. This he could not conceive of as anything but demonstrative of the 
anarchy that foreshadowed Republican government. He protested, “We are left 
drifting loosely, without chart or compass.”29 Republican victory, Davis implied, 
resulted in disorder. 
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To stave of the dangerous effects of instability, especially acute in a slave 
society, Davis defended the right of secession as a legitimate reclamation of 
sovereignty to preserve Constitutional liberty. This was no revolution, but an 
attempt at conservation. Davis lamented the loss of Calhoun, who he credited 
with “telegraphic intelligence.” Calling him “the wisest man I ever knew,” Davis 
spoke of how Calhoun had foretold of the present trials, though it occurred 
outside of the national boundaries that Calhoun sought to sustain.30 Davis 
defended the actions of his state and the Deep South by invoking the sanctioned 
wisdom of the Founders, placing secession at the end of a lineage of democratic 
acts. “Mr. Madison put the rights of the people over and above everything else,” 
Davis affirmed. Quarreling with Sen. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, whose 
hostility toward planters led him to speak of secession in violent, revolutionary 
terms, Davis contended that the South sought a pacific separation. The act of 
seceding marked a peaceful, legitimate resumption of sovereignty. “The people 
have never separated themselves from those rights which our fathers had 
declared to be inalienable,” Davis asserted. The very act of moving through state 
conventions and electoral politics placed Southerners in league with the 
Founder’s original steps toward independence. 
 Davis urged his colleagues to consider the threat posed by Republican 
ideology. By denying the South the right to spread slavery into the territories, 
Davis blamed Republicans for subverting the purpose of government to advance 
a single and ahistorical ideology. It was not overreach of the federal government, 
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but the selective application of the government’s powers that upsets Davis. The 
Republican platform failed to uphold the Constitution’s equal provisions. He 
bitterly protested against its designs to selectively favor one section over another. 
“It is by destroying the Constitution; by pulling down the political temple; by 
forming a consolidated government,” that forced the South to act. Davis 
protested the concentration and application of federal power to serve the 
interests of free soil ideology over slavery. To reinforce his point about the 
conservative desire of Confederates to do no more that sustain the Constitution, 
Davis told his colleagues, “It will be our purpose to commence the erection of 
another [government] on the same plan on which our fathers built this…in 
accordance with the Constitution, and in defense of the principles on which that 
Constitution rests.”31 In Davis’ estimation, the South needed government, and 
eagerly desired its protection. For that aim, the seceded states proclaimed to 
carry on the government of their fathers, enshrining liberties bestowed by racial 
inequality. Whether two nations proclaiming themselves American could coexist, 
Davis informed his colleagues, “is in your power.”32 
   
Secession commissioners fanned out across the South urging fellow 
southern states to join in the movement. Despite their various geographical and 
political backgrounds, the commissioners spoke to a commonality and brought a 
common message. Whether addressing a Deep South state like Georgia or a 
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border state like Kentucky, the commissioners advanced secession as a legitimate 
resumption of sovereignty and offered a Confederate purpose: to preserve racial 
inequality as a defining feature of their democratic society. J.L.M. Curry of 
Alabama, a gifted lawyer and politician, set the tone by urging his home state to 
secede. Curry spoke with clarity and persuasiveness, which resulted in his 
broadside enjoying republication throughout the South. In calling for separation, 
Curry offered a definition of a prospective Confederacy by reiterating the words 
of the court ruling Johnson v. Tompkins: “’The foundations of the Government 
laid and rest on the right of property in slaves.’”33 It was not the last iteration of 
the court’s ruling in the Confederacy. In using the language of the court, Curry 
argued that “the framers of the Government indulged in no sickly sentimentality 
or false philosophy” that sought racial equality.34 Indeed, he argued that such 
conclusions were out of step with original intent. The Founders’ government was 
not one of free soil and free men, and neither would the Confederate’s. The 
Founders understood the political and social value of slavery. A prospective 
Confederacy, Curry promised, would fix that understanding for all time.  
In his appeal to the Upper South Stephen Hale of Alabama similarly 
affirmed secession as the desire to protect racial inequality. In his letter to 
Kentucky Governor Beriah Magoffin, Hale defended resuming sovereignty upon 
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states’ rights. But he quickly proceeded to explain the purpose of a Confederate 
government. “Slaves are recognized both as property and as a basis of political 
power by the Federal compact, and special provisions are made by that 
instrument for their protection as property.” In this respect, maintaining racial 
inequality proved paramount for white Southerners. “African slavery,” Hale 
affirmed, “forms an important element of their political power, and constitutes 
the most valuable species of property.”35 Indeed, the two were inseparable and 
formed an essential component of white southerners’ definition of liberty.36 In 
this regard, Lincoln’s election justified secession because it threatened to 
overturn the racial principles upon which the South’s conception of liberty and 
political power were based. Republican rule constituted “the inauguration of new 
principles and a new theory of government” that stripped Southerners of political 
and economic power, Hale argued. To reinforce his point, he beseeched the 
governor to consider the social ramifications of a biracial future: 
What Southern man, be he slave-holder or non-slave-holder, can without 
indignation and horror contemplate the triumph of negro equality, and see 
his own sons and daughters in the not distant future associating with free 
negroes upon terms of political and social equality, and the white man 
stripped by the heaven-daring hand of fanaticism of that title to 
superiority over the black race which God himself had bestowed? 
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Will the South, he rhetorically concluded, “resume the powers delegated to the 
Federal government, and, as sovereign States, form other relations for the 
protection of their citizens and the discharge of the great ends of government?”37 
The great ends were not revolutionary, but conservative and they called upon 
embracing the power of government to enshrine such purpose. Indeed, Hale 
called it the “great end of government.” To guarantee such an understanding for 
all time, he sought Kentucky’s partnership. 
In crafting an appeal to the most crucial state in the Deep South – Georgia 
- William Harris of Mississippi appealed to the Empire State by offering racial 
inequality as foundational to Southerner’s liberty and political power. Defending 
secession to Georgians, Harris argued that the Union “…now demand[s], equality 
between the white and negro races, under our Constitution.” Reiterating this 
refrain, he asserted that the federal “government stands totally revolutionized in 
its main features, and our Constitution broken and overturned.” Though he did 
not define those “main features,” Harris made clear his thoughts when he 
proclaimed, “Our fathers made this a government for the white man, rejecting the 
negro, as an ignorant, inferior, barbarian race, incapable of self-government, and 
not, therefore, entitled to be associated with the white man upon terms of civil, 
political, or social equality.”38 In Harris’ estimation, the seceding states of the 
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Deep South acted to preserve this essential racial underpinning of American 
democracy; it required a government of their own to protect such understanding. 
Georgia politician Howell Cobb, the former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, governor, and Secretary of the Treasury, seconded Harris’ plea. 
In defining the purpose of secession, Cobb spoke plainly, “I allude to the doctrine 
of negro equality.” Repudiating the designs of Lincoln and the Republican Party, 
Cobb protested the distortion that turned the Declaration of Independence into a 
document heralding equality. “’All men are born equal,’ has been perverted from 
its plain and truthful meaning, and made the basis of a political dogma which 
strikes at the very foundations of the institution of slavery,” he protested.39 In his 
plea for independence, Cobb pledged nothing more than a continued reverence 
for the Constitution. Indeed, his argument was in favor of government. He sought 
nothing more than to continue traditional Constitutional guarantees. The 
“Constitution of Washington and Madison” would guide the South and its people 
in this new endeavor, for “It is not the Constitution and the laws of the United 
States which need amendment, but the hearts of the northern people.” Cobb 
could see no other means to maintain white liberty.40 
The diminutive Alexander H. Stephens stood in relatively lone opposition 
to secession. Secession represented a particularly grave threat to Stephens 
because he did not trust the motives of the fire-eaters and believed they 
needlessly upset the stability and tradition of government for unclear purposes. 
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Secession, in Stephens’ opinion, brought out the base instincts and ambitions of 
Southern politicians. Despite a frail appearance, Stephens proved a formidable 
politician. Disparaging secessionists, Stephens wrote to a friend, “The truth is 
that ultra men do not desire any redress of these [sectional] grievances. They 
would really obstruct indirectly any effort to that end” and “are for breaking up.” 
Stephens believed nothing short of disunion would satisfy their consuming 
hatred of the North. The fire-eaters, he continued, are “tired of the government … 
they have played out, dried up, and want something new.”41  Complaining to J. 
Henly Smith, Stephens wrote, “We have but little public virtue, heroic virtue or 
patriotism now amongst our public men. They are generally selfish, looking not 
to country but to individual aggrandizement.”42 Looking askance at fire-eaters, 
Stephens saw vanity and danger abounding. As a result, he warily guarded 
against allowing the men who most energetically desired a new government to 
lead the South. 
 The presidential campaign provided Stephens particular evidence of the 
madness in Southern political counsels. For Stephens, Douglas proved the best 
national candidate on the issue of slavery. Douglas shared the South’s conviction 
that natural law fixed the status of black as inferior to white, and he could not 
understand why the South forsook Douglas, the only candidate who could defeat 
Lincoln. For Stephens, this development reinforced his view in the rashness of 
the fire-eaters’ course. “Exclusive selfishness and personal ambition had taken 
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possession of all,” he could only conclude. 43 When a rumor appeared during the 
campaign that Stephens considered supporting a candidate other than Douglas 
he bitterly denounced any association with the fire-eating crowd. “Never could I 
do such a thing until I became as inconsistent and as regardless of my public 
record and long cherished principles as those who put upon [us] this 
nomination.”44 Stephens, the former Whig and recent Democratic convert 
supported Douglas to the bitter end over Southern Democrat John C. 
Breckenridge of Kentucky. 
The prospect of a government untethered from conservative values most 
unsettled Stephens. Little Aleck discerned the feature as the most alarming 
aspect of the secessionists’ chimerical designs.  Stephens’ conservative instincts 
reinforced his veneration for the United States Constitution for its traditional 
grants of liberty, in his estimation, constituted the greatest bulwark against the 
ideological threat of the Republican Party. “…I consider slavery much more 
secure in the Union than out of it if our people were but wise, ” he wrote to a 
friend, revealing himself a devotee of Calhoun. Succinctly summing up his 
appreciation for authority rooted in tradition, Stephens concluded, “We have 
nothing to fear from anything so much as unnecessary changes and revolutions in 
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government. The institution is based on conservatism.”45 To forsake the 
Constitution, in Stephens’ estimation, endangered the South.  
Stephens attempted to impart such wisdom to his colleagues in the 
Georgia assembly. Inveighing against those who passionately desired secession, 
Stephens delivered his argument in a quiet manner. Marking a notable contrast 
to the bellowing demeanor of the previous speaker T.R.R. Cobb, who in 
mimicking Patrick Henry cried out “’Liberty or death,’” Stephens urged 
sensibility: “My object is not to stir up strife, but to allay it; not to appeal to your 
passions, but to your reason.” After this call for dispassionate deliberation, 
Stephens urged the consideration of a subject of chief importance, conservatism. 
“Good governments,” he argued, “can never be built up or sustained by the 
impulse of passion.” Therefore, “Let us…reason together.”46 Stephens examined 
the motivation for secession as well as the rights to be gained by Georgia under 
an independent Southern government. He did not doubt that the presidential 
election marked a reversal in Southern fortunes. But, prospective dangers were as 
of yet mere phantasms. Stephens beseeched the assembly to appreciate such a 
perspective, “Let us not, on account of disappointment and chagrin at the reverse 
of an election, give up all as lost; but let us see what can be done to prevent a 
wreck.” When an audience member yelled out that the “ship has holes,” Stephens 
implored the crew to plug the leaks, not abandon the vessel with its “richest 
cargo.” Entreating the audience to repair rather than scuttle, Stephens 
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proclaimed, “that this Government of our Fathers, with all its defects, comes 
nearer the objects of all good Governments than any other on the face of the 
earth.” 
Stephens thought it foolish to forsake the government upon the dubious 
grounds of a legitimately elected president. “In my judgment, the election of no 
man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any State to 
separate from the Union.” The liberties at stake were of such import that he 
thought Georgia “ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution 
of this country.” To act impetuously placed the South in the wrong. Until such a 
time that the South’s constitutional guarantees were explicitly threatened, 
Stephens regarded secession as foolish and illegal. Even if Lincoln did move 
against the South, Stephens explained, he would be thwarted at every step by 
Constitutional restrictions. Channeling Calhoun’s concurrent power of the 
minority, Stephens pointed to the fact that the South still possessed numbers in 
the House of Representatives that could thwart any unconstitutional ambitions 
on the part of Lincoln and his party. The same held true for the Senate, where, 
Stephens observed, the South still enjoyed a four-person majority. In this regard, 
even if Lincoln harbored monarchical plans to destroy Southern liberties he 
would represent the feckless George III, who in having to ask a parliament of 
Whigs for a government, ended up “with a cabinet utterly opposed to his views.” 
If the South would unite in a calculating and deliberate manner, both the Union 
and the South’s historical constitutional liberties could be saved.47 Unable to 
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conceive how slavery and the South’s cherished understanding of racial 
inequality could be safer outside of the Constitution, Stephens asked the 
members present if their were any better government on earth. Toombs, lurking 
behind the podium, cried out “England!”48 Stephens calmly rebuked his friend. 
England, in his estimation, is second best. The Constitution best enshrined 
Southern liberties through uninterrupted tradition. 
Stephens never doubted the futility of his stand. “I see no ray of hope,” he 
told a friend, and predicted that his state would follow the fellow Deep South 
states.49 Stephens delivered one last address urging reconsideration in the name 
of conservatism, but it was abridged and altogether uninspired. Despite his 
minority sentiment, Stephens affected the sentiment in Georgia as evidence by 
Georgian secessionists turning to Governor Joseph Brown to rally support. A 
remarkable politician, Brown appeared on the political stage from out of 
seemingly nowhere at the time, north Georgia. From a yeoman family, Brown 
possessed remarkable intelligence and worked his way through college and then 
law school. Once he emerged on the political stage, he swiftly climbed the ranks. 
A state senator at twenty-eight, Brown continued his ascent by becoming a 
presidential elector at thirty and a judge just three years later. In 1857, as a dark 
horse Democratic candidate for governor, Brown beat out the more experienced 
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Benjamin Hill. He was just thirty-six. In 1859, the former ploughboy enjoyed 
reelection as governor.50  
Now, on the eve of the secession crisis, the state’s secessionist leaders 
turned to the political wunderkind to breathe new energy into their sagging sails. 
Brown’s appeal appeared in Milledgeville’s Federal Union on December 9 and 
spoke to three direct points: the election of Lincoln as sufficient to secede, the 
undoubted result of abolition as an effect of Republican rule, and the social ills of 
racial equality. In a direct nod to Stephens, Brown first admitted that the election 
of Lincoln alone is “not sufficient cause for a dissolution of the Union.” But 
whereas Stephens spoke of the candidate, Brown addressed the Republican 
Party’s ideology. He viewed Lincoln not as a feckless tyrant but as a 
“representative of a fanatical abolition sentiment – the mere instrument of a 
great triumphant political party.” As the embodiment of a hostile ideology, 
Lincoln’s election was a grave threat, Brown argued. He advanced that the 
principles the president-elect espouses “are deadly hostile to the institution of 
Slavery, and openly at war with the fundamental doctrines of the Constitution of 
the United States.” Brown too believed in the protections of the Constitution and 
viewed their perpetuity as paramount, but with a candidate who threatened 
slavery and the “fundamental doctrines” of government, he felt the menace more 
pressing than ever. For that reason alone he argued that the South take the reigns 
of its own government. 
 As a product of the laboring class, Brown argued forcefully and at length 
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that abolition would harm the South’s white laboring class. Trumpeting the 
manner in which racial inequality promoted prosperity among all among white 
citizens, Brown embedded his argument in opposition to racial equality by 
employing George Fitzhugh and John C. Calhoun’s economic critiques of 
capitalism.51 He decried the vulgar degradations that white laborers would 
experience as a result of emancipation. Thrust into a marketplace with 4,500,000 
new laborers, Brown saw economic catastrophe and societal decline. “It is 
sickening to contemplate the miseries of our poor white people under these 
circumstances,” Brown wrote. Pivoting from economic uplift to the destruction of 
social unity, Brown proclaimed all white people, even laborers, “are a superior 
race, and they feel and know it. Abolish slavery, and you make the negroes their 
equals, legally and socially (not naturally, for no human law can change God’s 
law)….”52 Thus, in Brown’s estimation, preserving racial inequality constituted 
the fundamental cause for which the South resisted the North. Returning to his 
cherished notion of the government’s fundamental principles, Brown appealed 
for a government that sustained white liberty. Poor white Southerners, Brown 
proclaimed, “love the Union of our fathers, and would never consent to dissolve it 
as long as the constitution is not violated, and so long as it protects their 
rights….” Those rights, Brown argued, were inexplicably not just the rights to own 
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slaves, but to participate and enjoy the political and social liberties denied to 
inferior races. That was the wellspring and purpose of American democracy. In 
order to “protect and preserve our liberties to the last generation,” Brown urged 
the establishment of a sovereign Southern government.53 
 Just two days after Brown’s appeal appeared, T.R.R. Cobb, brother to 
Howell, wrote to the Daily Federal Union to urge Georgia to coordinate with 
fellow Southern states. Even before Georgia seceded, Cobb envisioned a Southern 
nation. Expressing the wish that the Southern states acting upon their own would 
soon move together in the name of greater efficacy, Cobb informed the paper 
that, “while I am free to admit that each State must act for herself and resume by 
her own independent will her delegated sovereignty, yet I conceive that it is 
possibly and highly desirable that all of them should assign some common day 
for such resumption.” In this regard, Cobb did not want a delay from transferring 
from one Union into another. States’ rights are hardly more than foil for throwing 
off the yoke of a government that the South did not control. As to the shape of the 
Southern Confederacy, Cobb spoke clearly and compellingly in favor of a federal 
government. “I have said that the new Confederacy should be based upon the 
Constitution of the United States.” The reasoning? “Our people love that 
Constitution…” he pledged, and suggested that delegates be chosen to work on a 
few necessary changes.54 The few changes of which he spoke, he left open. Cobb 
strongly desired to move almost immediately into another union, from one 
federal government to another. Georgia seceded on January 19 at the behest of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53Milledgeville Daily Federal Union, December 9, 1860. 
 
54 Milledgeville Daily Federal Union, December 11, 1860. 
	   47	  
men like the Cobb brothers and Joe Brown, and over the objection of Alexander 
Stephens.  
With Georgia adding her star to the secessionist standard, Louisiana took 
up deliberation. Of all the Deep South states, Louisiana proved most 
impermeable to fire-eating rhetoric. Louisiana’s sugar masters depended on the 
federal tariff for prosperity. This economic tie to federal programs generally 
insulated the state against the fire-eating denunciations of the Union, but it did 
not entirely tamp down the rhetoric. On Thanksgiving Day, as the state looked to 
its neighbors and pondered its fate, Benjamin Palmer took to the pulpit in New 
Orleans to urge immediate action. Palmer’s sermon is, beneath the rhetoric, a call 
to preserve conservative ends. Asserting that secession enjoyed the sanction of 
Providence, Palmer famously enunciated that in its execution, “we defend the 
cause of God and Religion.” Yet even Palmer, full of fire and brimstone, spoke of 
conservation, not revolution. “Thus, if we cannot save the Union, we may save the 
inestimable blessings it enshrines; if we cannot preserve the vase, we will 
preserve the precious liquor it contains.”55 For Palmer, secession conserved a 
government that protected slavery and racial inequality. In the South’s quandary, 
he counseled action in the name of preservation. Late in January, Louisiana took 
up Palmer’s entreaty. 
Amidst the backdrop of secession’s march through the Deep South, Texas’ 
John H. Reagan, Davis’ future Postmaster General, briefly took to the floor of the 
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United States House to expound on the South’s course of action. Reagan 
addressed the present crisis as a result of the Republican Party’s ideology and 
rhetoric. Despite such denunciations, Reagan continued to speak glowingly of the 
Constitution. While knowing the futility of his unionist sentiment, he 
nevertheless expressed a hopeless desire to reconcile. But Reagan could not abide 
the Republican’s ideology, “Free negro equality.” Such a policy, Reagan objected, 
“would make us re-enact the scenes of revolution and anarchy we have so long 
witnessed and deplored in the American Government to the south of us” in Haiti. 
The Deep South had few options when faced with such overt threats. To that 
effect, “I stand here today to say that if there be a southern State, or a southern 
man even, who would demand, as a condition for remaining in this Union, 
anything beyond the clearly specified guarantees of the Constitution of the United 
States as they are, I do not know if it.” Reagan attested to Southerners’ reverence 
for the United States government. “We do rightly estimate the value of the 
blessings of this Government. We have loved and cherished the Union,” he 
affirmed.56 Reagan remained in favor of government and exhibited appreciation 
for the protections that federal power provided. But if the South could not win 
protections from the present government, then he felt it necessary to establish 
one of their own. No such guarantee proved possible and Texas, the final Deep 
South state in the Union, seceded on the first of February. 
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As the Charleston Mercury enunciated on December 26, secession 
constituted the preservation of conservative liberty. It was not an action to 
revolutionize government, or reform political behaviors. Rather, it sought to 
preserve a racially ordered, fixed society where political power, economic 
prosperity, and social harmony were safely in the hands of Southerners. 
Secessionists defined the South’s aims as conserving traditional authority and 
institutions, not advancing new ones. The Southern people resumed sovereignty 
through conventions identical to that of the Founders. At the heart of their desire, 
secessionists sought to preserve the South’s liberties and Constitutional 
guarantees - this was not a movement that desired revolution or reform. 
 In responding to the perceived threat of Republicanism, Southerners 
conformed to the antecedent framework envisioned by Calhoun. Although 
Calhoun labored mightily to preserve the South’s influence within the Union, in 
the act of independence Southern secessionists followed Calhoun’s lead by 
attempting to unite regional interests under a common government. Despite 
forsaking the Union, secessionists retained a belief that the Constitution 
constituted a powerful instrument for protecting and advancing Southern 
interests by controlling the government, not repudiating its legitimacy. Indeed, 
they spoke of the desire to preserve current forms of government. As Cobb plainly 
stated, “’All men are born equal has been perverted from its plain and truthful 
meaning…” To recover American democracy’s essential meaning, Cobb and 
others proposed to set up a government that protected slavery and understood 
democracy through its grants of racial inequality. Indeed, they argued, the 
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affixing and clarifying of the racial limits of the body politic preserved the vision 
of the Founders.57  
 Rather than constituting an anomalous event, the deep-seated 
secessionist impulse to preserve the Constitution, with its racially unequal grants 
of liberty and sanction of slavery, guided independence-minded Southerners. 
They did not desire to overturn the political culture, which in the years since had 
expanded suffrage beyond property restrictions but still maintained a strict 
division when it came to race and gender. As Jefferson Davis enunciated, the 
Declaration of Independence declared the Founders’ desire to establish a 
democratic republic void of inheritance, aristocracy and monarchy. It did not 
seek equality. During his farewell in the Senate, Davis reiterated his argument 
that the government of the Founders was a government of racial inequality, for 
the Constitution sanctioned white mastery, providing not just economic 
protections for slave ownership, but enhanced political representation. To 
preserve the definition of American liberties as bestowed by the Constitution, 
Davis justified secession as an act of continuation, indeed preservation. 
Secessionists argued that subverting the Constitution’s explicit guarantees 
of slavery subverted American democracy’s roots intended grants of liberty and 
revolutionized the Constitution’s meaning. With Seward’s proclamation that the 
United States Constitution offered no protection to slavery, and furthermore that 
the Republican Party was prepared to govern from a “higher law” than the 
nation’s guiding document, secessionists felt as though they were helpless to 
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avert a revolution in definition that threatened to subvert their political, 
economic, and social order. To frustrate such plans, Davis, Cobb, and the lot of 
secessionists lent support to an independent South to preserve the purportedly 
time-honored, original intent of American liberty and democracy. Stephens, the 
most reluctant among them with his desire to sustain a Union under the 
Constitution owing to his conservatism, even held racial inequality as a 
fundamental truth and expression of the government’s sanction and protection of 
white liberty. As a slave owner, Stephens sanctioned white mastery but had 
envisioned guarding such practices by appealing to the Constitution. He did not 
forsake government. Rather, like Calhoun, Stephens sought the government’s 
protections. As the Charleston Mercury proclaimed, secessionists sought to 
preserve the notion of conservative liberty. Such a definition remained rooted in 
the Constitution, which sanctioned white mastery and protected slavery, and as 
secessionists argued, defined the body politic according to racial grants. To affix 
such an understanding of government, secessionists sought independence to 
preserve their understanding of the federal republic, its grants, protections, and 
instrumentalities. They did not repudiate the government or the Constitution, but 
rather sought to perpetuate and direct its power for the protection of their vision 
of the American republic. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
“WE HAVE A LIGHT” 
 
To meet the challenge of building a government anew the seceded states of 
the Deep South came together at Montgomery, Alabama, the first week of 
February. Ostensibly called to draft a constitution and elect provisional 
executives, the convention quickly superseded its intended purview. Mirroring 
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the delegates at Montgomery assumed 
powers beyond their charge to constitute the most powerful legislative body 
convened by self-proclaimed Americans. With the United States Constitution as 
their template, the convention set to work drafting a Confederate Constitution. 
Avowedly imitative, the delegates accomplished this chief task without tarrying. 
With a familiar constitutional framework in hand, the convention elected 
Jefferson Davis and Alexander Stephens as provisional executives, demonstrating 
their clear desire to empower reputable leaders. Reconvening as a Provisional 
Congress, the men who worked to cement conservative principles in the Southern 
government guaranteed that they would see their imitative plans through the 
initial stages of the Confederacy. 
Almost immediately, the crisis over Fort Sumter tested the newly 
constituted nation and revealed the Confederacy’s federal mimicry. Davis, 
worried about the status of the fort from the moment he resigned his seat in the 
United States Senate, feared that South Carolinians or Union troops would start a 
war. Upon his selection as provisional president, Davis immediately wrote to 
South Carolina Governor Francis Pickens, stressing the need for coordination 
between state and federal governments. Soon after Davis’ inauguration the 
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Confederate Congress, with a powerful Constitution at their behest, nationalized 
the Palmetto Guard to bring South Carolina’s militia under federal control. Thus, 
the Confederate Congress utilized the provisions of the Confederate Constitution 
to exert federal authority before the first fighting. And Governor Pickens, 
understanding this essential fact, acceded to Davis’ authority. The Confederacy 
set off into the responsibility of time with an intentionally powerful federal 
government to protect Confederate conceptions of liberty and democracy and to 
safeguard the independence of the nation. 
Many scholars viewed the Confederate Constitution as an expression of 
secessionist state’s right principles1. More recent works have questioned that 
interpretation. As Donald Nieman argues, the influence of republicanism is the 
most salient feature of the Confederate Constitution.2 Accordingly, he concludes, 
“the spirit that animated Confederate Constitutional reform, far from being 
distinctly southern, was well within the mainstream of the American 
Constitutional tradition.”3 Recent works have moved away from this conclusion 
to sharpen the differences between the Confederate and United States 
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Constitutions. George Rable characterizes the convention and its Constitution as 
a clear delineation between Union and Confederate that addressed Southerners’ 
longstanding concerns with political corruption. Rable argues that the 
Montgomery Convention and Confederate Constitution highlight the South’s 
uniqueness by reflecting its peculiar political regional concerns. The result, writes 
Rable, is a “distinctly Southern republic.”4  
Stephanie McCurry’s most recent treatment of the Confederate 
Constitution overlooks the convention, instead focusing on the Confederacy’s 
elite and their pronouncements.  McCurry, advancing the general theme of the 
Confederacy as an anomaly, argues that the Confederate Constitution is more 
than distinctly Southern. In McCurry’s assessment, the chief influences are not 
republicanism or state’s rights, but an obsession with slavery. “The new 
Confederate Constitution left no doubt that slavery was the foundation of the new 
republic; it was a proslavery Constitution for a proslavery state.”5 McCurry 
concludes, the “Confederates’ vision of a perfected republic of white men was 
something new unto this world, the only explicitly proslavery nation-state any 
agrarian elite ever attempted to build in the modern world.”6 Such assessment 
casts the Confederate Constitution, which excluded slaves and women from the 
body politic, as a most unnatural, reactionary episode in the antebellum political 
landscape.  
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The Montgomery Convention constitutes an important chapter in the 
history of the Confederacy. The deliberations among the elite at the convention 
reveal their intention to begin anew by perpetuating the old. The secessionist 
delegates did not exhibit a problem with government. Rather, they sought to 
imitate the United States Constitution to preserve its power under their own 
government, not to fundamentally reject or revise its provisions, definitions, and 
supremacy. Preserving the Constitution’s grants, structure, and liberties required 
rebuffing the extremist designs of men like Robert Barnwell Rhett, who desired to 
advance a historically anomalous, unabashed slave empire replete with a 
resurrected international slave trade and full political representation, rather than 
three-fifths, for slaveowners. His fire-eating designs would have marked a 
departure, but his vision did not achieve reality owing to the evident 
unwillingness of the delegates to adopt fundamental changes to their definition 
and understanding of purpose of American governance, democracy, and liberty. 
Sectional issues prompted some constitutional reforms at Montgomery. 
However, most disputes originated not with secession, but with the lack of 
specificity emanating from the compromises of 1787. Confederate framers 
reformed the executive branch to eradicate the undue influences of partisanship, 
patronage, and electioneering. Such concerns were universal throughout the 
antebellum era, and the delegates’ solutions sought to empower officeholders to 
govern more effectively with the wellbeing of the nation in mind. The delegates 
approached the tariff with similar aspirations. To deal with that spark of sectional 
antagonism, the delegates prohibited legislation that privileged one aspect of the 
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economy over another. Although the delegates drew on episodes provoked by 
sectional concerns, these reforms sought to make government more functional, 
not more southern. By revisiting and addressing issues of political corruption, 
partisanship, and democratic campaigning, the delegates to Montgomery struck 
for reform, not revolution. They sought to fix government according to the 
supposed principles and definitions of the Founding generation. The 
advancement of clear definitions of the body politic and certain provisions of 
government did not fundamentally alter the purpose, power, or meaning of the 
government. Indeed, such an occurrence would have constituted the exact 
opposite motive of the majority of delegates. In the end the Confederate 
Constitution imitated the federal powers of the United States Constitution and 
even strengthened certain federal components, like the executive, which now 
enjoyed the line-item veto and a heightened control over national budgets. The 
intentional federal nature of the Confederacy is revealed by the independent 
South’s first test of national sovereignty, the siege of Fort Sumter. 
 
Although it was the first to secede, South Carolina was the last state to 
present its credentials on the morning of February 4 in Montgomery, Alabama. 
Governor Francis Pickens’ announcement introduced South Carolina’s delegation 
to the convention and instructed his state’s eight deputies to “submit on our part 
the Federal Constitution as the basis of a provisional government for such as shall 
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have withdrawn.”7 Forty two delegates from across seven states of the Deep South 
joined the South Carolinians in accordance with the general outline of Robert 
Barnwell Rhett’s plan for a convention. Each state sent a delegation 
corresponding to their representation in the former Congress.8 The “Father of 
Secession” Robert Barnwell Rhett headed the Palmetto State’s delegation. 
Although South Carolina constituted the heart of the movement, Georgia 
comprised its brains. Howell Cobb, who had served as governor and cabinet 
member among other posts, headed the Empire State’s delegation. He was, 
without doubt, one of the senior most politicians within the South. Georgia also 
sent Robert Toombs, former member of the House and Senate, and whispers of 
his ascension to the presidency circulated amongst the gossips at the Exchange 
Hotel in Montgomery. Toombs cut a remarkable and imposing figure. Upon 
meeting the formidable Georgian, J.L.M. Curry wrote, “Toombs was fascinating 
and bright, more suggestive and interesting than anyone I ever heard, except 
Calhoun.”9 Alexander Stephens considered his reacquainted friend genuinely 
brilliant. He has “brains enough,” Stephens gushed, “if its energy had been 
properly directed, to govern an empire.”10 In all, the Georgian delegation 
possessed strength in numbers with ten delegates and an enviable slate of 
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seasoned politicians. On the whole, the personalities of the Georgian delegation 
exhibited restraint, reverence for tradition, and a clear desire to act in as 
conservative a fashion as possible. Exerting an invaluable moderating presence at 
Montgomery the Georgia delegation proved vital to explaining the outcome of the 
convention. 
Despite opposing secession, Alexander Stephens found himself a delegate 
to the convention of seceded states. It was not a post he desired. But with the 
Empire State electing independence, the Georgia Assembly desired Little Aleck 
among those at the helm, evincing trust in his conservative instincts if not always 
following his lead. Before Stephens agreed to serve, he advanced a stipulation. A 
new Southern government, he insisted, must be modeled on the old. All 
throughout the debate over secession in Georgia, Stephens held the United States 
Constitution as the vital exposition and bulwark of Southern liberties. Now, he 
demanded that a Southern Confederacy, in form “be modeled as nearly as 
practicable on the basis and principles of the late Government of the United 
States of America.”11 Expressing uncertainty should this demand be rebuffed, 
Stephens won two resolutions that called for a continuation of governing 
arrangements. The new Southern government, Georgia decreed, ought to rest 
“upon the principles and basis of the Constitution of the late United States of 
America.”12 Stephens traveled to Montgomery possessing a formidable tool of 
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conservative influence. In fact, few men’s ideas were more determinative than 
Stephens’ conservative positions. 
Despite the concession in hand, Stephens’ gloomy disposition persisted, a 
reflection of his general mistrust of secessionists. Before leaving his plantation 
Liberty Hall, a richly revealing title that bespoke of Stephens’ mindset, he feared: 
“We shall become demons, and at no distant day commence cutting each other’s 
throats.”13 Earlier, he had written to J. Henly Smith of his distrust of the fire-
eaters’ selfish desires. “Our difficulties spring not from the gov’nt, its frame work 
or its administration so much as they do from the people, the leaders mainly.”14 
Now, Stephens constituted one of those leaders. “I shall go to Montgomery,” 
Stephens professed, and “do all I can to prevent mischief….”15 In his mind that 
meant frustrating the most extreme designs of the most base secessionists. He 
thought it “his duty to do all that he could to preserve and perpetuate the 
principles of our Federal System.”16 By definition Stephens’ aspirations were 
anything but revolutionary, and he most certainly did not harbor a motive to 
bring about a signal reordering of government along slave lines. He sought, more 
than anything, to embed the Southern Confederacy firmly within the United 
States Constitution and its governing tradition. 
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Of all the men present at the convention, Robert Barnwell Rhett possessed 
the most radical vision for a Southern Confederacy. Rhett exhibited ideas for a 
Confederacy that constituted its most potentially extreme definitions. His vision 
pushed aside concerns about how best to preserve American democracy in favor 
of advancing the Confederacy as synonymous with slavery. In December, just 
days before South Carolina severed itself from the Union, Rhett visited the British 
Consul in Charleston, Robert Bunch, to outline his radical vision. Posing as the 
leader of a not yet extant Confederacy, Rhett promised to extend Britain “free 
trade…with import duties of nominal amount” to curry favor with the mill and 
shipbuilding constituencies of Manchester and Liverpool. Believing in the 
supremacy of commerce, Rhett sought Bunch’s reaction. Bunch replied favorably 
“that as a matter of policy Great Britain…was much interested in the success of 
free trade.” But, while “agreeing in the main” on the policy of free trade, he raised 
a potential “difficulty of considerable magnitude” stemming from Rhett’s desire 
to renew the slave trade. Bunch iterated that “Great Britain viewed it with horror” 
and spoke to the seriousness of its antislavery conviction. At Bunch’s objection, 
Rhett replied crossly. He told the consul that a prospective Confederacy would 
never compromise on any issue over slavery since doing so “implied” it was “a 
moral evil and wrong” – a nonstarter for Southern politicians. After the meeting 
Bunch wired a report of the visit to Lord John Russell, Great Britain’s Foreign 
Secretary. Relaying Rhett’s arrogant belief in the indispensability of Southern 
cotton, Bunch stated, it is the “axiom that all their calculations are based upon.” 
He also informed Russell that despite raising the issue of Britain’s hostility to 
slavery, Rhett seemed dismissive. He “did not conceal that the feeling of the 
	   61	  
British Public was adverse to the system of slavery,” Bunch wrote, but 
nevertheless “saw no reason why that sentiment should stand in the way of 
commercial advantages.”17 
Rhett learned nothing from his conversation with Bunch, for he openly 
exhibited the same slavery-obsessed desires in Montgomery. Harboring 
aspirations to radically remake the seceded Southern states into an unabashed 
slave republic, he championed reopening the slave trade and eliminating the 
three-fifths clause in favor of full representation for slave ownership, radically 
strengthening slave owners’ influence in government. Rhett’s vision not only 
discounted the objections of Bunch, but the sentiments of his Montgomery 
colleagues. Such impolitic ideas were not unusual for the “Father of Secession.” 
As one newspaper surmised, Rhett is “all passion, excitement, and fire….”18 Even 
the admiring T.R.R. Cobb thought the South Carolinian possessed a “vast 
quantity of cranks and a small proportion of common sense.”19 Despite wishing to 
advance a radical vision, Rhett did not take others into his counsel nor did he 
solicit opinions. The other members of his delegation kept their distance, even his 
own cousin Robert Barnwell. Barnwell’s composure proved the opposite of his 
cousin - an observance not lost on Alexander Stephens. Recognizing Barnwell’s 
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sharp insights, moderation, and elocution, Stephens wrote, “He always has force 
in point in what he says – speaks with great precision and clearness as well as 
condensation.”20  
As Stephens agreeably discovered, most of the delegates conformed to the 
standard set by Barnwell. The seceded states in general sent a slate of skilled, 
conservative-minded men. Former cabinet members, congressmen, judges, and a 
previous governor filled out the ranks. Of the eventual fifty present, forty-two had 
college training. Forty-two similarly claimed the law and slave agriculture as their 
profession, while thirty-three of them considered themselves planters alone. As 
one historian observed, “Never in its history had the South seen such an assembly 
of brains, accomplishment, statesmanship, and property.”21 Of note, the largest 
slaveholders came from Louisiana. Four of the Bayou State’s sugar masters – 
Duncan F. Kenner, Alexander De Clouet, Edward Sparrow, and John Perkins – 
together owned an astounding 1,975 slaves. Kenner’s planation Ashland alone 
held 473 enslaved persons, making Kenner the largest slaveholder at 
Montgomery.22 As sugar masters, these planters possessed an important and 
often overlooked favorable stance toward federal power. With an evident stake in 
tariffs that kept Caribbean sugar out of the domestic market, sugar planters 
exhibited an abiding interest in maintaining federal power. Upon discerning the 
conservative nature of the delegates, Alexander Stephens wrote to his brother 
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Linton in an unusually upbeat manner: “There is more conservatism…than I 
expected to see, and this increases my hopes.”23 The coterie of planters, 
politicians, and lawyers did not harbor revolutionary desires or 
counterrevolutionary thoughts. Their motives, as they explained, sought to do no 
more than to continue in force the United States Constitution. Their problem was 
not with its provisions or explications its power, but rather with the growth of 
hostile interpretation governing the application of those powers. Fixing that 
aspect of governance involved removing uncertainty. The end goal retained and 
clarified the Constitution’s grants of liberty, with its sanction of slavery and white 
mastery. 
The night before the Convention’s formal opening, delegates gathered in 
the lobby of the Exchange Hotel for informal introductions. During the evenings’ 
socializing delegates offered cautious ideas on what they hoped to accomplish. 
The Charleston Mercury overheard William Harris of Mississippi convey that the 
Magnolia State appointed their present congressional representation to serve in 
the same capacity in the new Southern government.24 Therefore, his state desired 
to adopt the United States Constitution without delay, to elect a provisional 
executive – their own Jefferson Davis no doubt - and upon the completion of 
these acts to return home to allow the other six states to vote upon their 
congressional representation. De Clouet of Louisiana agreed with the thrust of 
Harris’ conservative plan. He stated that his delegation looked favorably upon 
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adoption of the United States Constitution and provisional executives without 
delay.25 Smith of Alabama signaled his sympathy for the Georgia Plan since his 
delegation welcomed any proposal that did not further unsettle voters.26  
 Stephens delighted in learning the sweep of these conversations. If Harris, 
De Clouet, and Smith spoke for their states, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Alabama’s plans accorded rather well with his conservative intentions. He did not 
wish to adopt a Constitution to send back to the states for revision, and then hold 
elections to ratify the Constitution and staff the government. Too much time 
would be wasted, and the uncertainty of electoral politics introduced a dangerous 
volatility at a time when the new government needed to project continuity and 
authority. Thus, despite the rhetoric of unanimity, democratic politics remained a 
consideration. Stephens, in lockstep with Toombs, thought that by transforming 
the convention into a congress, the nascent Confederacy could cement its 
conservative identity. Such an action ensured that in setting forth, the 
Confederacy would rely on a coterie of conservative politicians for support.27  
Nothing was more inimical to Rhett’s radical schemes than the majority 
holding opinions contrary to his visions. For the fire-eater, the calculating proved 
alarming. He wanted to launch a resplendent slave republic, not adopt the old 
Constitution. On February 4, Rhett’s Mercury charged the Montgomery 
Convention to adopt radical proslavery provisions. Casting a slave republic as a 
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utopia, the Mercury suggested that the fate of the South rested upon the 
deliberations at Montgomery: “It now remains to be seen whether, with slave 
institutions, the master race can establish and perpetuate free government. Shall 
the white man here enjoy liberty protected by law, and be free from impertinent 
interference with private rights – secure under his vine and fig tree.” Invoking the 
imagery of Micah’s biblical paradise, Rhett’s mouthpiece offered a vision of the 
Confederacy as a pastoral slave republic. The paper “trusted” that the “wisdom” 
of the delegates would see the desirability of such a plan, and sought “the speedy 
establishment of a permanent Central Government for the South – the grand 
desideratum of our position and its necessities.”28 Even Rhett sought a central, 
federal government. Yet, while his colleagues envisioned such an arrangement for 
an imitative, conservative government, Rhett envisaged a government for the 
purpose of championing a slave empire. 
As they set to work on the morning of February 4, the convention acted 
according to the general plan discussed the previous evening. Rhett bridled at his 
limited role. Howell Cobb was elected president, not Rhett. Assuming his post, 
Cobb spoke of the permanence of their action. “It is now a fixed and irrevocable 
fact. The separation is perfect, complete, and perpetual.”29 After selecting officers 
to staff their convention, Stephens moved forward with a bill to establish rules for 
the assembly. Cobb turned to Stephens to head up the committee, and the 
convention adjourned its business for the day.  
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The committee that set the rules for the convention proved important. 
Some states instructed their delegates to vote as a bloc, and so the committee had 
to adopt uniform rules that harmonized such a request. The committee returned 
to the convention the next day with rules adopted from the United States House 
and Senate, as well as a manual written by Thomas Jefferson.30 The desire to act 
and be seen as imitative is clear. Each state essentially voted as a bloc, for it 
enjoyed one vote. A tie counted as nay. If a state’s delegation voted in a tie, their 
ballot was nullified. Any assembly of states counted as a quorum. Upon approval, 
away they went, just as the Founding Fathers had done. After the adoption of 
rules, Christopher Memminger immediately proposed a bill to constitute the 
assembled body as a congress. At this, Stephens immediately rose to offer an 
amendment. He struck out the word convention in favor of “Congress.” The 
convention convened a closed session to debate the proposal. In end, 
Memminger’s bill met final approval and the Georgia Plan, with the help of 
Memminger, triumphed. The convention assumed the powers of a congress, all 
but assuring conservative vision and leadership. 31 
By February 6, Rhett sensed his vision for an explicit slave empire slipping 
away. Members of his own state delegation had moved against him, and it now 
appeared that in addition to usurping congressional powers for conservative 
ends, Mississippi planned to place Jefferson Davis at the head of the government. 
The policy of advancing a conservative Confederacy with establishment figures, 
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or the so-called “Washington policy” as Rhett termed it, provoked outrage. Rhett 
must have understood he had been outmaneuvered. Georgia had come seeking to 
preserve the Constitution and met a sympathetic audience. Rhett raged at the 
setback that turned the convention into a congress. He called the Empire State’s 
agenda a “usurpation of power,” and his paper thundered against supposedly 
secret deliberations on the part of Washington politicians to place Jefferson 
Davis at the helm of a government with an unaltered Constitution and a Congress 
of compliant conservatives.32  His Mercury decried, “The Conventions that 
created this Convention never supposed that it was not only to frame the 
fundamental law of a Provisional Government, but to be a part of it 
themselves.”33 For the convention to proclaim the power of a congress adopt the 
United States Constitution rendered secession meaningless. 
Rhett rhetorically thrashed at this nightmarish vision. His dream of an 
extremist Confederacy was being snuffed out by men who had opposed secession 
or who had endeavored until the last to keep the Union together. “Every principle 
of right government, and every dictate of policy, seems to be against the 
Mississippi scheme,” the Mercury protested. Behind the “absurdity” of adopting 
the United States Constitution and electing Davis, Rhett detected a “graver 
matter” that his conservative colleagues failed to appreciate: “Is it anything else 
than the policy of reconstructing the Union?” Bordering on the irrational, Rhett 
predicted that an unaltered Constitution would lead directly to reunion, thus 
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wiping away decades of his work. With a conservative government that only 
sought to preserve liberties rather than advance the most far-flung designs of 
slave mastery, Rhett proclaimed “After all, we will have run round the circle, and 
end where started.” If delegates did not awake to the menace of conservatism, 
Rhett promised, “The Union will be restored, with a few guarantees of 
negroes…and we will again enter upon the broad road of consolidation and ruin.” 
If the delegates had come to Montgomery to copy the United States Constitution 
and sit conservative delegates, “the Convention need not sit a week.34” Rhett’s 
prospective Confederacy constituted the historical anomaly, but that was not the 
Confederacy unfolding in Montgomery much to his chagrin. 
During the convention’s first week, things continued to go badly for Rhett 
and his extremist vision. As J.L.M. Curry wrote, the South “withdrew not from 
the Constitution, but from the wicked and injurious perversion of the Compact.”35 
That fact proved apparent as the convention set out to adopt a Constitution. 
Memminger acted as the man at the forefront once more, for he had apparently 
arrived in Montgomery with a draft constitution that proved nearly identical to 
the United States Constitution.36 He was selected to chair the twelve-man 
committee on drafting a provisional constitution, with Stephens joining. As 
Stephens later wrote, the twelve set out “to sustain, uphold, and perpetuate the 
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fundamental principles of the Constitution of the United States.”37 The 
committee finished their work relatively quickly, making only two changes. The 
president would enjoy the line-item veto, and the Congress could not enact a 
tariff that benefitted one industry over another. Originally, delegates advanced a 
ceiling on tariff rates, but Kenner squashed that notion and all acceded to the 
sugar master’s demands.38 With those two changes, the debate on the Provisional 
Constitution reached the floor on February 8.  
Rhett finally received an opportunity to imprint his designs. He advanced 
an amendment allowing for the reintroduction of the slave trade at the discretion 
of Congress. Couched in a conservative appeal, Rhett’s planned to grant Congress 
the “power to prohibit the importation of African negroes and slaves from any 
foreign country.” The United States had stopped the importation of slaves in 
1808, and Rhett sought to undo that abolition. His language fooled no one. As the 
votes were called, Rhett’s prospect for a resumption of the slave trade met a 
resounding defeat, with only South Carolina assenting. The centerpiece of Rhett’s 
hope was temporarily dashed. A Confederacy that did not proclaim its right to 
participate in and facilitate the slave trade was not a Confederacy that Rhett 
desired. There were to be no radical gestures or grand re-envisioning of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States 
(Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 1868) Volume II, 339. 
 
38 JCC, Vol. I, 35. 
 
	   70	  
Constitutional liberties. The convention cemented this fact on February 8 when 
after three readings it unanimously adopted the Provisional Constitution.39  
The main task accomplished, the convention transformed into an Electoral 
College to select provisional executives. Rhett and Yancey, although familiar 
names in secession, did not enjoy support for evident reasons. The two enjoyed 
reputations for disputation and radicalism, just the opposite of the convention’s 
desire. The most serious consideration for president came down to a choice 
between Davis and a member of the Georgia delegation. Stephens, having 
opposed secession, was out. That left Cobb and Toombs. Cobb did not want the 
post and said as much to his wife on February 6, “I greatly prefer not to be put 
there.”40 Between Davis and Toombs, Davis easily won.41 When the College cast 
its votes for vice president, Stephens enjoyed unanimous support as recognition 
for his service at the convention. The Confederacy now had a conservative 
provisional constitution coupled with similarly conventional politicians. In 
almost every facet, the convention rebuffed Rhett’s designs for a historically 
anomalous slave nation.  
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The news of the election arrived at Davis Bend late in the afternoon on 
February 9. Roughly one hundred miles south of Vicksburg at a great oxbow in 
the Mississippi River, Jefferson Davis and his older brother Joseph lived on 
expansive riparian plantations, a physical testament to the family’s rise from 
farmers with twelve slaves in 1816 to masters of some of the largest plantations in 
Mississippi. Joseph, Jefferson’s brother, mentor, and patron, bore much of the 
responsibility for raising the Davis family’s fortunes. A successful lawyer turned 
planter, Joseph’s plantation, Hurricane, encompassed 5,000 acres and a 
workforce of over 300 slaves, which made the elder Davis one of the largest slave 
owners in Mississippi and throughout the South. Befitting a rise in his fortune, 
Joseph’s success brought about a subsequent desire to match the family’s 
financial accomplishments in social and political circles, and he pinned his hopes 
on the younger Jefferson.  Joseph’s solicitude of Jefferson knew few bounds. 
Joseph underwrote Jefferson’s education at Transylvania College before he 
secured his nomination to West Point at the invitation of Secretary of War John 
Caldwell Calhoun. Jefferson Davis shipped off to war as an officer in the United 
States Army against Mexico in 1848, returning a hero for his actions at Buena 
Vista. Upon his homecoming, Joseph bequeathed Jefferson 900 acres, which he 
farmed with the labor of 40 slaves before building his own big house, Brierfield.42 
In the subsequent years Jefferson Davis lived up to his eldest brother’s hopes.  
After briefly serving in the United States House of Representatives, Jefferson 
Davis triumphed in an election to the Senate in 1847, where he served until 1851. 
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After a two-year respite from public office, President Franklin Pierce tapped 
Davis as his Secretary of War, and in 1857 Davis recaptured his seat in the Senate, 
which he relinquished upon the secession of Mississippi.  
Having just returned home from Washington with a stopover in Jackson, 
Mississippi, to organize the state militia, Jefferson and his wife Varina were 
tending to their rose garden when the messenger arrived. As Varina observed her 
husband, she thought the messenger a portent of ominous news. “He looked so 
grieved that I feared some evil had befallen our family. After a few minutes’ 
painful silence, he told me as a man might speak of a death,” she recalled in her 
memoirs.43 Before the convention Davis took the precaution of writing Alexander 
Clayton, one of his state’s delegates, to state that he did not desire a position 
within the civil government, intimating that he preferred command in the field. 
But, Davis closed by stating, “In this hour of my country’s severest trial [I] will 
accept any place to which my fellow citizens may assign me.”44 Ironically, the 
Confederacy featured a president who did not desire the post and a vice president 
who had opposed secession.  
Despite his professed lack of interest in the high office, few men were more 
suitable for the presidency than Jefferson Davis. In 1844 Davis launched his 
political career by campaigning for John C. Calhoun’s presidential bid as a 
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Democratic Elector from Mississippi. Davis continued to march in step with the 
“Arch Nullifier,” echoing Calhoun’s concerns about the dangers facing the South 
over the status of slavery in the territories. Following Calhoun’s lead, Davis 
opposed the Compromise of 1850 and advocated for the South to issue a national 
ultimatum over slavery’s perpetual protection.45 As the election of 1860 unfolded 
and the prospect of a divided electorate foretold the possibility of a Republican 
victory, Davis confronted the possibility of secession. Speaking to the voters of 
the Magnolia State, he pledged to abide by their wishes. Promising that if 
“Mississippi decides to submit to the rule of an arrogant and sectional North, 
then I will sit me down…and bear my portion of the bitter trial.” However, if 
Mississippi voters “decide to resist the hands that would tarnish her star on the 
National Flag, then I will come at your bidding.”46 Davis embodied the 
fundamental desire of the Montgomery Convention, conservatism. There were 
few politicians more respectable and esteemed in the Confederacy, and Davis’ 
political career projected legitimacy and stability. He was the ideal man for 
Stephens’ vision of a conservative government. 
By the time Jefferson Davis answered the call of his countrymen the 
convention, now a Provisional Congress, created a committee for the adoption of 
a permanent Constitution to send to the states for ratification. Rhett, having 
introduced the bill, finally enjoyed a modicum of success as he chaired the 
committee. He finally possessed the ability to advance his prospective vision for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Cooper, JD, American, 195. 
 
46 Quoted in Cooper, JD, American, 339. 
 
	   74	  
the nation. As the committee learned, his extremist views included limiting the 
Confederacy to slave owning states, striking out the three-fifths rule to strengthen 
the political power of slave owners, denying citizenship to those not born in the 
Confederacy, limiting the judiciary’s purview on congressional legislation, and 
lowering the threshold for constitutional amendments. It constituted a peculiar 
mix of purifying the Confederate nation by legislating exclusivity, while making 
the nation more democratic and constitutionally pliable now that it was secure in 
the strengthened hands of slave owners. As the Second Committee of Twelve set 
to work, Harris of Mississippi navigated a bill through the Provisional Congress 
to adopt the laws of the United States. Now, the Confederacy set off by not just 
aping the Constitution, but also the legal code of the former Union.47 A crucial 
development, one whose consequence is routinely overlooked yet far-reaching, 
continuing the legal code of the United States embedded old arguments into the 
Confederate nation. On February 28, Rhett presented a draft of the permanent 
Confederate Constitution to the Congress. At this, Congress attended the 
business of governing in the morning and reconvened as a convention in the 
afternoon.  
The first change was evident, for the newly penned preamble began, “We, 
the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and 
independent character, in order to form a permanent federal 
government…invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God – do ordain and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 JCC Vol. I, 41. 
	   75	  
establish Constitution for the Confederate States of America.”48 Although usually 
referred by scholars as evidence of the states’ rights composition of the 
Confederacy, the preamble also directly referenced a permanent federal 
government. J.L.M. Curry spoke with clarity about his conception of state’s rights 
and its attitude toward central authority. As Curry put it “The seceding States 
were not dissatisfied with the Constitution, but with its administration, and their 
avowed and manifest purpose was to restore its integrity….” Therefore, as the 
delegates set out to draft new Confederate arrangements, “The permanent 
Constitution was framed on the States Rights theory to take from a majority in 
Congress unlimited control….”49 Rebalancing congressional authority proved the 
paramount desire. And what the congress lost, the executive gained. Neither 
change strengthened the hand of the states in government. The Confederate 
Constitution rebalanced federal powers, but did not shift prerogatives to the 
states. 
While the reforms of the first day generally strengthened the hand of the 
executive, on the second day of revisions, Lawrence Keitt advanced South 
Carolina’s agenda to increase the political power of slave owners. Keitt’s 
amendment bluntly sought to accord slave master’s full political representation 
for their bondsmen, rather than three-fifths. Such reapportionment would 
radically strengthen the hand of planters in government. Here was a government 
for slave masters. Stephens immediately moved against the revision, and the next 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 JCC Vol. 1, 851. 
 
49 J.L.M. Curry, Civil History of the Government of the Confederate States of 
America… (Richmond: B.F. Johnson Publishing Company, 1901) 69. 
	   76	  
day, with the aid of Duncan Kenner, the convention buried Keitt’s revision “for 
the present” with the design to scuttle the proposal indefinitely. Exalting the 
political power of slave owners proved fundamentally impolitic. It not only 
threatened the Confederacy’s democratic aspiration but also might give pause to 
Border States thinking of rallying to the Confederate standard. And so, by March 
5 the delegates had arrived at the end of Article I with Keitt’s revision still 
sidelined. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas approved 
the article, with the three-fifths provision intact. Only South Carolina opposed. 
The motion to radically empower slave owners overwhelmingly failed.50 A final 
noted excision in the Confederate Constitution is the omission of the “general 
welfare” language, which some scholars see as the influence of state’s rights 
convictions. However, it is important to note the removal of general welfare was 
balanced by retention of the “necessary and proper” clause. Historian Charles 
Robert Lee Jr. argues that the simultaneous omission and preservation owed to 
delegates signposting for later judicial cases and wrote that the inclusion of 
necessary and proper emanated from “the belief that Southern judges would look 
closely when considering any legislation based on implied powers.”51 If that was 
the intent, the clause had the exact opposite effect desired by state’s rights 
activists, for the courts unanimously granted the federal government expansive 
purview and authority.52  
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The changes made to the executive branch followed the delegates’ general 
concerns with a reluctance to alter the fundamental structure of the United States 
Constitution. Evincing comfort with authority, the convention invested the 
executive with considerable control over the budget, requiring a majority vote of 
Congress for budgetary measures not introduced by the president. It also 
accorded the president with the line-item veto, an instrument of considerable 
power. Both provisions strengthened the fiduciary authority of the executive over 
the government, and the item veto presaged future constitutional reform.53 The 
convention also sought to furnish the executive with more control to stabilize and 
better manage the affairs of government. It concerned the universal problems 
inherent in republican structures that relied upon campaigning to elect office 
holders. To limit the influence of popular politics and reduce electioneering, 
Confederates hoped to focus the executive office on governance by lengthening 
the term of office to six years while prohibiting reelection.54 Theses changes 
addressed collective political concerns, rather than the parochial interests of the 
South alone.55 
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With these revisions complete, the Convention turned to a final remaining 
issue of import. How would the Constitution define the Confederacy? As an 
expansive, continentally focused American republic? Or would it turn inward, 
restricting citizenship and placing high thresholds for expansion by legislating 
exclusivity? This argument over the essential nature of the Confederacy stretched 
over three days in early March and marked the last effort of Rhett to advance a 
purified, unabashed, slave republic. For a convention notable for its alacrity, the 
time accorded the issue is remarkable. Arguing that allowing free states into the 
Confederacy invited the snake into the garden, Rhett sought a purified identity 
for the Confederate nation. The proposals he advanced limited the Confederacy 
to states with slavery, and citizenship to those born in the Confederacy. A united 
Georgian bloc of Stephens, Cobb, and Toombs opposed Rhett’s vision. They 
regarded the Confederacy as an expansive republic with evident desires to grow 
beyond present geographic boundaries. Smith of Alabama also thought of the 
Confederacy as an essentially expansionist republic. Indeed, he hoped that as a 
paragon of Constitutional government, “some of the great Northwestern States, 
watered by the Mississippi, will be drawn…to swell the number and power of this 
Confederation.”56 If Rhett’s proposals triumphed, the Confederate nation would 
certainly look different. As the debate unfolded, Cobb drew upon his legislative 
skills to hammer out a compromise, introduced by John Shorter of Alabama, 
which outlined an expansive and potentially heterogeneous Confederacy by 
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resolving that a majority of Confederate States approve new states, regardless of 
whether they met the standards advanced by Rhett.57 This compromise allowed 
both sides to claim success. The convention also decided as a counterpart that the 
federal government would provide legislation on citizenship and naturalization, 
which shifted standards to the federal level. The action appreciably extended the 
authority of the federal government and limited the power of the states to 
determine their composition. Ultimately, the dreams of continental expansion 
proved far more overpowering than the visions of a purified slave republic. These 
reforms retained fundamentally open citizenship standards in an imperially 
minded Constitutional democracy.58 
Having completed the revisions, Howell Cobb rose on March 11, to call the 
question of the Permanent Constitution. All states, in symbolic unity, signaled 
their approval. In just over one month the seven seceded states, with the United 
States Constitution as their template, advanced a thoroughly imitative 
Constitution. In most aspects, the Confederate Constitution reflected roughly 
eighty years of historical debates and proved characteristically American in its 
solutions. The Confederacy remained wedded to the principle of republicanism 
and democratic forms of government. It retained a bicameral legislature, an 
executive, and an independent judiciary. Perhaps most importantly, the 
Convention strengthened the powers of the executive and Congress over the 
states. It also shielded the presidency from electoral pressures while according it 
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considerable oversight over finance and the Congress. In the end, the revisions 
advanced refuted common perceptions of the Confederacy as a decentralized 
states’ rights government. The delegates also overwhelmingly turned back Rhett’s 
vision for a purified, anomalous slave empire. With these tasks complete, the 
Provisional Congress returned the Constitution to the states for ratification. 
That the delegates accomplished their tasks in six weeks demonstrated a 
clear desire to move beyond potentially destabilizing arrangements such as party 
identity and political factions. “Conciliation and harmony among ourselves are of 
the most vital importance,” Georgia Governor Joe Brown instructed.59 Wiping 
out the existence of political parties within their new nation, the secessionist 
delegates hoped to inaugurate a political system whose hallmark of accord, much 
like the government of the early republic, would prevent corruption. The spirit of 
unanimity made for a powerful and harmonious convention. As A.B. Roman 
wrote to his governor, “Action…will be the motto in this first stage of the 
proceedings.”60 As his letter intimated, speed necessitated consensus, a feature 
made possible by a widespread belief in the utility and desirability of powerful, 
imitative, federal government. Howell Cobb wrote to his wife to similarly boast of 
accord: “I can say to you that whilst there are differences of opinion, there will in 
the end be great unanimity and our final action will prove satisfactory. I feel the 
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greatest confidence in the entire success of our great movement.”61 Cobb’s 
prediction held. Though Rhett bridled at the setbacks and turned to his 
newspaper to amplify his discontent, the convention resulted in the creation of an 
evidently imitative United States republic. 
 
Jefferson Davis caught the ferry from Brierfield on February 11, stopping 
at Vicksburg to board the train for Montgomery amongst secessionist pageantry. 
Sixteen years earlier, Davis feted John C. Calhoun in the sentinel city on the 
Mississippi. Now, Davis bore Calhoun’s mantle. During the winding journey to 
Montgomery, the status of the Upper South and possible outbreak of hostilities in 
Charleston Harbor dominated Davis’s thoughts. Fort Sumter was controlled by 
US troops, and the incoming Republican president proved guarded. Davis 
confessed, “My quiet hours are mostly spent in thoughts of Charleston harbor.”62  
Neither Davis nor Abraham Lincoln could afford to let the impasse continue. 
Either the Confederacy did not constitute a nation capable of protecting its 
borders, or the Union no longer included the territory of the Southern states. The 
president-elect reached Montgomery late in the evening on February 16. Cannon 
fire greeted his arrival and a jubilant crowd gathered to hear Davis assure them 
that the separation was complete, the Confederacy perpetual. At the hotel, Davis 
encountered another assembly. This time Davis stressed the bonds among white 
southerners and assured them of the strength in a racial homogenous society. He 
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called out, “Fellow Citizens and Brethren of the Confederate States of America – 
for now we are brethren not in name, merely, but in fact – men of one flesh, one 
bone, one interest, one purpose, and of identity of domestic institutions.” The 
fitness of the Confederate course turned slavery, Davis pledged, from a former 
source of division into a source of social strength. Davis assured his countrymen 
that owing to the Confederacy’s maintenance of a racially divided society, “We 
have henceforth, I trust, a prospect of living together in peace, with our 
institutions a subject of protection and not of defamation.”63 Indeed, for Davis, 
slavery proved an example of Constitutional liberty and the South’s perpetuity of 
the institution marked its commitment to the racially divided society of the 
Founders. As evidence of the fitness of this decision Davis promised, “We shall 
have nothing to fear at home, because at home we shall have homogeneity.”64  
On the morning of February 18, Stephens’ forty-ninth birthday, the soon-
to-be vice president joined Jefferson Davis as they rode in an open carriage to the 
Alabama state house.  Davis’ inaugural outlined an optimistic, even energetic 
policy of government and affirmed the Confederacy’s imitative values. Speaking 
of their conservatism with pride, Davis avowed, “With a Constitution differing 
only from that of our fathers in so far as it is explanatory of their well-known 
intents.”65 With a restorative government free of political and social divisiveness, 
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Davis advanced a spirited policy: “To increase the power, develop the resources, 
and promote the happiness of the Confederacy….” The homogenous quality of 
society freed the Confederacy from governing policies inimical to their interests.  
Indeed, Davis affirmed the positive aspects of this powerful unity, outlining the 
new government’s policy in language reminiscent of a social compact. “The 
welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the whole.” As Davis arrived at the 
end of his remarks he returned to the broader theme of imitation. “We have 
changed the constituent parts, but not the system of government. The 
Constitution framed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States,” he 
pledged. To close, Davis championed the Confederacy’s united, purified 
Constitutional government and claimed an exceptional metaphorical attribute. 
Davis proclaimed to the assembled, “We have a light which reveals its true 
meaning.”66 The source of that light he left unspoken, but in conjunction with his 
sentiments of homogeneity and “well-known intents,” Davis ostensibly thought 
the light one of racial inequality, of a body politic limited to white mastery with 
the institution of slavery serving as an expression of liberty and a bulwark of 
virtue. That was the chief accomplishment of secession and the convention. The 
Confederacy was an American republic rooted in Constitutional liberty, which 
preserved immutable definitions of the body politic by race to bestow power, 
liberty, and prosperity upon those deemed fit for racial mastery. 
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Just days after South Carolina seceded from the Union, United States 
Army Major Robert Anderson led a small force from his exposed defenses at Fort 
Moultrie to the more defensible Sumter farther out in Charleston Harbor. 
Enraged by Major Anderson’s actions, as well as the clemency shown by 
Governor Francis Pickens that permitted Union soldiers to trade for foodstuffs in 
Charleston’s market, South Carolina’s hotspurs insisted upon a response. Leading 
the charge to action was none other than the chief agitator himself, Robert 
Barnwell Rhett. In late January, before he headed off to the convention in 
Montgomery, Rhett confronted governor Francis Pickens and harangued his 
longtime adversary on the need for military action. “Certainly, Mr. Rhett; I have 
no objection!” Pickens sardonically rejoined. “I will furnish you with some men, 
and you can storm the work yourself.” Having hoisted Rhett upon his impetuous 
demands, Rhett balked: “But, sir, I am not a military man!” Pickens, with a 
history of dealing with the irascible Rhett, coolly rejoined, “Nor I either, and 
therefor I take the advice of those that are!”67  
No doubt to Rhett’s frustration, the man whose advice Pickens sought was 
Jefferson Davis. Pickens wrote Davis on January 23 informing him of the dire 
military situation in his state. “I found everything in confusion…everything was 
on a small militia scale,” he confessed. South Carolina had taken the plunge 
without due preparation. Pickens underscored the fact that sentiments within the 
state demanded action and informed Davis that if “the Convention at 
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Montgomery can give us our rights and our possessions without blood, I shall 
rejoice, but if not, blood must follow.” Pickens informed Davis that he instructed 
his delegation to move with haste to assemble a duplicate government and not 
tarry in electing provisional executives. Pickens eagerly sought a Commander-in-
Chief to bring about an effective national coordination as soon as possible. He 
frankly informed Davis: “I think you are the proper man to be selected at this 
juncture….”68 Three weeks after his letter’s dispatch to Davis, Pickens had both 
his imitative government and his desired Commander-in-Chief.  
Before his acclimation, Davis wired Pickens to urge forbearance. His 
words sought to salve the Palmetto State’s wounded vanity, and in late January 
he told the governor, “The little garrison in its present position presses on 
nothing but a point of pride, and to you I need not say that war is made up of real 
elements.”69 Pickens understood and busied the Palmetto Guard with refortifying 
Fort Moultrie. By February 22 with Davis at the helm of the national government, 
the Confederate Congress strengthened the hand of the Commander-in-Chief by 
according him control over the contested federal forts. By latching on to the fort’s 
federal status, Congress provided Davis the power to oversee the military 
operations of the states. If there were to be a war, it would be the result of a 
deliberate, nationally coordinated endeavor and not a result of state action. Just 
five days later, Davis wrote to the Congress to ask for federal control over the 
military situation throughout the Confederacy. He wrote, “To distribute the arms 
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and munitions so as best to provide for the defense of the country it is needful 
that they be placed under the control of the General Government.”70 Congress 
acceded to his wish, and Davis asserted the prerogative of the executive over the 
powers of the governors. Secretary of War, Leroy Pope Walker, dispatched 
Congress’ authorization to the state governors, informing them of the 
nationalization.  
Even before the first fighting began, Davis and the Congress utilized the 
powers of the Constitution to federalize and coordinate the states into a 
concerted, nationally directed effort. Pickens wrote to Davis after Congress’ act of 
February 22 to inform him that he accepted his newly subsidiary role. “I have the 
fullest confidence that you and the Congress will do everything that may be due 
to the honor and the rights of South Carolina,” Pickens obliged.71 On April 10, 
Davis’ War Department wired General Beauregard, his appointed commanding 
general, to demand Sumter’s surrender, “…and if this is refused, proceed, in such 
manner as you may determine, to reduce it.”72 The Confederate Constitution, it 
was clear, accorded considerable federal power to the national executive, and 
granted the Congress the power to exert federal authority over the states. The 
first fighting at Sumter was not an exhibition of the triumph of state’s rights. 
South Carolina might have taken the lead in secession, but assumed a subsidiary 
role under a powerful, supreme federal government of its making. 
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As the convention of seceded states demonstrated, the delegates exhibited 
an overwhelming desire to retain the United States Constitution with as little 
disruption as possible. Every attempt of Robert Barnwell Rhett to push the 
Confederacy away from the center of respectability to the fringe of anomaly was 
turned back by the delegation. In this regard Alexander Stephens, opponent of 
secession and reluctant delegate, proved vital in ensuring that the Confederate 
Constitution remained as imitative and as close to the United States Constitution 
as possible. And it was Stephens and Toombs whose Georgia plan usurped the 
powers of the states to endow the convention with the powers of a Congress, 
thereby ensuring that the conservative work that the delegates undertook 
continued to be overseen by the same members throughout the provisional 
period of government. Other delegations vitally contributed to this vision, such as 
Harris from Mississippi, whose clear agenda of electing Jefferson Davis, one of 
the most conservative, respectable, and legitimizing choices, aided the Georgia 
delegation’s motives. Finally, the efforts to retain the legal code in force of the 
United States marked yet another moment of mimicry, another reach for 
continuity, and another expression of the intentional claim of an American 
identity. 
Of the changes that occurred in Montgomery, most can be seen to have 
strengthened rather than reduced the authority of the federal government. The 
executive revisions, although disallowing reelection, rendered the office 
potentially powerful, demonstrating a desire for a firm, authoritative head of 
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government. The various congressional reforms also ensured that the national 
congress, not the states, would exercise oversight in determining definitions of 
citizenship and national expansion. Although scholars have traditionally treated 
the war as baptismal, Montgomery stands as a vital chapter in fleshing out the 
intent of the Confederacy’s national makeup.  The Constitutional reforms that 
took place owed not to war, but instead owed to the long memory of national 
disputes. Liberated from sectional divisions, the Montgomery delegates were free 
to pursue the government of their desires. For the overwhelming majority those 
pursuits involved the articulation of a strong, central, federal republic.  
Despite a preamble proclaiming the sovereignty of the states, the 
Confederate Constitution did not legitimize secession. Rather, as the language of 
the preamble itself avowed, the Confederacy constituted a perpetual, federal 
republic. The reforms spoke as much to the unresolved disputes of 1787 as they 
did from the sectional crises that dogged the republic from 1820 until South 
Carolina’s secession. The solutions proved universally American, for they sought 
to explicate, according to the opinion of delegates, the original intent of the 
Founding Fathers. There is, perhaps, no more universal American enterprise 
than intuiting original intent. Thus, the delegates’ aim was not merely to salve the 
wounds inflicted by the Republican Party, but to endeavor to solve more 
longstanding sources of dispute. By clearing up the understanding over 
Constitutional liberty, the proper definition of the body politic, and proclaiming 
the perpetuity of a racially distinct body politic, the Confederate founders placed 
themselves in a lineage that they believed hailed directly from the nation’s 
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original thinkers. In uniting interests under a common government, the delegates 
exhibited pride at resuscitating the political atmosphere of the eighteenth century 
and gloried at their virtuous resurrection. Disallowing party identity returned to 
the parting counsel of George Washington and made evident his desires. The 
Confederates had, according to their beliefs, rendered the government of the 
Fathers a reality by conforming Confederate governing institutions to the 
Founders’ wishes. Most importantly, they took the Constitution as their guide, 
complete with its sanction of slavery and racial inequality. By perpetuating such 
definitions and grants of liberties, the Confederates claimed to have saved the 
republic. Or, to use the words of Davis, they rescued the Constitution with the 
“light” that Confederates alone possessed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE GOVERNING RACE AT WAR 
 
Where James Madison failed Jefferson Davis succeeded. In the 
Confederacy, ever mindful of history, the precedent for conscription advanced by 
James Monroe achieved fruition under Jefferson Davis. Davis’ elder brother 
Joseph dispatched a letter to Jefferson glorying in the news. “I am gratified to 
hear of the passage of the conscription law,” Joseph wrote. Ever the student of 
politics, he could not help but gush, “In this you are more fortunate than Mr. 
Monroe in Madison’s administration.”1  As the Davis brothers’ communication 
indicated, the Conscription Act proved a defining moment for the Confederacy 
became the first self-styled American government to successfully assert the 
government’s right to the life its male citizens. That the precedent originated by 
Secretary of War James Monroe achieved fruition under Jefferson Davis is a 
profound example of the Confederacy’s imitative approach to governance and the 
desirability to use federal power.  
By vesting the federal government with the power to enroll and sustain a 
national army, Davis embraced a policy that advanced a more centralized vision 
for conscription than his northern foe. The Confederate Congress supported the 
administration’s policy, and several even acclaimed the energetic executive 
policy. The parallel progression of the Union and Confederate governments, with 
their resonating calls for a draft and the suspension of habeas corpus, 
demonstrated the common governing links between the two self-proclaimed 
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American governments. That the Confederacy preempted and indeed superseded 
the Union in advancing federal control over the creation of a national army is not 
surprising. After all, the Confederate elite felt that it was not the Constitution that 
had failed them, but rather the political system.  
While Davis adroitly utilized the past to lay the groundwork for his 
administration’s policies, the responses of the Confederacy’s foremost politicians 
proved conditional. Alexander Stephens traversed the South to champion the 
Confederate government and its traditional grants of liberty. Returning home to 
Georgia in 1861 to advocate the new Confederate Constitution, Stephens spoke 
forthrightly and infamously on the purpose of the Southern government in order 
to encourage ratification. And a month after his address in Georgia, the vice 
president continued on to Virginia, where he urged Old Dominion to cast its lot 
with the Confederacy. While Stephens exhibited pride of authorship, the 
intrusion of military concerns revealed his concern with constitutional 
government. In particular, Stephens recoiled at the prospect that war might lead 
to the abeyance of civilian control, an essential feature retained from the United 
States Constitution. As the Confederacy embraced military policies to meet the 
exigencies of war, Stephens believed the federal government had a clear and 
supreme right to possess conscripts and to levy taxes, but he argued that the 
government must procure such rightful provisions through channels that 
sustained civil liberties. 
William Lowndes Yancey, one of the chief agitators in the antebellum era 
and an iconic opponent of party identity, first set off on behalf of the Confederacy 
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as a diplomat in April 1861. Returning in late March 1862, the wordsmith of 
sectional disruption took up politics once more as a Confederate States Senator 
from Alabama. To face the exigencies of wartime politics, one of the most radical 
of antebellum politicians sought a return to democratic convention. Upon his 
return to Congress, Yancey disavowed the antiparty composition of Confederate 
politics. Repudiating his previous convictions, Yancey called for open dissent and 
a return to institutional affiliations. Upon the failure of this singular pleading, the 
former vanguard of radical sentiments exhibited a remarkable change, and 
throughout the remainder of his career, Yancey facilitated harmonious state and 
federal relations. Realizing that the Confederate future depended upon the 
smooth interaction of both, he dedicated his efforts to aid government function. 
The notion of a Confederate Supreme Court, however, brought back the Prince’s 
fire. An unresolved issue that stretched back to the Confederate Founding, whose 
antecedents originated with the nation’s original founding, as a framer of 
government Yancey sought to preserve the power of the states and the Congress 
at the expense of the judicial branch. 
 
The Confederacy’s response to the struggle for national existence has 
invited various interpretations from scholars. Richard Bensel’s focus on “war 
mobilization and state formation” resulted in a surprising conclusion when it 
came to the subject of the Confederacy. For Bensel, the Confederate States’ 
response to the demands of wartime invites questions as to assessments of the 
South’s supposed hostility to central, federal power. Bensel writes, “…[T]he all 
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encompassing economic and social controls of the Confederacy were in fact so 
extensive that they call into question standard interpretations of southern 
opposition to the expansion of federal power in both the antebellum and post-
Reconstruction periods.”2 With the Confederacy retaining fundamental 
structures of American government, Bensel asserts, “…the most striking feature 
of this new framework was that it ‘prescribed for the Confederacy much the same 
kind of union which the Southerners had dissolved,’ a document that under the 
pressure of civil war proved fully expansive as that in the North.”3 Bensel thus 
implies an irony to the Confederacy’s federal organization, and concludes that the 
intensity of war transformed the Confederate Constitution into an instrument of 
unintentional centralization.  
Emory Thomas similarly treats the Confederacy’s reaction to 
centralization as anathema to the South’s prewar convictions. In The 
Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience, Thomas’ estimation, the war 
“revolutionized Southerners’ antebellum notions of state rights.”4 Thomas 
recounts the hostility heaped at Jefferson Davis as an example of the perceived 
betrayal of principles. While dismissing the transformation as the result of any 
single individual, Thomas concludes, “Goaded by the demands of ‘modern’ total 
war, the Confederate government abandoned the political system it was called 
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into being to defend.”5 Not desiring to advance a hypothesis as to why those 
changes occurred, Thomas asserts, that as a result of wartime experience, a 
“political revolution happened.”6 
George Rable’s emphasis on political culture locates a revolutionary 
change within Confederate politics, but in a way fundamentally different from 
either Bensel’s state formation or Thomas’ emphasis on state identity. By 
situating the arguments over centralization in political culture, Rable argues that 
the debates over conscription and habeas corpus challenged the premise of the 
Confederacy’s politics. For Rable the difficulty of conforming to wartime realities 
reveals the latent and opposing ideological differences dividing Confederate 
politicians. The debates over the application of federal power reveal the tension 
between two essential ideological poles, national defense versus libertarian 
autonomy.7 For the remainder of the war, Confederate politics breaks down 
between competing poles. 
Stephanie McCurry’s recent inquiry into Confederate politics finds that the 
Confederate response to wartime tested ambitions, identity, and core 
Confederate presumptions about loyalty. Like Rable, McCurry focuses on 
charting the changes in the political culture and writes, “The demands of nation 
building in war would unleash a new crisis of legitimacy and create a heightened 
context for political loyalty that would test not just the unity of the people but the 
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very definition of the people itself.”8 In McCurry’s estimation, the experience of 
making war undermined Confederate’s presumed identity. Such an interpretation 
stresses peculiarity and irony, advancing an implicit betrayal of political 
convictions.  
To meet the exigencies of wartime, the Confederate political culture 
responded in predictable fashion. Davis continued to employ federal power in a 
strategic fashion consistent with his antebellum views. His embrace of federal 
power to meet the demands of wartime in the Confederacy did not constitute a 
fundamental turn of character, betrayal of previous political convictions, or 
overthrow of Confederate intent. Davis turned to the Constitution and to the 
Confederate Congress to articulate a policy of national survival. Such a 
development placed the Confederacy within political convention. Indeed, the 
parallel developments of conscription and the suspension of habeas corpus in the 
Union and Confederate governments demonstrated the extent of the 
Confederacy’s conventionality. Both nations looked to a common set of governing 
principles and instruments. According to Davis, neither conscription nor the 
suspension of habeas corpus constituted a grasp at extra-legal authority. And, 
according to the reactions of the Confederacy’s leading politicians, neither policy 
amounted to a crisis or fundamental challenge to their vision of government. 
Exercising constitutional power for the defense of the nation fulfilled the intent of 
the Constitution. The response to the war constituted neither a crisis of identity, 
nor a revolution in character. Rather it revealed the fundamental character of the 
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Confederacy’s imitative sanction of federal power. And the continual grants 
afforded by congress reveal that while Confederate politics was not without 
disagreement, the divisions proved neither revolutionary nor disruptive. 
 
That Jefferson Davis turned to an earlier episode of American history to 
guide the Confederate future is not at all surprising. Joseph Davis’ plantation in 
Mississippi, Hurricane, featured one of the best-stocked libraries of the state. 
Filled with volumes on American presidents and the writings of Thomas 
Jefferson, the library was a repository of early American political history. Varina 
recalled how around the family hearth, Joseph and Jefferson often discussed 
readings and political ideas.9  Joseph’s congratulatory letter over the passage of 
Confederate conscription demonstrated Davis’ engagement with history. With the 
Confederacy’s claim to national heritage, Davis turned to the model for national 
conscription that emerged in 1814 from the pen of one of Constitution’s hesitant 
signees. With American fortunes at their nadir in the War of 1812, Secretary of 
War James Monroe dispatched a missive to Senator William Giles of Virginia, the 
head of the Military Affairs Committee, just after British forces rampaged along 
the Potomac River. Secretary Monroe warned, “It may fairly be presumed that it 
is the object that the British Government…to diminish the importance, if not 
destroy the political existence, of the United States.” To prevent the nation’s 
destruction Monroe urged Congress to conscript 100,000 men for a standing 
federal army.  
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Anticipating constructionist counterarguments, Monroe declared the 
“conservation of the State is a duty paramount to all others” and argued 
“Congress have a right, by the constitution, to raise regular armies.” Wading into 
the debate over the nation’s genesis, Monroe contended that the Philadelphia 
Convention sought to resolve the issue of insufficient national defense. With his 
line of argument offering the privilege of insight born from experience, Monroe 
castigated strict constructionist views as “repugnant to the uniform construction 
of all grants of power, and equally so to the first principles and leading objects of 
the federal compact.” Simply put, Monroe labeled opponents of state power 
ignorant. “The commonwealth,” Monroe concluded in language usually reserved 
for his state but now transposed to mean the nation, “has a right to the service of 
all its citizens.”10 Congress, influenced by recent events, did not require a great 
deal of persuasion. Monroe’s proposal swiftly passed through both houses, yet his 
vision for a national army met an inconclusive end when the Senate agreed to 
Monroe’s desired three-year term while the House only assented to a single year. 
While in reconciliation the war ended and the bill never became law. Monroe, 
however, had advanced an important precedent. 
Davis had a long history of dealing with the principle of federal power in 
his antebellum career. In fact, most Southerners’ strategic approaches to federal 
power are generally overlooked. From the removal of Native Americans in 
Southern states to the Mexican-American War to the Compromise of 1850, 
Southern politicians repeatedly championed beneficial applications of federal 
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power. As historian Adam Rothman argues, the federal government proved 
essential to the expansion and settlement of land inhabitable for conversion into 
plantation agriculture.11 Evidence of the desire for federal power continued 
throughout the 1850s when Southern politicians routinely denounced state’s 
rights. Davis’ own Secretary of State, Judah Benjamin, then a senator from 
Louisiana crystalized this sentiment when he sardonically observed: “Who would 
have ever expected, a few years ago, to have heard it said…by Senators from the 
north, that State tribunals were vested with jurisdiction…to determine upon the 
constitutionality of laws enacted by the Congress of the United States.” Benjamin 
enjoyed the spectacle of highlighting northern sympathies for state’s rights, and 
his statement publicized Southerners comfort with federal powers when they 
advanced particularly southern interests.12  
As the war assumed frightening dimensions, Davis turned to the powers 
granted by the Constitution to make manifest the preamble’s promise of 
perpetuity. Historically, Davis demonstrated comfort with the use of federal 
power so long as it advanced broadly nationalist or Southern aims. As Secretary 
of War Davis advocated a robust military policy, as John Calhoun had done 
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before him. Speaking before an audience in New York, Davis urged the 
construction of an intercontinental railroad to facilitate the extension of 
American power to the western reaches of the continent. Arguing that national 
aspirations muted state’s rights reservations, Davis viewed the facilitation of 
American hegemony as a legitimate endeavor of government. Calling the premise 
of national defense “one of the great ends of our Union,” the Mississippian urged 
others to see the wisdom of his view. “Our Constitution was formed to bind the 
States together, to provide for the common defense, to concentrate the power of 
all for the protection of each, to throw their united shields over every State, “ he 
avowed. For nationalist benefits, Davis proved an eager applicant of federal 
power.13  
Whereas most treatments of Davis’ attitude restrict his permissiveness to 
military ends, his actions upon returning to the United States Senate reveal a 
disposition to also use federal power to protect slave interests in the territories. 
To facilitate the spread of slavery under the banner of property protection in 
1859, Davis prepared a policy position urging Southern Democrats to insist upon 
federal action. Drafted with an eye toward the coming presidential election, 
Davis’ resolution not only undermined his in-state rival Albert Brown, who called 
for a federal slave code, but also crucially targeted Stephen Douglas, his party’s 
prospective nominee for president, by detailing the extent to which Douglas 
would have to alter the Freeport Doctrine – the notion that settlers of a territory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Lynda Crist, ed., Papers of Jefferson Davis, V, 30-31; Dunbar Rowland, ed., 
Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist, II, 249-51. 
	   100	  
could effectively exclude slavery by refusing to pass laws protecting it - to win 
Southern Democrats’ support.  
President James Buchanan, the head of the Democratic Party, assented to 
Davis’ proposals and touched upon their principle when he opened the 36th 
Congress. Buchanan advanced Dred Scott as “the final settlement…of the 
question of slavery in the territories.” The Supreme Court’s ruling, Buchanan 
submitted, protected the right of citizens “to take his property of any kind, 
including slaves into the common territories.”14 Davis’s resolution rendered the 
court ‘s ruling a reality. He drafted seven resolutions, two of which explicitly 
called for federal intervention on behalf of slave property should “the judiciary 
and executive” fail.15 Without laws explicitly protecting slave property, it was a 
fair presumption that slave owners would keep out of the territories, thus 
ensuring that the territory would enter the Union as a free state. To assert 
Southern claims over the western reaches of the country, Davis demanded the 
federal government directly protect slave property, thereby increasing the 
chances that the territories, once planted with slaves, would join the Union as 
slave states. It was a crafty application of federal power that allowed Davis to 
claim principle while furthering Southern aims. 
As President Davis exhibited the same practical attitude toward federal 
power. In his inaugural Davis defined the Confederate government in ebullient 
language. Proclaiming, “We have entered upon the career of independence, and it 
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must be inflexibly pursued,” he offered that “there should be a well-instructed 
and disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on a peace 
establishment.”16 Davis’ Hamiltonian tone did not go unnoticed. In the 
beginning, Davis worked with Congress to create a national army of one-year 
state volunteers. Davis initially sought three-year terms – vastly superseding 
Lincoln’s call for ninety-day men, but could not overcome the confidence of 
Southern congressmen like Francis Bartow, Chairman of the Military Affairs 
Committee, who astoundingly believed six months sufficient. In the end, Bartow 
relented to a single year at the president’s urging.17 The expiration of the terms of 
service coming in March of 1862 proved especially perilous. Out west United 
States General Ulysses Grant won a resounding series of victories at Forts Henry 
and Donelson along the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, vanquishing the 
Confederate defenders in degrading fashion and opening a broad swath of the 
South to Union penetration. Closer to the capitol, Roanoke Island met a similarly 
shocking fate owing to woeful manpower shortages. In addressing the Congress 
now at Richmond in late February 1862, Davis called the twin defeats 
“humiliating.” He found it particularly difficult to accept the news of defeat at 
Donelson, saying, “I am not only unwilling but unable to believe that a large army 
of our people have surrendered without a desperate effort….”18 Against the 
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backdrop of setbacks and expiring terms, the Union Army of the Potomac 
menaced the Confederate capital with its march up the Virginia peninsula. For 
Davis, the peril necessitated examining the federal powers at his disposal. On 
March 28, just two weeks after establishing a permanent constitution, Davis 
asked Congress for the unprecedented passage of a national conscription law.  
The challenges of survival did not fundamentally alter or overturn the 
Confederate designs for a government, but made federal sovereignty evident. In 
fact, the bill’s justificatory language cited the lack of cohesive state laws as 
necessitating federal control. Davis spoke of the need for federal supervision to 
keep “adequate forces in the field.” His call to action sought to take advantage of 
popular sentiment by channeling it into the creation of a standing federal army. 
Enemy incursions had “animated the people with a spirit of resistance…that it 
requires rather to be regulated than stimulated,” Davis proclaimed. He built wide 
support for his conscription bill by gathering the approval of his most illustrious 
military counsels. Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson made his approval known, and 
Robert E. Lee worked with Judah Benjamin on the draft’s language.19 The 
administration’s proposal appeared before the Confederate States Senate on 
March 29 and asked that men between 18 and 35 years be subject to national 
military service. 
Edwin Sparrow of Louisiana warmly greeted the policy and championed 
the executive’s robust policy. Indeed, he most appreciated that it “it evinced 
energy of purpose on the part of the administration in the prosecution of the 
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war….”20 John Clark of Missouri seconded Sparrow, for he exhibited weariness 
with the inefficient multiplicity of state rules. Clark praised the bill, for 
“enable[ing] the government to obviate the circumlocution and delay in 
transferring troops, in many of the States, under existing laws.” Indeed, for 
Senator Clark, smiting state provisions proved the vital attribute. While 
proclaiming “respect” for the “sovereignty of the states,” Clark thought the pride 
of states “secondary to the sovereignty of the people.” “Let us first establish 
individual rights, and then the rights of the States,” Clark entreated.21 For both 
men, the Confederate Constitution retained federal power for the guaranty of the 
nation’s perpetuity. They greeted such applications joyously. 
Upon these favorable pronouncements, Senator W.S. Oldham of Texas 
registered displeasure. Oldham avowed that he “did not believe that Congress 
had the power, except through the States, to force citizens into the army of the 
Confederate States.” Disregarding the indictment of inefficiency, Oldham 
countered, “This was not circumlocution; it was the theory of government.” As 
Oldham later explained, he feared that national conscription paved the way 
toward military rule. He did not harbor ill will toward the president, and in fact 
met with Davis repeatedly throughout the war, believing him a sound president.22 
Rather, Oldham wrote, “I opposed [Davis’] measures from the dictates of 
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judgment. I believed at the time that they would work mischief….”23 To prevent 
the military from aggrandizing power Oldham stood in opposition. 
Louis Wigfall, no friend of Davis, supported the call for conscription by 
rebutting the notion that the federal policy threatened to lessen civilian control of 
government. Wigfall clarified that the Confederate Constitution accorded the 
federal government a supreme grant for the defense of the nation and chided his 
fellow Texan for articulating state superiority as “the theory of our government.” 
Swatting away such arguments, Wigfall accused state’s rights literalists like 
Oldham of inhabiting a fantasy. He avowed that he too remained a “State rights 
man, but he could not close his eyes to the Constitution, or admit that we were 
living in the Confederacy under a loose league…” This was a powerful centralized 
government, Wigfall’s argument advanced, not an atomized collection of 
sovereign states. To demolish the constructionist argument, Wigfall pondered 
how states might conduct war:  
No State Government has the right to make war, raise armies, or conclude 
treaties of peace. These rights were expressly conferred upon the 
Confederate Government. There was no limitation upon the power. It was 
full, plenary and ample.24 
 
The provisions of the Confederate Constitution demonstrated the erroneousness 
of state’s rights as a philosophy of government. 
Denigrating the “demagoguery” over states’ rights, Wigfall decried limiting 
governing philosophies as political fictions. He impugned the system of 
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uncoordinated state provisions as “extra-constitutional, if not unconstitutional.” 
At any rate, he “had heard enough about it; and by relying upon it, the country is 
without an adequate army.” Decrying the mawkishness of republican sentiments, 
Wigfall desired an effective army, which he argued could not be brought about 
through patchwork appeals to provincialism. “No troops can be carried effectively 
into the field who elect their officers,” he bemoaned. Even the Founders had 
come around to such a view, Wigfall argued, for such a position “was the doctrine 
of Washington, Jefferson, Hancock….”25 In this regard Confederate conscription 
followed the tradition undertaken by the Founding generation. Such action did 
not repudiate the legacy of the Founding Fathers, but rather followed their lead. 
This was not a crisis of identity, but a direct aping. 
To close, Wigfall turned to the substantive. Quoting statistics on the 
army’s lack of strength, he scolded his colleagues: “‘Cease this child’s play.’” 
While the Congress dithered, the enemy advanced. “No man has any individual 
rights, which come in conflict with the welfare of the country,” Wigfall affirmed 
before forwarding that the federal “government has as much right to exact 
military service as it has to collect a tax to pay the expenses of the government.” 
Volunteerism and pleas for international aid were useless: “We are waiting here 
for Providence, or foreign governments, to help us. We lean upon a ‘broken 
reed.’” Against this forceful remonstration, W.S. Oldham protested that he did 
not “come here to be lectured” on the principles of government.26 Wigfall 
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apologized for his temperament, but not his conviction. He rejoiced at the 
administration’s bill, believing it high time that the federal government seize 
upon its constitutional obligation to provide for the nation’s defense. The 
Confederate Congress adopted the Conscription Act on April 16. The final vote in 
the Senate revealed the support of 19 senators with 5 in opposition, while the 
House passed conscription with a clear majority of 54 yeas to 26 nays.27 The 
president had his bill, delivered by a congress that viewed the federal government 
supreme in its powers. 
 
Whereas Jefferson Davis set to work after his inauguration shoring up the 
Confederacy’s defenses by appealing to the federal provisions of the Constitution, 
Alexander Stephens embarked upon a tour of Southern states in order to urge 
ratification of the Confederate Constitution and to solicit additional states to join 
the Confederacy. His remarks reveal him relatively unconcerned about the 
Confederate nation’s response to war, for he took to the states to champion his 
nation’s cause. March 1861 found Stephens at home in Georgia, urging the people 
who had sent him to Montgomery to ratify the Confederate Constitution that he 
had returned with. Speaking to an overflowing audience at the Athenaeum in 
Savannah, Little Aleck highlighted the Confederate Constitution’s protection of 
time-honored liberties. In a fit of inspiration, Stephens praised the Confederate 
Constitution for preserving not just the grants of the United States Constitution, 
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but also, “All the great principles of Magna Carta are retained in it.”28 Quite 
explicitly, Stephens sold the Confederate Constitution on its merits as an 
imitative, reverent expression of traditional English rights. The philosophy of 
government meant a great deal to Stephens, and by turn he advanced the cause of 
the Confederacy as the cause of preservation. 
But in one vital area the Confederate Constitution offered a different 
definition of the body politic that Stephens felt the need to explain. To spare his 
audience the tedium of reciting all of the changes, he moved with haste to this 
singular alteration. By fixing the grant of American democracy according to race 
Stephens proclaimed that the Confederacy solved the great quandary of American 
government. In praising the Confederate Constitution he joyed that it put to rest 
“forever, all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institution…” 
Recalling the prescience of Thomas Jefferson, who once “forecasted” slavery as 
“’the rock upon which the old union would split’” Stephens observed, “What was 
conjecture with him is now realized fact.” But Stephens saw certainty where 
Jefferson evinced doubt. The Founders, he noted, saw slavery as a “violation of 
the laws of nature,” a view fundamentally at odds with the Confederacy. “Those 
ideas” Stephens rejected as “fundamentally wrong.” “They rested upon the 
assumption of the equality of races. This was an error,” Stephens determined. 
Instead, he proclaimed the Confederacy’s “foundations are laid, its cornerstone 
rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that 
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slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition.”29 
In this lone aspect, Stephens declared that the Confederacy superseded the 
wisdom of the Founders. Indeed, the Confederacy’s contribution the lineage of 
English rights and American democracy owed to the notion that liberty is 
conferred according to race. “This, our new government, is the first, in the history 
of the world,” Stephens joyed, “based upon this great physical, philosophical, and 
moral truth.”30 Embracing a government that secured a racially exclusive grant of 
liberty was the essential question before the Georgia Assembly, which they 
viewed favorably. 
After his success Stephens retired to his plantation Liberty Hall, but in 
April Davis summoned him back to Montgomery on account of the firing at 
Sumter. Upon his return Stephens learned that Davis desired him to travel to 
Virginia to address Old Dominion’s secession convention called in response to 
Abraham Lincoln’s demand for 75,000 volunteers from the states. Stephens 
departed once more as an ambassador of the Confederacy. The vice president’s 
appearance was somewhat anticlimactic for he arrived in Richmond on April 22, 
several days after the Virginia convention decided in favor of secession. The 
convention remained in session, however, to hear Alexander Stephens’ address. 
The state constituted the strongest historical link to the men, ideas, and 
government that the Confederacy purported to perpetuate. Stephens offered 
adulatory pronouncements of Virginia’s tradition and legacy. To encourage 
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reciprocity, he assured the assembly of the deep conservatism of the Confederate 
government. “We quit the Union, but not the constitution – this we have 
preserved,” Stephens avowed in a pledge of the Confederate government’s 
conventional makeup.31  
Stephens also addressed the convention’s concerns about the influences of 
extremism in Confederate counsels. As a means of explicating the Confederacy’s 
genuine desire to imitate the United States Constitution, Stephens asked the 
assembly to see if they did not agree with the Constitution’s limited changes – 
“they are all of a conservative character,” he proclaimed. “None of the changes 
introduced are of a radical or downward tendency,” he promised, insinuating 
that although radicals like Robert Barnwell Rhett remained in the government, 
his vision of the Confederacy as a slave empire had been defeated. And so 
Stephens dismissed any pretension that the present Confederacy “sprung from 
some of the hot heads down South.”32 He urged those who harbored such 
thoughts to read the Confederate Constitution, which he had brought, to see if the 
changes were not as he told them. This was not a movement of radical or 
revolutionary aspirations. As he promised, it was decidedly conservative. 
With the assembly having expressed reservations on the issue of 
radicalism, Stephens turned to the area of Confederate singularity, its affixing of 
race as the principal qualification to the body politic. In language befitting his 
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formal audience, Stephens spoke to the philosophy behind the changes in 
governance. “The condition of the negro race amongst us presents a peculiar 
phase of republican civilization and constitution liberty” Stephens noted. By 
restricting the body politic to those he termed the “governing race,” the 
Confederacy resolved the problem of race in American political life. In his words, 
“No truth is clearer than that the best form or system of government of any 
people or society is that which secures the greatest amount of happiness, not to 
the greatest number, but to all the constituent elements of that society, 
community, or State.” There was little doubt about the Confederacy’s definition 
of the constituent elements of society. “Our system, therefore [?], so far as 
regards this inferior race, rests upon this great immutable law of nature. It is 
founded not upon wrong or injustice, but upon the eternal fitness of things.” 
Through a series of clipped affirmations, Stephens heralded the Confederate’s 
embrace of purported racial truths. As a government, the Confederacy rested 
upon a foundation of irrefutable inequality: “As a race, the African…is not his 
equal by nature, and cannot be made so by human laws or human institutions.”33 
From the wellspring of exclusion, Stephens professed that the Confederacy 
eradicated dissent among the body politic.  
Implying that tailoring laws and dedicating government to advance 
equality were doomed to fail, Stephens twisted the words of Republican William 
Henry Seward, who declared that the Republican Party’s platform on race and 
slavery drew its principles from a higher law than the Constitution. Now 
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Stephens returned the phrase, contorting its definition to sanction the 
Confederacy’s fastening of racial inequality. “We stand upon that higher law,” 
Stephens sardonically intoned.34 Although he had dropped the corner stone 
phraseology, Little Aleck reaffirmed his belief in the righteousness of explicating 
and fixing American democracy’s grant of liberty by race. Swayed by that vision 
of American government, the Virginia convention sought popular ratification of 
the convention’s decision to secede. Upon the conclusion of this address, 
Stephens returned to the Congress, which soon relocated to the Virginia capitol. 
The increasing scale of war did not fundamentally revise Stephens’ notions 
of Confederate identity, its Constitution, or functions of government. Throughout 
legislation drafted to meet the exigencies of war, the Constitution remained the 
instrument that governed political behaviors and policies and Stephens remarked 
little on its effects. The bill for the suspension of habeas corpus, for instance, 
passed the Confederate Senate without comment from a presiding Stephens. And 
at the congressional recess, Stephens returned to Georgia to encourage his state’s 
support for the produce loan, whereby planters and agriculturalists could 
purchase bonds by pledging part of their expected proceeds.  Before the 
adjournment of Congress in April 1862, Stephens affirmed: “Independence and 
liberty will require money as well as blood. The people must meet both with 
promptness and firmness.”35 Throughout June and July Stephens took to the 
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stump, making at least a dozen speeches to raise funds for the government. He 
knew that for the government to succeed, for his definition of liberty to persevere, 
the Confederate people must sacrifice for the state. For most of the summer, 
Stephens remained evidently unconcerned about military overreach. Instead, 
Stephens endeavored to enrich the coffers of government. 
Although Stephens remained silent on the first habeas corpus restriction, 
its quick conjunction with conscription raised his alarm. Upon his return to the 
capitol in mid August, Stephens expressed concern about the growing influence 
of military necessity in Confederate politics. Stephens, although never opposing a 
national army, wanted conscription carried out in alignment with the states to 
prevent military aggrandizement. Writing to the Augusta Constitutionalist in 
August before he departed for Richmond, the vice president expressed 
disagreement with the policy that advanced conscription through federal 
jurisdiction. “The citizen of the state owes no allegiance to the Confederate State 
Government,” he wrote. The only time a Confederate citizen could be compelled 
to answer the call of allegiance was when it originated from “his State.”36 Thus, 
Stephens desired the policy turned over to the states, where civilian governors 
would administer enrollment, not national conscription officers. Having returned 
to Congress, Stephens alerted his colleagues to the dangers of their decisions. He 
informed Linton that he threw himself into the work, “I have not been idle.”37 For 
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the diminutive but spirited Georgian, the threat of military despotism imperiled 
the Confederacy’s highest aspirations. As such, he directed his energies toward 
Congress, the body responsible for approving the federal decrees.  
That fall, evidence of Stephen’s concern about military overreach 
manifested in his home state when Commanding General of the Army of 
Tennessee, Braxton Bragg, appointed Mayor James Calhoun “civil governor” of 
Atlanta under the pretext of martial law. Calhoun wrote to Senator Ben Hill to 
inquire of his new duties. Hill, unsure of how to advise Calhoun, in turn passed 
his letter on to Stephens. The vice president penned a blistering response to the 
unwitting Calhoun. Stephens wrote, “I am not at all surprised at your being at a 
loss to know what your power and duties are in your new position.” Calhoun’s 
befuddlement, Stephens stated, owed to the fact that the appointment of “civil 
governor” was extralegal, an office “unknown to the law” and a “nullity.” 
Informing Calhoun “you, by virtue of it, possess no rightful authority; and can 
exercise none” the vice president eviscerated the entire military arrangement. 
“General Bragg has no more authority for appointing you civil governor of 
Atlanta…than any street walker in your city.”38 
It was not, as Stephens wrote to Richard Johnston, that he possessed a 
cynical assessment of the military. Rather, he confided, “…my dear sir, it is the 
principle involved. We live under a constitutional government, with clearly-
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defined powers.”39 “Martial law,” the vice president opined, “sets at defiance the 
Constitution itself.”40 Continuing to channel his frustrations at the 
obsequiousness of Congress, Stephens thought their behavior exasperating. “It is 
strange what ignorance prevails on this subject,” a dejected Stephens wrote 
Linton in remarking upon Congress’ actions. Indeed, he seemed to despair on the 
subject of congressional competence. In a downcast assessment of the trajectory 
of government, which Stephens feared headed toward despotism, he complained, 
“How little the representatives of the people know of the nature of Government 
under which they live.” Upset over Congress’ “lamentably ignorant” state, 
Stephens privately complained to Linton, “The whole ground has to be gone over 
with these children in politics and statesemanship.”41 It was not, as Stephens 
made clear, that he opposed the Confederate nation or the military. Rather, just 
as the Founders insisted, Stephens demanded civilian control over the military. 
Stephens believed that the government had the right to possess these men. It 
does, and it clearly owns the supreme right in his opinion. But the national 
government must acquire conscripts through proper channels, the states. His 
greatest criticisms of the Congress and Davis’ policies owed to their proclivity to 
lean upon military power. Stephens strove to maintain a government of 
conservative values and forms where civil liberties triumph. The points he raises 
guard constitutional liberty, not repudiate or exalt the national government or 
states’ rights. He churlishly wrote to Dick Johnston, “Better, in my judgment, that 
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Richmond fall…than that our people should submissively yield obedience to one 
of these edicts of our own generals.”42 Stephens prized the Constitution, and 
endeavored to preserve it as the sole source of legitimate governing authority. It 
was not possible, in his estimation, to sustain the liberties of which he so proudly 
spoke without maintaining civilian control. 
Although Stephens denounced martial law and the federal administration 
of conscription, he returned to Georgia once more as a spokesperson for the 
government. To close the woeful gap in supplies needed by soldiers, Stephens 
exhorted his fellow Georgians to donate money, shoes, and clothing to sustain 
soldiers. He also urged the populace to keep heart, pointing to the American 
Revolution as an example of adversity overcome. On his own plantation, 
Stephens proved an exemplar, dedicating an increasing share of his fields to grow 
foodstuffs for soldiers. He similarly pledged several hundred dollars to purchase 
shoes for all the soldiers from his home county. He clearly had not abandoned the 
cause or his interest in the effective functioning of government. Rather, he strove 
to sustain the government through popular appeals and personal action. 
Stephens sought to secure Confederate adherence to constitutional governing 
principles, and to sustain its soldiers so as to vindicate its quest for 
independence. 
Stephens did not lose himself in the abstract world of political principles in 
as the calendar turned to 1863. In addition to worrying about civilian control over 
government, Stephens expressed his growing concern about the deteriorating 
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state of Confederate finance. With inflation rising, Stephens knew the 
Confederate government needed to drive currency out of the market. The only 
real solution, Stephens understood, lay in direct taxation – a most decidedly 
federal policy. “Capital by itself has little patriotism above the brute instincts to 
self preservation,” Stephens wrote to Senator Raphael Semmes as a means of 
expressing his concern with the general unattractiveness of Confederate bonds.43 
Despite raising concerns over the draft because he felt that state allegiance ought 
to form the exclusive avenue by which citizens served the nation, Stephens’ 
solution to the problems facing the Confederate treasury showed his clear desire 
to support the federal government and not stand upon abstract constitutional 
principles. 
Not believing anything short of direct taxation sufficient to alleviate the 
woefully inflationary trajectory of Confederate finance, Stephens urged for a 
change in treasury policy. The solution, according to Stephens, lay in levying a 
direct tax through a wide reading of the same law that allowed Congress to raise 
and support armies.  By asserting a generous interpretation of the grant of 
constitutional provisions, Stephens advanced that “with as little violation of 
either the spirit or letter of the clause as…is now used in the conscription of men,” 
the Congress could extend its reach not just to men but also to goods.44 Such a 
stance evidently stood at odds with state’s rights constructionists. It was not, as 
Stephens told Johnston, that he opposed the government, Davis, or the military. 
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Rather, it was “the principle” of constitutional rule that he held so dear. 
Maintaining the Confederacy’s constitutional government and its grants of 
liberties required a military and stable finance, which Stephens recognized. He 
responded to the demands of war by insisting on civilian rule while personally 
working to strengthen the ledger of the government to better supply and sustain 
the military upon which the Confederate future depended. 
 
William Lowndes Yancey’s homecoming from his ambassadorship marked 
his return to politics. Assuming his seat in the Senate in late August of 1862, 
Yancey began his tenure by openly questioning the wisdom of the South’s 
antiparty organization. It must have been quite a surprise to hear the so-called 
“Prince of Secession,” the man who had channeled his inexhaustible contempt for 
party identity for over a decade assert a newfound appreciation for party 
identification. Yancey’s position not only repudiated his previous legacy, but also 
the admonition of Washington and the attempt to model the Confederacy as 
closely as possible on the early American republic. Expressing dissatisfaction 
with the current state of affairs that he feared yielded too uncritically to military 
demands, Yancey professed: “I am now fully convinced that we have too much 
secrecy in our legislation.”45 Reconciling himself to the fact that his previous 
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political convictions about the dangers of party proved misguided, Yancey 
proposed to end the secrecy that shrouded many congressional decisions.  
In calling for the development of a loyal opposition, Yancey declared: “[I]t 
has been a republican argument, that parties keep up a healthy public sentiment, 
and aid to check improper assumption of power by those in office.” Although 
such sentiment escaped him in his antebellum years, in reversing course Yancey 
affirmed: “As to factions, I have but little fear of them.” Coming to terms with the 
necessity of political institutions, Yancey advocated opening debates to allow “the 
healthful sunlight of an enlightened public opinion” to register its influence.46 
Yancey felt Congress’ attachment to secrecy enabled surreptitious loyalties. 
Seeking the cleansing light of day, the Alabaman pushed his colleagues to raise 
the voting threshold for closed sessions. Despite his pleading, Yancey’s colleagues 
did not desire to resume party politicking, stump speeches, and the institutional 
politics. In fact, such a course threatened the very tenets of the original political 
system that the Confederates had claimed to resurrect. Yancey watched as his 
motion failed the Senate by the margin of 17-4, signifying that his days as a 
vanguard of Southern politics were in the past.  
 By September Yancey had moved on from the defeat, instead devoting 
himself to harmonizing Confederate political divisions over the Conscription Act. 
His turn of character constituted a remarkable change, for the trials faced by the 
Confederacy appeared to have chastened the former fire-eater. Avowing the 
constitutionality of conscription, Yancey swept aside legal grounds for protest. “I 
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have not read or heard of any argument against it, which I conceive tenable,” 
Yancey concluded, undercutting strict constructionist’s arguments. Yancey 
sought most of all to kindle a harmonious relationship between the central 
government and states. By pleading for the federal government to handle its 
prerogatives with a defter touch, Yancey warned that “collisions” between federal 
and state officers “are remembered as humiliations.” His stressing of the personal 
nature of politics highlighted that in the absence of party organization, divisions 
often assumed personal natures. Yancey counseled that “like old wounds” the 
conflicts “occasion a jealous and watchful conduct towards the Confederate 
Government…which, in the end, may disrupt the Government.”47 The federal 
government, he warned, disregarded the considerations of state officials at its 
peril, for much depended on their support. In order to sustain “the smooth and 
harmonious action of all the parts of our complex Government in favor of a 
common cause…” Yancey advocated a compromise. To placate the states and 
retain constitutional authority for federal prerogatives, he proposed revising 
conscription by turning responsibility for enlistment over to the states, much as 
the Union government had done. After calling for the federal government to 
moderate its approach, Yancey took to patriotic appeals to encourage the 
enlargement of the army so as to carry the Confederate state to a final victory. He 
fantastically proposed to “strengthen the army so ‘that they shall rush through 
the Yankee capital, blow up every vestige of its public buildings, and pass on into 
the heart of the enemy’s great cities, and in the midst of his treasures, and in the 
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citadel of his power dictate a peace.’”48 If anything, Yancey inhabited a position of 
calling for more vigorous federal action through calculating appeals to 
partnership and conciliation. 
Echoing Stephens, Yancey labored to ensure the proper constitutional 
balance between the states and the federal government. As Yancey avowed, “The 
State governments, are an essential part of the complex system of government 
known as the Confederate States.” Without them, he sustained, “there can be no 
Senate.” Opposing the use of unlimited powers when “the ‘National life is in 
danger,’” Yancey pushed back against blanket justifications for military powers 
that threatened to obviate the role of the states: 
Mr. President, I here enter my solemn protest against the introduction 
into our political vocabulary of such a phrase as ‘the National Life.’ Sir, we 
have no national life. ‘National Life’ is but another term for sovereignty. A 
nation is a Sovereign State; the Confederacy is not a Sovereign State…It 
has no national life to defend.49 
 
The calls to defend the national life, Yancey declared, permitted the Congress to 
uncritically authorize grants of power that disregarded the states and the proper 
balance of powers within the federal system. “We should remember that State 
sovereignty, which in some respects is the strongest, may yet become the weakest 
point in our organic system,” he warned.50 Yancey did not desire a repudiation of 
the national government, but worried about the obviation of civilian control. “I 
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49 Speeches of William L. Yancey, 19. 
 
50 Ibid., 22. 
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deny, in toto” Yancey declared, “that the war power is paramount to the civilian 
power, either of the Confederate or State governments.”51 Seeking “harmony” 
Yancey proposed a self-described “peace offering” that endeavored to assuage the 
concerns of state governors while still according the federal government the 
states’ manpower by organizing some troops under three-year state 
enlistments.52 Throughout, he sought to safeguard the nation from fears of 
military usurpation.  
The last exertion of Yancey involved the establishment of the federal 
judiciary. Left unresolved after the initial outlines hammered out by the 
Provisional Constitution, the Confederate Senate hoped to establish a Supreme 
Court. Yancey feared that the court’s establishment would override the separation 
of powers and render the federal nature of the republic a fiction. Wigfall, ever 
caustic and extreme, began reading John Adams’ Alien and Sedition Act to offer 
his protest of the judiciary’s power.53 Thus Wigfall, the man who welcomed 
conscription, drew the line at judicial review. As the debate over the Confederate 
Supreme Court revealed, the men moved along a spectrum of opinion that 
championed the cause of national preservation while defending civilian checks 
upon government consolidation of power. It was not a simple binary, but a 
complicated negotiation between federal power’s legitimate authority and limits. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Speeches of William L. Yancey, 24. 
 
52 Ibid., 19-20. 
 
53 SHSP Vol. 47: 210. 
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In Yancey’s opinion, nothing less than the survival of state sovereignty and 
a truly balance federal republic lay on the line. To allow federal judges to decide 
on the legality of state and congressional intention constituted the type of 
usurping power that the Confederacy sought to restrain. “When we decide that 
the State Courts are of inferior dignity to this court, we have sapped the main 
pillar of this Confederacy,” Yancey avowed as he pushed back against the 
judiciary bill advanced by Benjamin Hill’s committee.54 Yancey spearheaded the 
opposition, advancing amendments to limit the court to three justices, to equalize 
low salaries, and most importantly to prohibit judicial review. The personal 
politics of the Confederacy lent a spiteful quality to the debate. The Confederate 
Constitution and antiparty atmosphere proved flexible enough to withstand the 
debates over habeas corpus and conscription. Yet, on the issue of judicial review, 
the atmosphere of consensus failed. Yancey thundered at Hill, whose committee 
advanced the bill. The two engaged in acrimonious denunciations, which 
devolved into personal recrimination and political smears. In one particularly 
dishonoring episode Yancey ridiculed Hill and distorted his record. The old fire 
had welled up and exploded in an exhibition reminiscent of his previous political 
stunts. Robert Barnwell, feeling Yancey’s acrimony too severe, insisted on an 
apology for violating the rules of debate. When Yancey refused Hill threw his 
inkwell at Yancey, severely lacerating Yancey’s face. Blood spilled forth as the two 
men lunged at each other. R.M.T. Hunter had to call for the Sergeant-at-arms. 
The “jealous and watchful” conduct Yancey warned about became reality before 
his very eyes. Just weeks after his quarrel with Hill, Yancey fell ill. For years he 
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supposedly suffered from an infection of the kidneys.55 This time, he would not 
recover. As Yancey languished, resolution on limits of judicial review remained 
elusive. He died just short of his fiftieth birthday. 
 
The governing race’s experience with the exigencies of wartime clarified 
the federal makeup of their Constitution. Federal power was not an inimical 
feature of the Confederate Constitution, but rather a fundamental component. 
Jefferson Davis, with his military, political, and administrative experiences, 
turned to the Confederate Constitution and historical precedence to formulate 
the administration’s response to war. The Confederate Congress repeatedly 
approved federal power, from conscription to the suspension of habeas corpus. 
As one of the chief influences on the Confederate Constitution, Alexander 
Stephens spent most of 1862 championing the Confederate nation. By 1863 he 
exhibited weariness with the demands for military necessity, worrying about their 
impact on democratic rule and liberty. In response, Little Aleck stressed the 
principle of constitutional liberty and energetically guarded provisions 
maintaining civilian control. Despite his denunciations of martial law and the 
federal provisions for conscription, Stephens remained a key proponent of the 
Confederacy. He urged his fellow Confederates to seize federal power to levy a 
direct tax by the same rationale that it claimed the lives of able-bodied men. As 
he made clear, the federal government rightfully owned a superior claim to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Eric Walther, William Lowndes Yancey and the Coming of the Civil War 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010) Yancey told his son 
that “for years he had endured ‘bleeding piles.’” 368. 
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nation’s men and moneys. Despite his historical reputation, Stephens’ 
denunciations sought to perfect and safeguard the Confederate nation, not to 
repudiate the legitimacy of government. 
Yancey had labored for over a decade to bring about the Confederacy and 
upon accomplishing the feat of independence. Yancey served the Confederacy by 
departing for London as a diplomat, and then in a return to institutional politics, 
he strove to bridge the tension between constitutional grants of federal authority 
and state authority. Once identified with the cause of disunion, party elimination, 
and Southern separatism, Yancey conformed to the practice of governing and 
sought to conciliate rather than unsettle. He desired to balance constitutional 
powers with civilian oversight, to create a strong national army to wage offensive 
war, and to embed its creation through the states. His ultimate act, seeking to 
frustrate the creation of a Supreme Court capable of overriding state legislation 
and intuiting congressional intent owed to his desire to preserve the federal 
checks of power and to prevent future usurpation of power. Yancey did not 
occupy a single ideological position, but moved along a spectrum of political 
sentiment. Generally chastened by his return to formal politics and the exigencies 
of wartime, Yancey’s career as a Confederate Senator is notable for his efforts at 
conciliation. Throughout, Yancey did not inhabit a consistently oppositionist 
attitude. Yancey never considered himself a foe of Davis or the administration 
and on his deathbed sought reassurance of Davis’ continued friendship. Yancey 
even bequeathed Davis his possession of George Washington’s spyglass. Davis, in 
turn, thanked Yancey’s widow for the gift and informed her that he would cherish 
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it, just as he had Yancey.56 It was an anticlimactic end to a career filled with 
ambitious visions, robust exertions, and outrageous outbursts. 
The experiences of Davis, Stephens, and Yancey reveal that the war did not 
radically transform the Confederate State. Rather, the war made clear the grants 
for federal power. Davis, ever the conventional politician, turned to precedent, 
personal experience, and the Congress to formulate the administration’s response 
to war. As Stephens spoke, the Confederacy fixed the body politic according to 
race. Its overwhelming conservatism, however, left provisions for federal power 
intact. Only when the threatening hydra of military despotism threatened to 
upend his cherished government of liberty did he recoil. And even then, the limits 
of his denunciations remained confined to military overreach. Yancey too 
understood the provisions for federal power inherent in the government and 
sought to harmonize the politics of the Confederacy. Like Stephens he guarded 
against military usurpation and sought modifying policies that supported the 
federal government while offering conciliating measures to the states. He could 
not, however, abide the creation of a court that proclaimed the power to sit in 
judgment of congressional and state legislation.  
On the whole the elite of the governing race demonstrated widespread 
comfort with applications of federal power. Davis looked to the Congress and to 
historical precedent, a fact made clear by the generally widespread agreement 
that greeted his policy proposals, especially in the area of congressional 
confirmation. Throughout their conditional response to the exigencies of 
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wartime, neither Stephens nor Yancey proved inveterate opponents of federal 
power. Rather, they worked to conciliate policies to sustain civil liberties while 
affording the nation its clearly sovereign right to embrace the instrumentalities 
necessary to defend the nation. The reactions of the elite did not break down 
along strictly binary positions. Rather, they measured their response according to 
context. They proved, in that regard, predictably political. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
“JUDGES BEFORE KINGS” 
 
In the argument over the Confederacy’s war powers, Jefferson Davis drew 
aspersions as a Hamiltonian. Georgia’s governor Joe Brown hurled the loaded 
epithet at the nation’s chief executive in the midst of a remarkable exchange of 
correspondence that lasted from the spring of 1862 to the summer of 1863. 
Throughout the discussion, Davis and his cabinet articulated a vigorous defense 
of the Confederate Constitution’s federal powers to the wily state governor.  As 
Brown’s epistles lengthened into 1863, they sparked an important political and 
legal debate about the nature, identity, and intent of the Confederate 
government.  
Though commonly conceived as a champion of states’ rights, the lengthy 
correspondence from Brown reveals his desire to retain political significance. In a 
governing atmosphere void of political parties and stripped of patronage, Brown’s 
jeremiads sought to accomplish a single-minded purpose: to preserve a system of 
political clients within an antiparty Confederacy. By invidiously guarding the 
state militia, its officer corps, and the right to deem officials indispensable to the 
operation of his state, Brown coveted the power to maintain a system of 
patronage under the rhetorical guise of state’s rights.1 As evidence of the success 
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was second only to North Carolina in terms of military exemptions. For a 
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Declarations of Independence: The Long Reconstruction of Popular Politics in 
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of Brown’s exertions, in the fall of 1864 Jefferson Davis received word from Judge 
Andrew Gordon Magrath’s opinion that as many as 30,000 men in Georgia and 
the Carolinas avoided national service owing to the crafty application of the detail 
system that allowed exemptions for individuals who produced goods essential to 
the war effort. Furthermore, Governor Brown maintained 9,000 officers for the 
state militia, second only to Governor Vance in North Carolina.2 The resolution 
for these contests of power between the federal and the state governments 
centered upon state courts, for the political stasis in Richmond prevented the 
establishment of a Confederate Supreme Court. The political divisions exposed by 
conscription demonstrated the Confederacy as foremost a contest over power, not 
principles. Resolving that dispute fell to state courts, which offered a definitive 
ruling on the federal nature of the Southern Confederacy.  
 
The legal history of the Confederacy offers one of the more interesting and 
under appreciated perspectives into Confederate politics and governance. The 
state of North Carolina in particular offers a most telling example of the legal and 
political intersection of Confederate makeup. As the site of the most pronounced 
legal challenges to federal power, the cases and ultimate rulings of the state’s 
supreme court offered the sharpest legal challenges to federal power yet even 
these failed to result in a reversal for the Davis administration. The best 
treatment of the wartime North Carolina Supreme Court is Jennifer Van Zant, 
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“Confederate Conscription and the North Carolina Supreme Court.”3 Van Zant 
writes that the North Carolina court relied upon “precedent and their principles 
in construing the statutes of the Confederate Congress.” The problem with that 
interpretation, as pointed out by Mark Neely, is that the North Carolina Supreme 
Court constitutes an extreme outlier owing to the overwhelmingly influence of a 
single justice, Judge Richmond Pearson. 
 Mark E. Neely’s Southern Rights: Political Prisoners and the Myth of 
Confederate Constitutionalism is a broad and thoroughly engaging examination 
of the legal history of the Confederacy. On the issue of the North Carolina court, 
Neely argues that the jurisprudence of Chief Justice Pearson remains anomalous, 
for the state courts in the Confederacy generally ruled in favor of the federal 
administration, which Neely concludes as evidence of the overwhelming desire on 
the part of Southerners to enjoy peace and order. Neely’s cautions against 
historical interpretations that take Southern rhetorical protests about the 
degradation and subjugation at face value. As such, Neely approaches the subject 
of federal power cynically, concluding the notion of Confederate 
Constitutionalism, with its purported roots in civil libertarianism, a myth.  
The political divisions between Governor Joseph Brown and Jefferson 
Davis are often portrayed as an example of Brown’s success as a populist and 
Davis’ failure as a popular, inspiring politician. Paul Escott’s After Secession finds 
Brown the singular rising star among state governors owing to his success in 
providing sustenance and aid to the people of Georgia. The row with Davis did 
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Court.”3 The North Carolina Historical Review, Vol., 72, No. 1 (Jan., 1995) 54-75. 
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not owe to ideology, according to Escott, but to Brown’s realization that he stood 
to gain by meeting the needs of the people. “Brown’s opportunity to gain the 
people’s affection arose from their need,” Escott writes.4 “Of all the state 
governors, [Brown] stood out as the most vigorous, determined, and effective 
defender of the common people.”5  
Despite the discomfiting political realities for state’s rights rhetoricians, as 
a replica of the United States Constitution the Confederate Constitution operated 
as intended. Davis reached for constitutional grants of federal power to defend 
the nation, which the Congress consistently granted throughout the 
Confederacy’s existence. And while the episodes with Brown may be viewed in 
light of state rights collisions, what is apparent about Davis’ row with Brown is 
Brown’s motive to preserve his powers of patronage, among the last inducements 
to loyalty left in an antiparty political climate. Brown was not unwilling to 
provide the national government with troops, but was reticent to do so without 
first obtaining some benefit. Brown was an opportunistic leader whose chief 
motive was to sustain the power of his office and advance his personal ambition. 
To the extent that serving the needs of the people allowed him to extend and 
sustain his own power, he proved a successful governor. But his efforts were not 
selfless or done out of concern for state’s rights. 
Owing to the lack of a Confederate Supreme Court, the Davis 
administration’s policies achieved resolution through an appeal to state courts. 
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As the rulings of state courts reveal, the administration enjoyed an overwhelming 
rate of success across a broad swath of the Confederacy. State supreme courts 
overwhelmingly found the Confederate Constitution an instrument of broad 
grants and strong instrumentalities to aid the execution of federal powers. State’s 
rights proponents, consigned to test the issue of state sovereignty over 
conscription and habeas corpus, found their arguments obliterated by the courts. 
The legal interrogation of the Confederate Constitution found absolutely nothing 
therein to validate state’s rights as a governing philosophy. 
 
 As the conflict with Union forces in Charleston Harbor stretched into the 
spring of 1861, the Confederate Congress invested Jefferson Davis and his 
administration with military authority, thus removing the state militia of South 
Carolina from command. Brown received the news on March 1, 1861, when 
Secretary of War Leroy Pope Walker informed state executives of Congress’ bill to 
federalize the war effort. “Under this act,” Walker instructed, “the President 
directs me to inform you that he assumes control of all military operations in 
your State.”6 Just eleven days after the dispatch, Brown replied, seeking an 
exchange of policy views. Writing to Secretary of War Walker to inquire whether 
the Confederate government would accept Georgia’s regiments with officers 
intact, Brown clouded his self-interest with a pledge of compliance. “I have 
appointed the officers for the two regiments and they are now actively engaged 
enlisting soldiers,” he wrote, presaging the issue of maintaining his powers of 
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benefaction.7 Brown desired to know whether he would be allowed to continue to 
appoint officers, a right that passed to the president under the new law. “I cannot, 
in justice to the privates who had enlisted,” Brown asserted, “tender the 
regiments unless they are received with the officers which I have appointed.” 
Should the War Department accede to his terms, Brown promised, Georgia’s 
regiments “are now at your service and subject to your order.”8 
 Brown’s letter revealed that the governor surreptitiously appointed officers 
to regiments that lacked men. Walker responded that the War Department could 
only accept staffed regiments. Never one to accede to a lessening of power, Brown 
refused to comply and the issue remained deadlocked until May 21 when Robert 
Toombs interceded, lecturing Walker that “technicalities must not stand in the 
way of harmony.”9 Suggesting that Walker overlook the letter of the law in favor 
of its spirit, Toombs preserved harmony between the administration and his 
home state for the present. Though Walker bowed to Toombs’ negotiated 
solution, he did not let the incident pass unnoted. He dispatched a letter to 
Brown with Congress’ bill along with the third article of the Confederate 
Constitution to “prevent misapprehension in the future.”10  
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8 Ibid., 23. 
 
9 Quoted in William C. Davis, A Government of Our Own: The Making of the 
Confederacy (New York: Free Press, 1994) 214. 
10 The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, Volume III, 36. The 
resolution passed on February 13 read; “That this Government takes under its 
charge the questions and difficulties now existing between the several States of 
this Confederacy and the Government of the United States relating to the 
occupation of the forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other public establishments, 
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 Throughout the opening days of April, Brown continued to harangue the 
War Department on the point of mustering troops in the state of Georgia, 
insisting that his point was merely legal. “When the troops leave Georgia they are 
under no law till they are mustered into the service. The officers object to leave 
the State till it is done.”11 In professing to look after his constituents, Brown 
challenged the will of the administration over the right to appoint officers for 
regiments headed for service in the national army. Indeed, no other state 
executive issued raised such protests. Walker, irritated, curtly replied to the 
recalcitrant Brown, “I cannot make an exceptional case of the Georgia troops.” 
The secretary then demanded that Georgia’s enlistments be mustered into federal 
service.12  
 Brown’s attempt to retain the vestiges of patronage could not be so easily 
overcome. On April 18 he again wrote to the War Department promising to meet 
his quota if Walker agreed to the stipulation that the officers he appointed 
remain. “I have a division of volunteers nearly organized,” Brown informed the 
Secretary of War. “Will you accept them by division and brigades?” he inquired, 
claiming that to do so “would greatly facilitate” the transfer of troops.13 An 
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11 The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, Volume III, 36. 
 
12 Ibid., April 3, 1861, 38. 
13 The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, Volume III, April 18, 1861, 
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overwhelmed Walker responded that he did not have time to consider Brown’s 
request. In the face of Walker’s exasperation, Brown proved relentless. 
The tough-minded Georgian fired another missive to the department on 
April 27 asking to be appraised of law’s specific language that transferred the 
rights of appointing officers and surgeons to the nation’s chief executive, despite 
Walker having included the act of congress in the earlier dustup that Toombs 
resolved. He also sought to know whether Walker acted consistently with other 
state troops. On April 29 Walker offered a retort that ignored much of Brown’s 
protest: “I appoint them.”14 The secretary signed off without salutation, evidently 
exhausted. Having predicted peace, the responsibilities of his office were proving 
too much for the lawyer turned administrator. Faltering, Walker resigned just six 
months into his term.  
Judah Benjamin briefly stepped in as the acting secretary, and sustained 
the administration’s argument with Brown. Possessing a sharp mind and 
commendable industry, Benjamin carried forth the administration’s case that 
Congress nationalized the war for the coordination of a common defense. 
Throughout the administration’s exchange, Benjamin concealed the fact that the 
military faced acute manpower shortages owing to Davis’ strategy of defending all 
points along the Confederate border. 15 Believing such a strategy necessary to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, Volume III, April 25, 1861, 
62. 
 
15 “[Davis] believed he had to maintain a visible military presence throughout his 
country, or he would face ‘dissatisfaction, distress, desertion of soldiers, 
opposition of State Govts.’” Quoted from William J. Cooper, Jefferson Davis, 
American (New York: Vintage Books, 2001) 379. 
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retain allegiance from the far reaches of the Confederacy, Davis’ insistence 
stressed the logistical capacity of the military, which was quickly revealed by the 
defeats at Forts Henry and Donelson, the Confederate route at Roanoke, and the 
creeping advance of George B. McClellan’s Union Army up the James River 
toward Richmond, the Confederacy’s capitol after Virginia’s secession in mid 
April. 
Amidst the cascading Union advances, the Confederate Congress grew 
restive and political considerations interceded momentarily. Seeking to 
understand the reasons for the reversals of arms, criticism focused on Secretary 
of War Benjamin. Rather than reveal the woeful state of the shortages, Benjamin 
accepted responsibility and resigned.16 Appreciative of Benjamin’s skill and 
devotion, Davis moved Benjamin into the newly vacated State Department after 
R.M.T. Hunter won a seat in the Confederate Senate. It seemed Hunter had little 
interest in the largely symbolic office and left after less than one year. In just two 
years Davis was already on his third secretaries in the departments of war and 
state.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
16 The Confederate House assembled a special committee to investigate 
responsibility for the debacle at Roanoke, which claimed the life of O. Jennings 
Wise, the son of the former governor of Virginia and current political general, 
Henry Wise. In its ruling, the committee could not ascertain with certainty the 
party responsible, so it concluded, “from the testimony…that whatever blame and 
responsibility is justly attributable to any one for the defeat of our troops at 
Roanoke Island on February 8, 1862, should attach to Maj. Gen. B. Huger and the 
late Secretary of War, J.P. Benjamin.” Official Records, Series I, Volume 9, 190-1. 
Judah Benjamin biographer Roubert Douthat Meade believes Jefferson Davis the 
committee’s real target, with the censure of Benjamin serving as a warning that 
Congress would not look kindly on Davis exerting sole influence on the War 
Department. Meade, Judah P. Benjamin, Confederate Statesman (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1943) 228. 
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With the political make up of his cabinet resolved, Davis addressed the 
issue of manpower shortages by moving forward with a conscription bill drafted 
by General Robert E. Lee. By December of 1861 Lee expressed his desire for the 
central administration of the war effort. He wrote, “I think it only necessary to 
repeat more emphatically than I perhaps have been able to do in person the 
urgent necessity of bringing out the military strength of the State and putting it 
under the best and most permanent organization.” In order to achieve 
independence, Lee penned, “The Confederate States have now but one great 
objective in view...Everything should yield to its accomplishment.”17 The 
estimable Virginian thus proved an early and consistent proponent of federal 
power.  
The act granted the Confederate government the compulsory service of 
male citizens ages 18-35. As the new law went into effect, Davis needed to appoint 
a new Secretary of War. Having lost one Virginian, he turned to another. Davis 
selected the grandson of Thomas Jefferson, George Wythe Randolph. A 
proponent of Southern independence, Randolph authored Virginia’s conscription 
act of 1861, an ordinance that created and regulated state forces. His experience, 
Davis hoped, would accord vital knowledge in executing such a bill on a national 
level.18 As the new secretary, it fell to Randolph to inform Brown on April 15, 
1862 of the Conscription Act, a bill certain to arouse Brown’s ire for it surpassed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Official Records of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol. 6, 350. 
 
18 George Green Shackleford, George Wythe Randolph and the Confederate Elite 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988) 68. 
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all of Brown’s previous reservations about the abating influence of his office. 
Although Brown was now tangling with the scion of Thomas Jefferson, his desire 
to remain firmly in control of appointing officers continued. By this stage, 
however, Davis waded into the dispute. On the 17 of April, President Davis wrote 
to Governor Brown to urge him to turn over his state’s regiments while organized 
rather than releasing recruits to Confederate authorities as a mob. Davis’ 
pleading was to no avail. Having acted by the letter of the law, Brown cheekily 
informed the War Department in a letter dispatched on the same day as Davis’ 
urging cooperation that he had turned out his state troops in handing them over 
to federal authority. As a result, General John Jackson of Georgia was now 
without command, and among his former soldiers “there is great 
dissatisfaction…some are almost mutinous.” Worry not though, Brown penned, 
“Jackson’s appointment by the President to the command of the division, as it 
was, would have a most happy effect at a critical moment.”19 Yet again Brown 
sought any means to keep his prerogatives alive, even to the extent that his 
actions bordered on outright defiance.  
An exasperated Davis could do little but chastise the unrepentant 
governor. It was not until April 22 that Brown informed Davis of his view about 
conscription’s attack upon the traditional powers of his office. He protested that 
conscription constituted the very consolidation that Georgia sought to escape. 
Furthermore, he asserted that federally administered conscription stripped his 
office of its ability to shield vital positions within state government from the 
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nation’s grasp. The remonstrating Brown argued, “The conscription act…places it 
in his [meaning Davis’s] power to destroy her State Government by disbanding 
her law-making power.” Asserting that the Founding Fathers intended to codify 
the supremacy of the states, the contentious Georgian advanced a specious 
argument that all men of the state were members of its militia since they 
constituted its potential manpower pool. To remove men from the state, as the 
Conscription Act permitted, undermined the militia and exposed the state’s 
citizens to invasion to say nothing of subjecting its male citizens to the capricious 
dictates of federal authority. All of this, he complained, destroyed the principle of 
self-government. With his tautological logic, Brown argued that the present 
arrangement overthrew the Founders’ intent to place the national government in 
a subservient position to the states.20  
Brown understood the legislation as shifting control and influence from 
the states and thus sought to share power by appealing to the rhetoric of state’s 
rights. Brown did not inhabit an immovable, principled position, the evidence of 
which is revealed by his supplicating closing. Pledging fidelity if Davis would 
permit him to continue exercising unfettered control over the appointment of 
officers, Brown would gladly, “reserve the question of the constitutionality of the 
act and its binding force upon the people of this State for their consideration at a 
time when it may less seriously embarrass the Confederacy in the prosecution of 
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the war.”21 In closing with this astonishing suggestion, the supposed paragon of 
states’ rights principles revealed himself as a consummate politician willing to 
barter away principle for power. 
Davis’ response objected to Brown’s suggestion of an arrangement. He 
gently chastised Brown by disputing the Georgian’s reading of the law by 
distinguishing the right to raise a national army as separate from the right to call 
out the state militia. Davis insisted that the issues not be conflated and closed by 
affirming that the subject was not open to exemption. “[The] intent of Congress is 
to me, as to you, to be learned from its acts….” The law deserved compliance, not 
subversive arrangements.22 Davis’ censorious retort enraged Brown. If Davis 
would not bend the spirit of the law, then Brown intended to attack its very letter. 
On May 8 he wrote a lengthy response refuting an argument that no one had 
advanced: “State rights and State sovereignty must yield for a time to the higher 
law of necessity.” In all of the correspondence from Davis, Walker, Benjamin and 
now Randolph, the administration asserted a clear and consistent message. 
Congress acted out if its constitutional prerogatives to provide for the national 
defense. The administration was not pursuing an extralegal course, but rather the 
directive of the Congress. When confronted by national crisis, Congress turned to 
the Constitution, and not beyond it. The notion of “necessity” is a fabrication of 
Brown’s, for the federal government, as Davis advanced, possessed a clear and 
compelling legal right to pursue the course of federal conscription. But even in 
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22 Ibid., April 28, 1862, 200-1. 
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this moment of purported dispute, Brown revealed that he was prepared to 
concede the principle if the federal government merely offered him the right to 
continue administering conscription. 
Having previously sought a power sharing arrangement, Brown now took 
up all points in opposing the unchecked abatement of his influence. Lecturing 
Davis, Brown argued that calling out the militia and raising men for national 
defense “are all contained in the same section of the Constitution, and by a well 
known rule of construction, must be taken as a whole and construed together.” 
Harping on this novel point since it served as the only legal defense for his 
position, Brown asserted that since the federal executive could only raise an army 
through the militia, it was subject to the oversight of the governor. Brown 
unsurprisingly joyed at his conclusion. “The States,” he affirmed, “shall appoint 
the officers.” Again, for Brown it was not misgivings about power that provoked 
disobedience, but who would administer such power.23 The letter of May 8 from 
Brown to Davis offers a remarkably extended thesis of Brown’s attempt to 
advance a constitutional basis from which he could defend his views. Brown 
remains content with the purpose of enlisting Georgian’s for service in a national 
army, but sought to play a role in selecting officers and filling regiments. Letters 
passed between Brown and the War Department throughout the remainder of 
May with Randolph doing his best to calm Brown’s concerns yet firmly adhering 
to administration policy. The Constitution granted the executive the power to 
meet the exigency of national defense. The clarity of the law was occluded only in 
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the eyes of Brown. Unable to accede to delegation and piqued at Brown’s 
continual challenge to his authority, Davis provided Brown with a final, definitive 
rebuttal. 
Davis finally answered Brown as the governor’s arguments attracted the 
attention of Confederate malcontents. Determined to stamp out the embers of 
dissent, Davis wrote Brown by speaking of the broad consensus among the 
delegates at Montgomery to sustain the old Constitution’s governing 
arrangements. Not to be lectured on original intent, Davis touched on the broadly 
accepted notion that the Constitution gave the federal branch supreme authority 
in a time of war. Davis succinctly defined the national government of the 
Confederacy as “combin[ing] the power of the several members.”24 Though the 
president’s point was plain, Davis asserted federal power as the very reason for 
the Southern states joining in a federation. To safeguard the perpetuity of that 
nation, Davis underlined his convictions through a series of avowals. “I see 
nothing which confines Congress to one class of men,” he began. Continuing to 
speak of Congress’ right to raise an army, he furthered, “I see no limitation by 
which enlistments are to be received of individuals only.” Adding, “I find no 
limitation of the time of service.” Davis closed his thought with a final flourish: “I 
discover nothing to confine Congress to waging war within the limits of the 
confederacy, nor to prohibit offensive war.” The governor’s logic, Davis 
concluded, “appears to me unsound.”25 Carrying Brown’s argument to its logical 
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25 The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, 240-1. 
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conclusion, Davis pointed out his alarming implications. If the militia could only 
be called to national service in defense, this suggested that the framers had not 
provided the United States or the Confederate States of America with the means 
to expand. “Surely,” Davis delighted, “this cannot have been the intention of the 
framers of our compact.”26 For Davis, at least, the Confederacy appropriated the 
federal arrangement of power so as to remain an expansionist empire.27 The 
Confederacy sprang forth from the right to spread its institutions and to partake 
in expansion.  
Brown replied to Davis’ forceful repudiation by admonishing Davis for his 
Hamiltonian tone. “You enunciate a doctrine which I must be pardoned for 
saying, struck me with surprise,” an acerbic Brown noted. Such sentiment “was 
first proclaimed, I believe, almost as strongly, by Mr. Hamilton in the Federalist.” 
After a tendentious defense of his own views, Brown hammered at Davis’ 
position. The Conscription Act strikes “a blow at the very existence of the State, 
by disbanding the portion of her militia left within her limits.” he declared. 
Hiding behind the issue of invasion and slave insurrection, Brown protested, “I 
felt it an imperative…that I could not permit…State officers to be compelled to 
leave their respective commands and enter the Confederate service as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
26 Ibid., 245 
 
27 Walter Johnson’s River of Dark Dreams, Slavery and Kingdom in the Cotton 
Kingdom (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013) traces 
the desire of what he terms “re-openers” to renew and expand slave trading and 
to project the power of slave owners throughout the continent and ultimately 
beyond. Their effort was but one component of “ an imperial vision of the future 
of slavery, patriarchy, and white supremacy.” 418. 
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Conscripts.” Davis, eager to snuff out Brown’s agitation, published their 
correspondence. The standoff led Secretary Randolph to quip, “We might as well 
drive out our common enemy before we make war on each other.”28  
As their exchange of letters drew to a close in the summer months, the 
administration turned the issue over to the courts in Georgia while Brown sought 
support from a familiar target of his obsequiousness, Alexander Stephens. 
Writing to the vice president, a supplicating Brown professed, “I entered into this 
revolution to contribute my humble might to sustain the rights of the states.” 
Upset with Davis for publishing the correspondence without permission, Brown 
objected to the portrait of him revealed by their communication and turned to 
Stephens for approbation of his arguments. Brown complained, “It was not fair to 
publish part of the correspondence…Can it be that the object was to obtain a 
verdict of the people without permitting the whole case to go to the jury?”29 Many 
of Stephens’ close friends objected to Brown’s unashamed ploys for Stephen’s 
affections. J. Henly Smith thought Brown “a dirty low-down man” whose evident 
motives distasteful.30 Fellow Georgian Cobb went further, calling the wily Brown 
“a miserable demagogue.”31 As Stephens’ biographer Thomas Schott writes, 
“Brown, an oleaginous politician, who when cornered could have taught a 
chameleon some tricks, recognized Stephens’ popularity with the people. So he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 C.R. Ga., III, 248-9. 
 
29 Brown to Stephens, July 2, 1862, Stephens Papers, Robert E. Woodruff Library, 
Emory University. 
 
30 October 16, 1861 Smith to Stephens, Stephens Papers, LC. 
 
31 Correspondence TSC, 568. 
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had assiduously courted his opinions and played shamelessly to his vanity. Little 
Aleck…found such blandishments difficult to resist.”32 Clearly the portrait of 
Brown as a solipsist portrayed him in an unpatriotic light. Brown sought to 
defend against such condemnation by avowing that he acted out of states’ rights 
principles, not ambition.33 With Stephens in Richmond, it fell to Linton to align 
the trio’s dissenting opinions. 
In the wake of the publication, the outmaneuvered Georgian mocked Davis 
for the manner in which he broke off their communication. Responding to Davis’ 
letter announcing his intent to turn the controversy over to the courts, Brown 
chastised Davis for closing, “I cannot share the alarm and concern about State 
Rights which you so evidently feel, but which to me seem quite unfounded.”34 
Brown fired back, “I regret that you cannot.” Revealing states’ rights as less a 
principle than a condition, Brown suggested Davis had succumbed to the 
temptations of his own office. “The views and opinions of the best men are 
influenced more or less by the positions in which they are placed,” he wrote, and 
with mock surprise accused the president of perfidiousness: “It is probably not 
unnatural that those who administer the affairs and disburse the patronage of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Thomas Schott, Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia: A Biography (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988) 342. 
 
33 For an interesting perspective see, Joseph H. Parks, “States Rights in a Crisis: 
Governor Joseph E. Brown Versus President Jefferson Davis,” The Journal of 
Southern History, Vol., 32, No. 1 (Feb., 1966) 3-24. Parks maintains that Brown 
remained a divided figure. He worked toward and earnestly “desired peace and 
security, yet he opposed the development of concentrated power which alone 
might guarantee these desires.” Parks’ estimation heavily relies on the sincerity of 
Brown’s rhetoric. 
 
34 C.R. Ga., III, 285-6. 
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confederation of States should become to some extent biased in favor of the 
claims of the Confederacy when its powers are questioned.”35 As Davis could 
perceive no advantage in response, he left the issue to the state courts. 
  
The Confederate Constitution called for the creation of a Supreme Court, 
but in the halcyon days of 1861 Confederate leaders postponed the establishment 
of a Supreme Court until the approval of the permanent constitution. Broaching 
the subject required caution, for inveterate fire-eaters like Louis Wigfall issued 
“venomous attacks” upon Chief Justice John Marshall for establishing judicial 
review and federal authority, though he remained quiet about his likely sympathy 
with the rulings of Roger Taney.36 Secessionists worried about reestablishing 
similar precedents within the Confederacy, thus making any definitive resolution 
unlikely.37  The desire to avoid fracture had played into the hands of traditionally 
minded men like Alexander Stephens and Christopher Memminger. Despite the 
success of a conventional agenda, the lack of a supreme court left the divisions 
between the states and the Confederate government up to the various state courts 
to resolve. These conservative delegates pushed for the continuation of previous 
governing arrangements at Montgomery, resulting in the largely unaltered 
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36 Publications of the Southern History Association (Washington, D.C.: 1900) 
Vol. 4, 84-7. The issue of United States legal precedent is one of some confusion 
among recent scholars, but remains a subject of import due to the Provisional 
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adoption of the United States Constitution. Moreover, their conventional agenda 
met further success when the Confederate delegates retained United States legal 
precedence. Such a move, done with intent to place the Confederate legal system 
on as traditional a footing as possible, had far-reaching consequence. It provided 
firm ties to the old government, and embedded old arguments about the nature 
of federal power into the new Confederate republic. 
 As 1863 dawned Senator Benjamin Hill grew tired of the unsettled nature 
of the Supreme Court and urged its establishment. He cajoled his colleagues, 
calling it “high time the judicial department be thoroughly organized, for it has 
been a limping concern long enough.” Just after the establishment of the 
permanent Congress Thomas Semmes had put a bill before the Confederate 
Congress for just such consideration, but it languished. Upon hearing word of 
Hill’s bill, Louis Wigfall expressed his hostility. An opponent of establishing the 
court when a delegate in Montgomery, Wigfall sustained his assault against the 
Supreme Court of the United States as responsible for secession. In his own 
words, “If Marshall had been a small, weak man, there would have been no 
‘monstrous despotism’ to engender dissolution.”38 In an effort to forestall the 
court’s establishment, Wigfall quarreled with the proposed salary range for 
judges. Such a move, he explained, owed to his desire to avoid an intellectually 
rigorous bench. “I do not think it desirable to have the first talent in this court,” 
Wigfall pronounced. “Had Marshall attended to the small business of his court, 
the Union would not now be disrupted.” For the inveterate fire-eater, the course 
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of judicial review “warped into the monstrous despotism from which we found it 
necessary to break away.” Pointing to the fundamental purpose of his obduracy, 
he concluded: “It is said by an old writer that the Book of Judges went before the 
Book of Kings. I have the same opinion of the courts.”39 Wigfall did not believe 
states’ rights could survive probing legal examination. 
With Congress unable to come to a resolution, the contentious political 
arguments about the limits of federal power fell to state courts to resolve. In 
Georgia, the argument between Davis and Brown came down to the case Jeffers 
v. Fair. Davis’s chief contention with Brown owed to the governor’s assertion that 
the power to raise an army and the power to call out the militia fell under the 
same purview of constitutional authority. With the state militia an undoubted 
prerogative of governors, Brown had sought a legal avenue for exerting state 
control over the federal government by making it dependent on the state to raise 
an army. As Davis saw it, no such intention existed, and collapsing the clauses 
into a single meaning was misguided. With this proxy argument over federal 
power before the court, Georgia’s justices interrogated the purpose of the 
Confederacy as outlined in the Constitution.  In turning directly to the language 
of the Constitution, the court intuited the guiding principle of Confederate 
nationhood as: “’The Confederate States shall guaranty to every State that now is, 
or hereafter may become, a member of this Confederacy, a republican form of 
government.’” If the premise of the Confederacy included a guaranty of 
republican government as the bonding element, it proceeded to ask: “Can a 
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republican form of government be maintained without the necessary 
instrumentalities?”40 Without federal power the court wondered, by what means 
could the states guarantee a common commitment to republican government?  
Indeed, if each state could claim the power to review federal law, interpret the 
intent of congress, or circumvent obligations for a common defense, then the very 
guarantee of republican government seemed doubtful.  
In following the premise of a federated commitment to republican 
government, the Georgia Supreme Court questioned the validity of states’ rights. 
The justices wondered how states’ rights as a governing philosophy might be 
executed. Taking up Brown’s proxy argument through Jeffers the court 
wondered, by what standard might government actions be judged? And, upon 
whose authority might grants of power be ruled as legitimate or over-extended? 
The selective quality of states’ rights worried the judges:  
Those who would thus limit the power of Congress, seem to forget that voluntary 
enlistment is not mentioned as a means in the Constitution. Upon what then 
rests their limitation? Clearly on their own notions of fitness and propriety. And 
upon these points of view how variant are men’s ideas!41  
 
Finding serious qualms with the capricious quality of states’ rights, the 
court turned to both the preamble of the Confederate Constitution and the sixth 
clause of Article 6 because states’ rights proponents held out both as indicating 
the state-centric foundation of the republic. The preamble asserted, “each State 
acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent 
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Federal Government…do ordain and establish this Constitution.”42 Further 
reinforcing their view of the Constitution’s limits on state sovereignty, the 
language contained within Article 6 stated: “The power not delegated to the 
Confederate States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it, to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people thereof.”43 In the eyes of 
states’ rights supporters, these constitutional clauses affirmed the basis of states’ 
rights within the Confederacy. 
Interrogating such a perspective, the Georgia court returned to the issue of 
“instrumentalities,” or the grants of power necessary to carrying out obligations 
within the Constitution. What troubled the justices about Brown’s argument was 
the fact that as a philosophy of government, states’ rights seemed too broadly 
construed. When specific grants of power and their limiting qualities were 
investigated the bolstering arguments for states’ rights derived their legitimacy 
from conviction and platitudes, not from a close reading of statutes. As such, the 
judges concluded that states’ rights “are referable to no criterion, measurable by 
no standard. Something more weighty than vague abstractions must be invoked 
to induce us to fetter the government in the exercise of a power, upon the vigor of 
which depends our national existence.”44 Such a revelation proved devastating for 
the legal cause of states’ rights, and revealed the difficulty of attempting to 
advance a limited definition of government in the area of national defense. 
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In language nearly identical to that by which Davis defended federal power 
to Brown, the court reasoned that the framers of the Constitution unquestionably 
would not have created obligations without granting the power to fulfill 
responsibilities. In the specific language of the court, “As a general grant of power 
includes the means necessary to its exercise, so a general reservation of power 
includes its necessary instrumentalities.” In one sweeping sentence the court 
found the exalted phrases of states’ rights proponents unpersuasive.45  
Having fairly demolished states’ rights as a guiding principle of 
governance, the justices demonstrated their lack of patience with such 
arguments. Namely, they held that the Constitution adopted by the Confederacy 
contained broad sanctions of federal power to defend the nation. In the 
sentiment of the court: 
If the true construction of the Constitution be, that in deference to State 
sovereignty the Confederate Government must depend upon the separate, 
unconcerted action of the several States for the exercise of powers granted 
to it in the general comprehensive terms, it is but the shadow of a 
government, the experiment of Confederate Republics must inevitably fail, 
and the sooner it is abandoned the better.46 
 
With this astonishing statement the Georgia court eviscerated states’ rights 
arguments. It also added in firm language, “If the doctrine set up of late be true, 
this is the weakest and most contemptible government on earth; it is neither fit 
for war or peace, it has failed of all the ends for which governments are 
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established.”47 In sweeping away the very contention of states’ rights as a 
governing principle in the Confederacy, the court ruled the Constitution clear in 
granting sovereign federal powers to guaranty the perpetuity of the nation. 
 
Despite Davis’s success in Georgia, the administration faced a serious test 
from North Carolina, where the composition of North Carolina’s court amplified 
the power of its judges, for North Carolina capped the time and frequency of the 
court’s full sessions and allowed its judges to independently hear cases while not 
in session. These rulings, “in chambers,” bore the force of law until the full court 
vacated them during a regular session. In the provincial town of Richmond Hill 
north of Charlotte near the state line with Virginia, Chief Justice Richmond 
Pearson held court. Absent a higher national court, Judge Pearson’s state 
Supreme Court rulings carried a weight magnified in his state.48 With wartime 
exigencies and the illness of fellow Justice Matthias Manly during the summer 
session of 1863, Pearson’s power went unchecked for a considerable stretch. 
While South Carolina courts heard but a single case, North Carolina issued 
rulings for an unparalleled forty-six cases concerning habeas corpus between 
1863-4 owing to Pearson’s proclivity to hear cases that challenged federal 
power.49 
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 Judge Pearson took full advantage of his situation. Hearing cases far 
beyond the normal scope of jurisdiction, Pearson announced his legal opposition 
to the extent of federal wartime powers with his June 1863 decision in the case of 
John Irvin. Irvin had hired a substitute during the first Conscription Act but was 
arrested after Congress revised the provisions of the Conscription Act in May 
1863, making his substitute eligible on his own right.50 In re Irvin Judge Pearson 
ruled that the September revision did not apply to men already in the army. 
Rather, its application was limited to those not yet enrolled. Pearson thus 
rejected the attempt of Congress to make the principal individual liable by ruling 
that Congress lacked the requisite legislative purview to abrogate a contract.51 
Pearson’s decision announced North Carolina as the surprise battleground for 
legal challenges to federal authority. 
The Confederate Congress’ delay in renewing Davis’ ability to suspend 
habeas corpus in 1863 allowed to Pearson to issue writs. With Pearson’s actions 
compounded by the nascent stirrings of a peace party in the Tar Heel State, 
Attorney General Thomas Bragg, a native North Carolinian, resigned from the 
cabinet in order to return home and act as an emissary between Governor 
Zebulon Vance and Jefferson Davis. Upon arrival Bragg took up work with the 
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district attorney in Raleigh, where he learned the staggering scope of the legal 
challenges facing the administration. Bragg informed Davis that an astounding 
number of habeas cases awaited trial, “some thirty,” of which twenty-seven 
belonged to Pearson.52 The administration inveighed against Pearson’s in Irvin 
and continued to conscript able-bodied men. Pearson responded by hearing In re 
Meroney in 1863 Pearson openly accused the administration of detaining 
Meroney’s in an attempt to challenge his authority. The judge’s ruling on July 9, 
offered a portent of his dissatisfaction with the federal government and stinging 
criticism of the executive’s purported behavior. “It is said that the arrest of 
Meroney was ordered in disregard of the decision in the matter of Irvin, because 
the Secretary of War does not consider the construction given…’a sound 
exposition of the act.’” With matters of conscription having seemingly assumed a 
contest of wills, Pearson shot back, “Who made the Secretary of War a judge?”53 
Pearson granted Meroney’s exemption, overtly challenging the executive with an 
aggressive demonstration of his court’s unyielding nature. 
Pearson continued to ratchet the pressure. In re Bryan, Pearson ruled that 
state courts had the right to review congressional acts when it involved the 
citizens of the state. The judge recapitulated his ruling from Merony, arguing that 
Congress could not grant the Secretary of War the powers of a judge. Given the 
absence of a Confederate Supreme Court, since any collisions of understanding 
would go unresolved. Pearson ruled his court held jurisdictional power to 
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construe writs of habeas corpus. Justice Battle assented to Justice Pearson’s in 
ruling in favor of Maroney, yet Battle did so by affirming the legality of the 
Conscription Acts. Citing The Federalist as indicative of original intent, Battle 
held that the authority to review remained within the state and quoted 
Hamilton’s Federalist Number 82, which outlined the use of concurrent 
jurisdiction between the state and federal governments. Simply, Hamilton 
outlined how state courts possessed the right of review, unless explicitly 
prohibited by Congress.  Quoting the passage specifically, Battle concluded: “The 
States will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively 
delegated to the federal head….And under this impression, I shall lay it down as a 
rule, that the State courts will retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it 
appears to be taken away in one of the enumerated modes.” Invoking The 
Federalist introduced a provocative link between new and old arguments over 
federal sovereignty. As a source of authority, turning to The Federalist offered a 
potentially discomforting portent to state’s rights advocates, with Hamilton’s 
assertions of the right of judicial review and favorable assessments of federal 
power.54 
The court battles continued to escalate in Maroney’s wake. In re Russell 
Daniel Lindsay Russell Jr., an intemperate eighteen-year old son of a well-
connected North Carolina planter, quarreled with a senior officer and absconded 
in the aftermath. Russell was captured while claiming to be transferring units, 
which lead Confederate authorities to strip Russell of rank and hold him until 
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court martial. Family connections came to the rescue, however, when Governor 
Vance tapped the intemperate Russell as commissioner for Brunswick, his home 
county. Upon word of his appointment Russell sued for his release and sought the 
distant court of Judge Pearson. Pearson, who lived 200 miles from Brunswick, 
unsurprisingly obliged to hear the case. Given the relatively straightforward fact 
that Governor Vance selected Russell to serve as a county commissioner, an office 
exempt from conscription, Pearson ruled in Russell’s favor. However, in ruling in 
favor of Russell, Pearson asserted state sovereignty as the principle of law and 
offered a most suspect logic for his legal opinion. “The Confederate government is 
a creature of the States,” he avowed before claiming a privileged view of original 
intent, which he discerned “from the very nature of things.” Pearson found it 
“absurd to suppose, that the intention was to make a grant of power, which would 
enable the creature to destroy its creation, and cause the existence of the States to 
be dependent on the pleasure of Congress.” With this declaration, Pearson 
granted Russell his release.55  
The next case on Pearson’s docket, In the matter of Cain, challenged the 
legality of Congress’ suspension of habeas corpus. In suspending habeas corpus, 
Congress afforded conscription officers the right to detain absconded conscripts, 
even in the face of legal writs, since they acted under the authority of the 
President. Pearson parsed habeas corpus by noting that there were in fact three 
different definitions of the writ, and ruled that in the circumstances where the 
plaintiff is held without a clarification of criminal acts, the suspension is illegal 
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and the accused must be produced before the court.56 Pearson asked: “Will it be 
said Congress has power to pass an act, and then make it a crime to apply for a 
civil remedy to test its constitutionality, and to suspend the privilege of habeas 
corpus, so as to exclude the question from the Courts? (! ! !) I shall leave the 
proposition stated nakedly, to be looked at in silence, as the best mode of 
exposing its error.”57 After Pearson’s Cain ruling Jefferson Davis wrote to Bragg 
expressing displeasure, astonishment, but most of all resolve. The president 
opened his letter by sounding a note of optimism, writing that since Pearson’s 
decision Congress had renewed the suspension of habeas corpus, which Davis 
hoped shifted the legal authority clearly in his favor. He also expressed outrage at 
Pearson’s assertion that a state’s judicial branch possessed the authority to 
ascertain the intent of congressional legislation. But Davis expressed optimism 
that since Pearson’s ruling occurred during the court’s vacation, it stood a good 
chance of being overturned in full session. Despite such sanguinity, Davis 
informed Bragg that should Judge Pearson continue to prove obstinate the 
administration would seek to vacate his authority. “I do not believe that his 
decision is right,” the chief executive confided. “The public interest will not suffer 
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by awaiting the result of the appeal…. I shall not shrink from the issue.”58 If 
Pearson sustained his wayward rulings, Davis was prepared to arrest the judge.  
Having recovered from his illness, Judge Manly came to Davis’ aid. 
Joining Battle and Pearson in a full session in June 1864, Manly and Battle 
overruled Pearson’s Cain decision by pointing to Congress’ authority to pass 
conscription.59 Although at times Battle shared Pearson’s sympathies, he wrote 
the majority opinion, Gatlin v. Walton, finding the grant and exercise of federal 
power as legitimate. Justice Battle’s decision quoted directly from the United 
States Constitution and The Federalist. He wrote that the war powers are given in 
“the most unlimited terms,” before venturing on to cite the “23d No. of the 
Federalist,” in which Battle assented to Hamilton’s opinion: “’These powers ought 
to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent 
and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of 
the means, which many be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that 
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional 
shackles can wisely be imposed on the power, to which the care of it is 
committed.’ This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced 
mind, carries its own evidence along with it, and may be obscured, but cannot be 
made plainer, by argument or reasoning.” Pearson offered his dissent, but from 
that moment forward, Pearson’s influence waned and North Carolina’s court 
rulings returned to norm with Manly and Battle moderating the acrimonious 
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Pearson. For a brief period, North Carolina had been the site of a pointed 
challenge to federal authority, but the overwhelming weight of the law ultimately 
crushed the challenge within the state. 
Adding to the federal administration’s quiver, South Carolina and Texas 
state courts also ruled conscription and the suspension of habeas corpus the 
rightful constitutional prerogatives of the federal government. In Texas in 
particular, Ex parte Coupeland included an astonishing affirmation of federal 
power. The “power to raise and support armies is an express constitutional grant 
to the Congress of the Confederate States, and there is no limitation as to the 
mode or manner of exercising it,” the ruling proffered. The court also found, “The 
general government is not dependent upon the will either of the citizen or of the 
State, to carry into effect the power to raise and support armies.”60 There was 
hardly be a more sweeping statement in support of the executive and Congress’ 
use of federal power. 
Brown understandably recoiled at these decisions. He accused his state 
court of deciding the case ex parte, and rebuked the ruling as demonstrative of 
ineptitude.61 Alexander Stephens joined Brown, expressing astonishment at the 
court’s decision, believing the finding to be as sweeping as it was misguided. 
According to Stephens, “Such a rehash of Old Federal doctrine as this decision 
presents I have not met with in many a day. If its principles be correct, on what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 168-9 Moore, Ex Parte Coupleand 26. 
 
61 Brown message to the Legislature, quoted in Albert Burton Moore, 
Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1996) 170. 
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ground can our court justify our present position toward the Federal 
Government? It must be a rebellion.”62 Stephens dare not interrogate the logic of 
the court’s decisions further in that regard. He had exerted such effort in 
Montgomery to instill the old Constitution in the new Southern Confederacy. 
Having pushed for a conservative document of federal power, he recoiled at its 
applications that he felt upset the balance of civilian authority and control over 
the military.  
In the wake of the ruling Brown complained about the lessening 
significance of state office and expressed surreptitious desires to seek national 
office. Brown admitted to C.B. Wellborn, “I am free to say that I have but little 
relish for the Executive office since the Conscription Act has taken it out of my 
power to be of service to our glorious cause in our time of trial.”63 Despite such 
earnestly professed convictions to safeguard states’ sights, Brown desired most of 
all to remain at the center of political action. Although his spirited defense of 
state prerogatives won plaudits from some corners of the Confederacy, Brown’s 
contest with the president resulted in a cool reception from state legislators, who 
warily guarded against Brown’s posturing. His ambition thwarted, Brown 
declined to campaign against Davis and instead ran for an unprecedented fourth 
term as Georgia’s governor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Richard M. Johnston and William H. Browne, Life of Alexander Stephens 
(Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Co., 1878) 430. 
 
63 Joseph H. Parks, Joseph E. Brown or Georgia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1977) 211. 
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In a resounding success for the administration of Davis, Southern state 
courts affirmed the Confederate Constitution’s broad grant of federal powers. 
Their rulings elucidating the Confederate Constitution as an instrument 
establishing consolidated and sovereign federal powers just as Davis argued, 
envisioned, and executed. Furthermore, as in the case of the Texas court, the 
standing of states’ rights as anything but a rhetorical stance was summarily 
demolished. Despite the potential for chaos, the rulings of the thirty-seven state 
justices in the nine states of the Confederacy largely upheld federal prerogatives. 
In the end, state supreme courts ruled that the Confederate Constitution granted 
the federal government expansive and supreme power over the states for 
common defense. 64 In facing the litigation over the federal powers at his 
disposal, Davis did not lose a single case over the Conscription Acts. Despite 
having to rely on a variety of state courts, all affirmed the administration’s stance 
and in the process thoroughly dismissed any legal existence of states’ rights. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
“CONSOLATION” 
 
As the Confederacy’s fortunes darkened in the winter of 1864, Jefferson 
Davis appeared before the Confederate Congress to call for a most radical 
revision of national policy. With perhaps as much as two-thirds of the army 
absent and the Confederacy only able to field one-quarter of the manpower of the 
Union, Davis turned to the final recourse, enlisting slaves.1 Calling his proposal a 
“radical modification in the theory of the law,” the president pushed the Congress 
to extend federal power into an avowedly domestic sphere. Supported by his 
military counsels and state governors, Davis pursued a consistently nationalist 
approach to defend the life of the nation. Even, it seemed, when the federal 
policies he sought challenged the identity of the nation. 
From conscription to habeas corpus, federal power enjoyed a consistent, 
central role in the political life of the Confederacy. Indeed, the steady expansion 
of federal power in the United and Confederate States mirrored each other 
throughout the first years of war until the Union advanced the Emancipation 
Proclamation in 1863. By February 1865, Davis called for the Confederacy to 
match the Union’s provision in a demonstration of the general copacetic comfort 
with federal power. Moreover, the last, most extensive application of national 
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power in the Confederacy came at the behest of state newspapers, governors, and 
state legislatures. Federal power was not an example of the Confederacy gone 
wrong or a betrayal of founding identity, but rather the culmination of 
democratic aspirations to preserve the Confederate nation. 
In defeat, the Confederacy’s former leaders became the first generation of 
Americans to lose a war, an odious precedent. To cast off the opprobrium Joseph 
Brown, Jefferson Davis, and Alexander Stephens exerted enormous energy in 
rewriting history. Ignoring the last episode of Confederate political life and the 
broad sweep of federal authority in the Confederacy, the discredited former 
leaders sought to recover their legacies by highlighting the issue of self-
government, a fashionable phrase in the “redemption” of state governments 
throughout the South after Reconstruction. Through thousands of pages of 
dissembling, the former Confederate elite fictionalized a nostalgic image of the 
Confederate past that divorced the purpose and the role of government from 
actual events. They endeavored to make the memory of the Confederacy into a 
fiction fit for future consumption. Penning vast apologias, the trio offered 
laments that accepted the defeat of the Confederacy and even the loss of slavery, 
helping to make the memory of the Confederacy safe for veneration by removing 
its most objectionable component. By defending secession as an act of self-
government, the former Confederates obliquely dismissed the charge of treason, 
conflating the Confederate past and the redeemer present, which sought to 
recover of white civil government. Though they accepted the loss of independence 
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and the institution of slavery, for those former Confederates that desired, the 
essential ideology that sustained the Confederacy remained.  
 
The first scholarly exploration of emancipation in the Confederacy 
emerged with Nathaniel Stephenson’s “The Question of Arming the Slaves” in 
1913. The work corrected popular accounts and offered a much-needed scholarly 
narrative of the legislative course of Representative Ethelbert Barksdale’s bill. 
Stephenson, however, overlooked Major General Patrick Cleburne’s proposal, 
instead focusing on the high politics in Richmond where he argues Secretary of 
State Judah Benjamin led the emancipation policy, with Davis offering only 
hesitant support. Stephenson writes by the final stages of the war “Benjamin 
was…the Confederacy’s premier, the originator to a great extent of its policy” to 
emancipate slaves.2  
Robert Durden’s landmark 1972 work The Gray and the Black offers 
scholars a rich collection of primary source material. Durden’s impressive 
assemblage provides readers with ample evidence of this most extraordinary 
episode in Confederate history, which is portrayed as a remarkable moment of 
lost potential when the Confederacy’s political leaders ventured something brave. 
Durden writes, “This was probably the fullest and freest discussion of slavery in 
which the South as a whole ever engaged, and it was a critical turning point in 
southern, and indeed American, history. Yet the South refused to turn – or 
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rather, it half turned in the chaotic closing weeks of the war and then later forgot 
all about the uncharacteristic flirtation with unorthodoxy.”3 Slave emancipation, 
in Durden’s estimate, constituted something more considerable than a mere play 
to national survival. It offered, at the very least, the possibility of a much richer 
future. In memory, however, this last federal policy was lost among the nostalgic 
renderings of the Lost Cause and the white South returned to orthodox views on 
racial supremacy. 
More recent scholars have returned to Confederate emancipation to 
balance the historical narrative with the actions of slaves and black soldiers. 
Bruce Levine’s Confederate Emancipation artfully blends the narratives of slaves, 
black soldiers, and planters by recounting how historical actors with cross-
purposes shaped the Confederacy’s policy and its outcome. Levine argues that the 
composite narratives of white Southerners reveal the reactionary and desperate 
aspects of the policy, which help explain its failure to elicit broad support. 
Similarly, bondsmen understood the desperate nature of the policy, and in a 
calculated approach felt the Confederacy’s failure a more promising means of 
acquiring freedom. Levine writes, “The combined (if very differently motivated) 
opposition of masters and slaves consigned this long and hotly debated black-
troops plan to impotence and oblivion.”4 Confederate emancipation failed, Levine 
concludes, because both masters and bondsmen perceived the policy as inimical 
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Emancipation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, Paperback Edition 
2000) xii. 
 
4 Bruce Levine, Confederate Emancipation: Southern Plans to Free and Arm 
Slaves During the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 15. 
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to their interests. Planters wished to sustain the institution, while slaves 
understood their best chance at freedom in Confederate defeat. Levine assesses 
the postwar period moment when planters, no longer possessing title over 
freedmen, worked to reassert their legal right to hold captive former slaves 
through labor laws and black codes. The ideology of mastery remains despite the 
downfall of its formal institutions. 
The most recent scholarly analysis of Confederate emancipation is 
Stephanie McCurry’s Confederate Reckoning. Rebutting scholars’ treatment of 
Confederate emancipation as an episode where the Confederacy faced either 
accepting slave soldiers or the end of the nation, McCurry argues that the 
Confederacy attempted to do both – to preserve their institution and their 
nation.5 Slave enlistment is the primary and indeed exclusive goal of the policy, 
the sustenance of the nation always the singular motive. McCurry finds the end of 
the Confederacy ripe with historical irony. “The Confederate States of American 
was driven by “the stern ‘logic of events’ into a process of slave enlistment and 
partial emancipation that literally eviscerated the original national project.”6 The 
Confederacy collapsed, McCurry surmises, because of the poverty of it national 
vision, whose tinge of arrogance failed to consider the desires of its marginalized 
populations. 
The policy of Confederate emancipation is striking for a number of 
reasons, and in no small measure for what it reveals about the Confederacy’s 
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relationship to federal power and its view of the purposes for that power. With 
federal power sustained by the Confederacy from first to last, from conscription 
to habeas corpus, the copacetic stance exhibited by this last, desperate grasp at 
slave enlistments is remarkable. Additionally, the manner in which Davis 
embraced the policy deserves a degree of attention, for the policy did not 
originate from Richmond, but rather from the military, from state governors, and 
from legislators who looked to the federal government for solutions. Davis’ 
embrace of slave enlistments was not a policy foisted on an unwilling populace. 
Rather, the administration was periodically confronted with multiple proposals 
that sought to harness the power of the government to advance the means by 
which slaves would be accepted as enlistments into the army. Ultimately, the 
Davis administration’s slow approach helped to build enough support to override 
the reservations of an earnest number of opponents. And in a final flourish of 
executive power, Davis acted on personal conviction and in counsel with fellow 
executives and military leaders to push the policy to the extreme by promising 
emancipation and the rights of freedmen to slave enlistments. By the end, 
popular and personal appeals for federal power are a regular feature of 
Confederate politics, placing it firmly within the continuity of the American 
political landscape. 
In the immediate postwar period the former Confederate elite struggled to 
overcome the opprobrium of defeat while the white South dedicated itself to 
overthrowing racially diverse state governments, not respecting their sovereignty. 
Furthermore, despite a final policy that promised a different future, after the 
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white South’s return to political power state legislatures began efforts to 
reinstitute legal control over former bondsmen through the passage of black 
codes and vagrancy laws. As the Confederacy’s former leaders reappeared in 
public, their memorials sought to rescue the memory of the Confederacy by 
offering fictionalized, nostalgic renderings that divorced the memory of the 
Confederacy from the purposes for which it fought. In joining in the vast literary 
undertaking of the Lost Cause, Davis, Stephens, and Brown no longer evinced 
support for slavery or Confederate independence. Both institutions were firmly in 
the past, and well enough. The Confederacy’s political history and its repeated 
embrace of federal power to sustain the sovereignty of the nation proved a 
convoluted, best-forgotten issue in Reconstruction. Despite the consistency of 
federal power in the Confederacy, in memoriam states’ rights were heralded to 
legitimize secession and the notion of self-rule, which sought to overthrew 
Reconstruction state governments throughout the South. As the author of the 
cornerstone comments, Alexander Stephens maintained the Confederacy as 
preserving an immutable definition of American democracy according to race. To 
make the Confederacy safe for veneration Stephens highlighted the notion of self-
government, a phrase whose usage perfectly encapsulated his conditional support 
of federal power. He proved neither a champion of state’s rights nor an eager 
applicant of federal power. Instead, he promoted his vision of balanced 
government. Peculiarly, neither Brown nor Davis exhibited any interest in 
lingering over the topic of their wartime dispute – federal versus state power. In 
retrospect, each can only muster enough interest to reprint previous 
correspondence. The overriding concern of both men is to be remembered as 
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Confederate stalwarts. Brown sought to be heralded through his contributions to 
the nation as state governor, while Davis continued to proclaim the merits of the 
nation, even in its defeat. Both desired a lasting legacy that viewed their labors as 
earnest efforts to preserve Southern independence. How they did so and to what 
ends they sought to accomplish remained unspoken, particular so for Davis, 
whose final endeavor in according slaves the rights of freedmen and 
emancipation in exchange for military service offered a potentially discomfiting 
legacy as a champion of white Southern political values. 
 
On March 19, 1864, State Representative Linton Stephens introduced a bill 
before the Georgia State House condemning the federal administration of 
conscription. The protest recapitulated arguments long since settled by 
congressional approval and court rulings and discerning politicians detected the 
elder Stephens’ sentiments sprinkled throughout, with its appeals to support the 
government but desire to restore civilian control. Remedying the policy of 
conscription by affording states primary control, the protest intimated, would 
lead to a renaissance of support. The resulting excitement, the Stephenses 
incredulously promised, “Would constantly weaken and sooner or later break 
down the war power of our enemy….”7 A fantastical assertion but one that 
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demonstrated a continued adherence to both Confederate victory and 
constitutional principle.8 
Imbuing the remonstration with significance, Governor Brown appended 
his name to the protest, glorying in his newfound political company.  Where 
Stephens offered a retread, the governor advanced a novel call for peace. Seeking 
to extend the power of states, Brown incredibly proposed that states begin 
independently negotiating peace settlements with the Union government. 
Twisting history to suit his ends, Brown defended his policy by asserting that 
state governments enjoyed a legitimate recourse to “make to the Government of 
our enemy an official offer of peace on the basis of the great principle declared by 
our common fathers in 1776.”9 The possibly dizzying array of eleven 
independently negotiated settlements aside, Brown groped for any means to 
advance his ambition, even the unacknowledged precedent for state’s rights, the 
Hartford Convention.10 If Brown could not play a part in the execution of the war, 
then he demanded a role in its resolution. 
Brown found himself at the center of just such a state peace proposal later 
that summer. Union General William Tecumseh Sherman, triumphant and 
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unencumbered after his victory at Atlanta in September, pledged to lay waste to 
Georgia should it sustain its rebellion. As Sherman set out to plan the coming 
campaign Joshua Hill, a former colleague of Sherman’s brother Senator John 
Sherman, sought permission to travel through Union lines to recover the body of 
his fallen son. Sherman granted Hill permission, along with an invitation to 
dinner. Over the course of conversation during the evening Hill confessed that 
“further resistance on the part of the South is madness.” He told Sherman “he 
hoped Governor Brown, of Georgia, would so proclaim it, and withdraw his 
people from the rebellion, in pursuance of what was known as the policy of 
‘separate State action.’”11  Sensing opportunity, Sherman pursued the policy of a 
separate peace with Brown. With the aid of Hill, Sherman dispatched three 
personal friends of governor to travel to Milledgeville to personally deliver his 
offer of clemency. 
With Sherman’s offer in hand, Brown faced the dilemma of salvaging his 
state or imperiling his political career. Owing to the political danger, Brown 
sought the refuge of national identity. His printed response appeared in 
Milledgeville’s intriguingly titled newspaper, Confederate Union at the end of 
September. Announcing Georgia’s continuing resolve, Brown thanked Sherman 
for the consideration but evaded the issue of separate state peace by stating since 
Sherman “is only a General commanding an army in the field, and I the Governor 
of a State, neither the Constitution of his country nor of my own, confers upon us 
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any power to negotiation a treaty of peace.”12 Having dodged his long-held 
commitment to state’s rights, Brown nevertheless insisted upon his state’s 
sovereignty. His response, however, tipped the limits of even his own claim for 
state independence. He wrote, “Georgia possesses the sovereign power to act 
separately, her faith…is pledged by strong implication, to her Southern sisters, 
that she will not exercise this power without consent on their part….”13 Thus by 
Brown’s very articulation Georgia, having entered into a nation, did not possess 
the ability to conduct its own diplomacy. On this matter the federal government 
enjoyed the supreme, indeed only, voice. 
 Atlanta’s fall and Governor Brown’s flirtation with a separate state peace 
compelled Jefferson Davis to embark on a tour of the South in late September. 
The president sought to restore vigor to a theater reeling from the loss of Atlanta 
and Georgia’s flirtation with submission. Davis addressed public crowds and 
privately encouraged state governors to partner with his government. Although 
later accounts disparaged Davis’ skills as a politician, few moments are more 
telling and noteworthy than his successful exhortations while on his last tour of 
the Confederacy. The president repeatedly pressed the flesh of voters and in a 
remarkable appeal urged the women of the South to return their men to the 
army. Davis called for a renewed sacrifice from those that he had acknowledged, 
“Like Spartan mothers of old had given up all.”14 Davis’ political appeal resulted 
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in a conference of six governors at Augusta, Georgia in October as Davis made his 
way back to Richmond. With Virginia Governor William Smith presiding, the 
governors of North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi 
pledged more than continued support for the administration. They suggested 
their willingness to support a potentially revolutionary federal policy to arm 
slaves. Their resolution forthrightly called out the manner in which slavery had 
become a liability, while obliquely referring to their desired course of future 
action: “That the course of the enemy in appropriating our slaves who happen to 
fall into their hands to purposes of war, seems to justify a change of policy on our 
part…to appropriate such of them to the public service as may be required.”15 The 
meaning of public service left undefined, all that remained was for Davis to take 
up their call and place the power of the federal government behind the policy. 
 Upon returning to Richmond in October it did not take Davis long to set 
to work laying the groundwork for slave enlistments. Threatening to displace the 
cornerstone of the Confederacy less than a month after his return, Davis crafted a 
policy that first originated from the field in 1864. To address the Confederacy’s 
manpower shortages Major General Patrick Ronayne Cleburne, an Irish born 
brigadier general, composed a plan to accept slaves into the army in exchange for 
emancipation.16 Presenting his “memorial” to the general staff of the Army of 
Tennessee during their winter respite, Cleburne argued that the war overturned 
prewar conceptions about the advantage of slavery. Cleburne asserted that by 
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promising freedom, the Union capitalized on the efforts of slaves who demanded 
freedom.  As a result, “slavery, from being one of our chief sources of strength at 
the commencement of the war, has now become, in a military point of view, one 
of our chief sources of weakness.17” Indeed, slaves fed on the South’s “granaries” 
while aiding and abetting the Union at every turn. To counter this most 
unexpected and alarming development Cleburne sought a daring shift in policy. 
In order to “adequately to meet the causes which are now threatening ruin to our 
country,” the Irish born general along with fourteen officers signed a 
memorandum that proposed to “immediately commence training a large reserve 
of the most courageous of our slaves….”18 Like the “helots of Sparta” Cleburne 
believed that slaves offered “the allurement of a higher reward” would prove 
valiant in battle.  
 Cleburne understood his proposal as a direct challenge to the 
Confederacy’s political identity. While acknowledging the assertion that, 
“Republicanism cannot exist without the institution,” Cleburne countered, “Even 
were this true, we prefer any form of government of which the Southern people 
may have the molding, to one forced upon us by a conqueror.” Freedom, in his 
estimation, meant more than preserving slavery. As a result, Cleburne argued 
that the federal government must embrace a radical policy. He was not naïve in 
the ramifications of his policy, its politics, and corollary consequence: 
 If, then, we touch the institution at all, we would do best to make the most of it, 
and by emancipating the whole race upon reasonable terms, and within such 
reasonable time as will prepare both races for the change, secure to ourselves all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 OR, Ser. I, Vol. 52 (2), 586-92. 
 
18 Ibid. 
	   174	  
the advantages, and to our enemies all the disadvantages that can arise, both at 
home and abroad, from such a sacrifice.19 
 
Cleburne thus encouraged the nation to entrust the army with the responsibility 
to reveal the fitness of adopting the revolutionary policy. Commanding General 
Joseph Johnston, who understood the dangerous ramifications of Cleburne’s 
proposal, cut short all discussion. But word of Cleburne’s memorial slipped 
through the camp and eventually made its way to Richmond. Davis initially 
ordered all discussion of the Cleburne Memorial “suppressed.”20 Ten months of 
mounting reverses, however, obligated revisiting the policy. 
 On November 7, Davis challenged Congress. He told the assembled that 
his “present purpose is to invite your consideration…of a radical modification in 
the theory of the law.”21 Asking for authorization to enlist 40,000 enslaved 
persons into noncombatant roles, Davis sought to expand upon his earlier 
enlistment of 20,000 enslaved persons as teamsters, nurses, and general 
laborers. In calling to expand the ranks by 20,000 more, Davis proposed an 
ambiguous expansion of roles. Broadening the scope of federal policy, Davis 
sought an inducement for service beyond mere recompense. Desiring to overturn 
a policy that viewed slaves “merely as property,” Davis countered, “The 
slave…bears another relation to the State – that of a person.” Davis thus nudged 
the Congress to broaden their views of bondsmen by offering an indistinct, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 OR, Ser. I, Vol. 52 (2), 586-92. 
 
20 For background on the enigmatic Cleburne see Craig L. Symonds, Stonewall of 
the West: Patrick Cleburne and the Civil War (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1997) 181-91. On Jefferson Davis’ response, William J. Cooper 
Jr., Jefferson Davis, American (New York: Vintage Books, 2001) 555. 
 
21 Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, Vol. I, 493. 
	   175	  
unspoken goal.22 Allaying concerns about the extent of the social revision he had 
in mind, Davis maintained his belief in racial inequality as the political and social 
foundation of the nation. Racial inequality, the president affirmed, “Embraces the 
stability of our republican institutions.”23 Davis evidently did not desire a social 
revolution, but sought to advance a view of the slave as more than mudsill. With a 
mind toward the political difficulty of advancing such a radical policy, Davis did 
not initially go as far as Cleburne by calling for complete emancipation. His 
beseeching of the Congress for federal powers to overturn the cornerstone of 
Confederate political ideology proved extreme enough to elicit a backlash. 
Howell Cobb, former president of the Montgomery Convention and an ally 
of Davis, discerned the proposal as an existential threat. Writing to Secretary of 
War James Seddon, Cobb protested against any consideration to arm slaves, 
labeling it a “most pernicious idea.” He attacked the plan as a betrayal of 
Confederate principle and pleaded with the administration to appreciate the 
irreversible political and social ramifications: 
Use all the negroes you can get, for all the purposes for which you need 
them, but don’t arm them. The day you make soldiers of them is the 
beginning of the end of the revolution. If slaves make good soldiers our 
whole theory of slavery is wrong.24 
 
Cobb’s dissent demonstrated the deep concerns presented by a fundamental 
reconsideration of the white republic. If slaves were capable of honorifics, their 
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presumed inferiority was laid false, a treacherous development for a government 
that advocated the eternal fitness of racial inequality. By according slaves with 
arms and the potential for valor, the Confederate nation gambled on its future, 
inviting questions as to the purpose of sustaining a nation that did not defend 
purportedly immutable principles. 
 Judah Benjamin, Davis’ Secretary of State, offered a model that 
attempted to place slave soldiers in the field while sustaining a core belief in 
white supremacy. Writing to his old classmate from Yale Frederick Porcher of 
Charleston, Benjamin sought Porcher’s aid in bolstering the administration’s 
position in the press. The secretary confided to Porcher the wisdom of Cleburne’s 
observance that slaves had turned against the South. “The drain of that source of 
our strength is steady, fatal, and irreversible...,” the Secretary of State affirmed.25 
Lest they adopt a new course, he assured his friend the South would collapse in 
no small measure due to the actions of slaves. Benjamin concealed his radical 
proposal for the federal government to take direct ownership of slaves by terming 
it a restrained approach. Concluding that the best solution was one “settled by 
degrees,” Benjamin affirmed the administration’s goal as one where “…the 
Confederacy should become the owner of as many negroes as are required for the 
public service and should emancipate them as a reward for good services.” After 
settling on this most extraordinary piece of purportedly cautious legislation, 
Benjamin promised that an encompassing federal policy offered numerous 
benefits: 
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We might then be able, while vindicating our faith in the doctrine that the negro 
is an inferior race and unfitted for social or political equality with the white man, 
yet so modify and ameliorate the existing condition of that inferior race by 
providing for it certain rights of property, a certain degree of personal liberty, and 
legal protection for the marital and parental relations, as to relieve our 
institutions- from much that is not only unjust and impolitic in itself, but 
calculated to draw down on us the odium and reprobation of civilized man.26 
 
Benjamin touted the wisdom of the administration’s policy for its ability to avoid 
fundamental and potentially upsetting revisions. By promising to ameliorate the 
future status of slave enlistees, Benjamin proclaimed that the Confederacy gained 
all of the advantages of a new source of military manpower while retaining its 
belief in racial inequality. 
Although in his message before the Congress Davis had maintained the 
importance of slavery among domestic audiences, just two months later in 
February he and Judah Benjamin, seizing the broadest reading of executive 
power, hatched a surreptitious plan to offer full abolition in exchange for foreign 
recognition.27 The proposal constituted a remarkably underappreciated 
application of executive power. To carry this sensitive proposal abroad, Davis 
selected Louisianan Duncan Kenner, Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee. Kenner proved an inspired choice. Soon after the fall of New Orleans 
in 1862 Kenner personally approached Davis with a plan to arm slaves, but the 
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president encouraged Kenner to keep such ideas private.28 Kenner demurred to 
Davis’ demand, yet in February 1865 Davis returned to the Louisiana planter with 
the abolitionist proposition. The clandestine communiqué carried by Kenner 
pledged that the Confederacy would move against “objections not made known to 
us, which have for four years prevented the recognition of our independence….” 
To assure foreign audiences of the earnestness of the proposal, Davis and 
Benjamin pledged, “no sacrifice is too great, save that of honor.”29 With the 
Confederacy stumbling toward ruin, Davis’ desperate plea failed to move foreign 
powers. Just how Davis would have eradicated the institution is unclear, but the 
promise to do so offered a fitting example of the extent to which Davis felt 
comfortable employing the promise of federal power for the defense of the 
nation. 
 While the executive branch worked to secure recognition abroad in 
exchange for abolition, at home state governments pushed the federal 
government to adopt a more liberal policy. In response to progressive defeats and 
Union occupation, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi all publicly toyed with 
arming slaves at various stages of the war. As early as 1863 in Jackson, 
Mississippi, the Mississippian inaugurated southern newspapers’ call for an 
effective and equal response to the Union’s Emancipation Proclamation. “We 
must either employ the negroes ourselves, or the enemy will employ them against 
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us,” the Mississippian concluded.30 By August official governing bodies joined the 
call. That month the Alabama Assembly voted on a resolution urging Congress to 
work on a policy to “[use] in some effective way a certain percentage of the male 
slave population of the Confederate States….31” The assembly specifically sought 
the attention of the “President and Secretary of War of the Confederate States to 
this subject as requiring immediate and energetic action…”32 That fall, Louisiana 
Governor Henry W. Allen pushed the matter more directly. Responding to his 
colleagues’ pleading for troops, Allen replied that he had none to give. As such, he 
wrote, “The time has come for us to put into the army every able-bodied negro 
man as a soldier.”33 By January 1865 Virginia Governor William Smith took the 
lead on Allen’s proposal by permitting federal conscription of Virginia’s slaves. 
Smith’s bill languished for three months as state legislators pondered the 
ramifications. Passing in early March, Virginia permitted “her able bodied male 
free negroes between the ages of eighteen and forty-five…to be called for on the 
requisition of the General-in-Chief of the Confederate Armies….”34 With states 
having cleared the way, the federal government soon followed. 
 The desire for action on this most charged of subjects was far from 
unanimous. Rhett condemned Davis and the state of Virginia for trading away 
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Confederate identity. “When Virginia wants a sword to assist in her defense, 
Carolina’s will ever be the first unsheathed. But, we are no followers,” they 
thundered in the Charleston Mercury.  Explaining their obstinacy, Rhett 
proclaimed, “It was on account of encroachments upon the institution of slavery 
by the sectional majority of the old Union, that South Carolina seceded from that 
Union.” To “barter away” the institution that “30,000 dead South Carolinians” 
sought to preserve was incomprehensible. South Carolina, the obdurate former 
fire-eater proclaimed, “stands upon her institutions – and there she will fall in 
their defense.”35 “The soldiers of South Carolina will not fight beside a nigger – to 
talk of emancipation is to disband our armies.”36 Such pronouncements were 
rarely so bold. The sentiment crystalized Rhett’s general disfavor for moderation, 
and with his fanatical call, pronounced defeat preferable to amendment. 
 For the administration the calls to resist change proved tantamount to, in 
the words of Judah Benjamin, “antiquated patriotism.”37 The war turned slavery 
into a liability and necessitated Confederate response. Speaking before a crowd at 
the African Church in Richmond, Confederate legislators held public meetings 
after the failure of the Hampton Roads Peace Conference to reinvigorate morale 
through public demonstrations.38 On February 6 Jefferson Davis took to the 
stump to call for total sacrifice. “All must now be laid on the altar of the country,” 
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the president proclaimed, putting forward the proposal rather politically. But 
Davis’ speech was anything but staid, and his appearance even moved longtime 
foe Edward Pollard, who called it “the most remarkable speech” of his 
presidency.39 The next day Judah Benjamin took to the lectern on behalf of the 
executive. He shared the stage with R.M.T. Hunter, who reiterated his opposition. 
Hunter relied on the supposed expertise of racial ideology to explain his 
opposition, “Those best acquainted with the negro’s nature know that perish he 
must in time off the face of the earth; for, in competition with the white man, the 
negro must go down.”40 After calling the administration’s proposal an invitation 
to racial extermination, Hunter dismissed the a policy as misguided 
philanthropy, “How many cruelties are committed in thy name?” Benjamin 
moved directly to the issue at hand, forsaking abstract principles and theories. 
The stout secretary returned the focus of the meeting to the plain reality, “War is 
a game that cannot be played without men.” Sweeping away theoretical 
discussions, Benjamin pushed on, “Where are the men?” Telegraphing the 
administration’s rationale for their policy, Benjamin asked the audience to assess 
the situation for themselves and to see if they did not agree with the 
administration’s course: “Look to the trenches below Richmond. Is it not a shame 
that men who have sacrificed all in our defense should not be reinforced by all the 
means in our power? Is it any time now for antiquated patriotism to argue a 
refusal to send them aid, be it black or white?” At this a voice cried out “Put in the 
niggers,” to which Benjamin responded by listing the reinforcements slave 
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enlistments could supply to the army. As a foreign-born Jew who had risen to the 
top of Southern politics, Benjamin closed by offering a portent of a potentially 
different Confederate future, “I feel that the time is rapidly coming on when the 
people will wonder that they ever doubted.”41 
In conjunction with the revival occurring in Richmond, the Confederate 
Congress once more took up debate on Davis’ policy. On February 10 Senator 
Ethelbert Barksdale of Mississippi introduced a bill before the Confederate 
Congress. Learning from a debacle in the House that saw a similar bill featuring 
emancipation turned back, Barksdale moderated his bill by omitting 
emancipation. He also employed the powerful support of General Robert E. 
Lee.42 Knowing of the gravity of his influence, Lee penned a letter to 
Congressman Barksdale that he knew would be released to the public in which he 
championed the notion that slaves “under proper circumstances, will make 
efficient soldiers” and with “good officers and good instructions, I do not see why 
they should not become good soldiers.” And while Barksdale’s bill did not include 
emancipation as a reward for service, Lee expressed strong support for the 
president’s plan to reward service with emancipation by stating that he felt it only 
right that “…those who are employed should be freed.”43 Now congressmen who 
voted against the legislation also took a stand against the expressed wishes of the 
General-in-Chief.  
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Lee’s support revealed the degree of his nationalist proclivities, which lent 
considerable weight to the president’s policy. But opposition remained stiff, 
requiring the governor of Virginia to once more pave the way. Just as he had 
shepherded the bill through his own legislature, Virginia Governor Smith 
directed his state’s senators, R.M.T. Hunter and Allen T. Caperton, to reverse 
their opposition. Hunter, Davis’ former Secretary of State, sustained his vigorous 
opposition to arm slaves and constituted the chief obstacle to its passage. Hunter 
expressed dismay at slavery’s continued agitation. “When we left the old 
Government,” Hunter professed that he “thought we had gotten rid forever of the 
slavery agitation.” He assumed the Confederacy ended “the agitation of the 
slavery question, which had become intolerable under the old Union…” But much 
to his dismay, that promise failed and Hunter expressed bewilderment at the 
irony. “If we are right in passing this measure we were wrong in denying to the 
old government the right to interfere with the institution of slavery and to 
emancipate slaves.”44 On March 7 owing to the urging of the Virginia legislature 
Hunter signaled the end of his opposition but let it be know that he received 
instruction to “vote against his conviction.”45 Hometown newspapers chided 
Hunter for the indulgence, believing he stood in the way of the state’s expressed 
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desire. With Hunter and Caperton’s begrudging support, the bill passed by a 
single vote in the Confederate Senate.46 Federal power reigned supreme. 
In March, Davis amended the legislation’s omission of emancipation by 
using his executive authority to issue General Order Number 14.  Bringing the bill 
into alignment with his earlier desire granting emancipation in exchange for loyal 
service, Davis’ enabling orders required the enslaved to sign a pledge proving a 
willingness to fight on behalf of the Confederacy, along with the written consent 
of the slave owner to surrender their property to the state. Davis’ orders 
instructed: “No slave will be accepted as a recruit unless with his own consent 
and the approbation of his master by a written instrument conferring, as far as he 
may, the rights of a freedman….”47 Such a significant enabling piece of legislation 
offered a fitting addendum to the Confederacy’s embrace of federal power. The 
Confederacy not only promised emancipation to slaves who enlisted, but Davis, 
as president, accorded slaves the rights of freedmen to enter into legal contracts. 
Recruitment began in Richmond in late March, just weeks before the 
Confederacy’s ultimate collapse. The final application of federal power failed to 
affect the outcome of the war, and the Confederacy surrendered mere weeks after 
mustering two regiments. The Confederacy began the war by proclaiming to be 
preserving immutable definitions of American democracy, but ended the war 
attempting to desperately test that principle. 
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The opprobrium of defeat proved fierce for the first self-proclaimed 
Americans to lose a war. To combat the legacy of failure, former Confederate 
leaders took to the pen. No figure struggled more with his Confederate legacy 
than former vice president Alexander Stephens. In defeat Stephens attempted to 
insert an inviolate and unyielding motive of virtue to make the Confederacy safe 
for veneration and public loyalty. Stephens’ immediate attempt to grapple with 
his legacy occurred while a prisoner at Fortress Monroe. His world having 
crumbled and the possibility of treason hanging over his head, Stephens’ diary 
entry on June 6 offers a remarkable insight to his thinking on Confederate 
purpose and his attempt to craft a narrative of which to be proud. Stephens began 
the day by singing the opening lines of Thomas More’s hymn, “Consolation”: 
This world is all a fleeting show, 
For man’s illusion given; 
The Smiles of Joy, the tears of Woe, 
Deceitful shine, deceitful flow –  
There’s nothing true, but Heaven! 
 
The incantation alarmed the guard, which set Stephens to reflection. An ardent 
reader, Stephens sought solace by explaining the abundant newspaper stories 
expressing “wonder and surprise…at the suddenness and completeness of the 
collapse of the Confederate Cause.”48 Stephens professed that despite the totality 
of defeat, Confederates constituted a remarkably principled people, for “no 
people on earth were ever more united, earnest, resolved to resist to the last 
extremity.” Confederates, Stephens insisted, drew strength from their steadfast 
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faith from a conviction in “the right of self-government.” Their defeat 
necessitated a new struggle to retain control over government, and self-
government became the rallying cry of so-called redeemers. 
Stephens argued that despite their loss, Confederates remained principled 
actors. Even in the face of military authoritarianism, whose “first great blow was 
conscription! With this came impressments, suspension of habeas corpus, 
military arrests and imprisonments, martial law.” Still bitter over the manner by 
which federal conscription occurred, in defeat Stephens castigated Davis for 
overriding Stephens’ vision of constitutional government. Criticizing Davis for his 
reliance on federal authority, Stephens though the executive’s proclivities to lean 
upon central authority constituted “as deadly a blow at independent State 
organization, State’s Rights, or State sovereignty….”49 Despite such facts, 
Stephens heralded Southern soldiers who took to the field “to maintain the 
Sovereignty of their own states, which had quit the Union but had rescued the 
Constitution. This ark of the covenant of their fathers was in their hands, and it 
was to preserve this (containing the life-giving principles of self-government) 
from destruction and pollution that they rushed to the ranks….”50 Such an 
articulation allowed Stephens to claim fealty to the Constitution and to distance 
himself from the opprobrium of defeat. His insistence upon the principle of self-
government proved a convenient dodge against charges that the government was 
one of his crafting. And in fact, Stephens presided silently as the first applications 
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of federal power and military authority passed the Confederate Senate. In 
memory Stephens retreated into principles that exalted the heroism and 
dedication of the white South. “What I affirm is, that the Southern people were 
actuated by no disloyalty to the Constitution, to the principles it contained, or to 
the form of government thereby established.”51 Like Thomas More, Stephens 
insisted he and the white South were not traitors, but principled actors striving to 
uphold a standard. 
By exalting self-government, Stephens adroitly sought to displace the 
cornerstone of slavery in the memory of the Confederacy. He avowed, “ The 
slavery question had but little influence with the masses.”52 The diminution of 
slavery’s importance was certainly not something evinced by Stephens at the 
Hampton Roads Peace Conference just months earlier, where he pressed a series 
of questions to President Abraham Lincoln about the future of the institution. In 
Stephens’ remembrance, Lincoln informed the Confederate delegation that with 
the development of the Thirteenth Amendment, “I would go home and get the 
Governor of the State to call the Legislature together, and get them to recall all 
the State troops from the war; elect Senators and Members to Congress, and 
ratify this Constitutional Amendment prospectively, so as to take effect – say in 
five years…” Lincoln apparently concluded his point by remarking, “Whatever 
may have been the views of your people before the war, they must be convinced 
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now, that Slavery is doomed.”53 It was a suspect rendering of the conversation for 
it proved inconsistent with Lincoln’s policy. However, it demonstrated the extent 
of Stephens’ conviction in the institution and the ideology, even at such a late 
hour in the life of the Confederacy.  
Stephens’ postwar desire to distance himself and the Confederacy from 
slavery most conspicuously ran up against his historic role in clarifying racial 
inequality as the singular purpose of Confederate nationhood. To explain away 
the contradiction, Stephens figuratively returned to the Athenaeum in Georgia in 
1861. In reflection, Stephens downplayed the importance of his remarks by 
disavowing their accuracy. Stephens expounded, “As for my Savannah speech, 
the setting forth ‘slavery’ as the ‘corner-stone’ of the Confederacy” they were the 
result of “extemporaneously” delivered remarks. Even though Stephens corrected 
the reporter’s remarks and did not offer a clarification as his comments enjoyed 
wide distribution throughout the northern press, in retrospect he maintained 
innocence. While advancing that “slavery was without a doubt the occasion of 
secession,” he asserted that sectional hostility deepened over the failure to 
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. With northern states subverting their obligations 
through so-called personal liberty provisions, Stephens argued that the South 
became bitter about the lack of federal enforcement. In Stephens’ ornate 
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phrasing, by “refusing to comply with Constitutional obligations as to rendition of 
fugitives from service, a course betraying total disregard for all constitutional 
barriers and guarantees,” Southern distrust mounted. The source of discontent 
therefore lay not with too much federal power, but rather the lack of its 
application.54 
 Stephens’ also defended his cornerstone sentiments as elucidating nothing 
more than a historical truth. He sought to demonstrate that the Confederacy 
perpetuated the “relation of the black to the white race, which existed in 1787.”55  
It was not the Confederacy but the Founders who had introduced such notions. 
In defending the “order of subordination” that “was nature’s great law,” Stephens 
advanced that the Confederacy was built upon timeless racial principles. Indeed, 
in memorial he avowed, “…philosophy taught that order as the normal condition 
of the African amongst European races.56” All he desired to make evident was 
how the Confederate Constitution codified and perpetuated those truths. Seeking 
absolution from slavery, Stephens did not disavow the ideology of racial 
inequality, but rather he offered after the fact condemnations of its practice: “My 
own opinion on slavery, as often expressed, was that if the institution was not the 
best, or could not be made the best, for both races, looking for the advancement 
and progress of both, physically or morally, it ought to be abolished.”57 Stephens 
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clearly accepted the defeat of the Confederacy and the end of slavery, but he did 
not surrender his views on race. Those he sustained throughout redemption. 
 Granted his release from prison, Stephens returned to Georgia and took up 
his pen with resolve. The first volume of his expansive memoir, A Constitutional 
View of the Late War Between the States, appeared in 1868. The title page 
telegraphed the thrust of the work: “Times change and men often change with 
them, but principles never!”58 A Constitutional View continues to wage a defense 
of the legitimacy of secession. Composed in the style of Plato’s dialogues, 
Stephens creates a fictional trio of synthetic characters to explore the 
constitutional basis for state separation. To move directly to the “philosophical” 
causes of the war, Stephens sweeps aside the role of slavery to recapitulate 
familiar episodes of political collision in the antebellum era. Contending that 
while slavery was “the main exciting proximate cause” of secession, Stephens 
affirms, “It was not the real cause” of the war. In Stephens’ retelling, 
constitutional principle is at the center of the Confederate drama. Yet, Stephens 
cannot dispense with slavery and white supremacy, for they constitute his own 
declared ideology of the Confederacy. By the second volume one wonders why 
Stephens’ guests have not pressed more directly to this point, foregoing the 
needless retellings. In the fourteenth colloquy Stephens is finally called to 
account. Stephens demonstrates his continued belief in the eternal fitness of 
racial inequality by offering a theological defense for slavery and racial inequality. 
“I know of but one sure standard in determining what is, and what is not sin or 
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sinful. That standard is the written law of God…” Stephens maintained.59 From 
Abraham to Job to Paul, the fictional Stephens spins tales of biblical sanctions of 
slavery to place the Confederacy safely within the confines of religious sanction. 
It soon becomes clear that the strength of such conviction transcends history. 
While Stephens is offering a retrograde apology for the failings of the 
Confederacy, he is attempting to rescue the wisdom upon which antebellum 
Southerners and Confederates relied to sustain their society. Once more 
returning to his infamous Cornerstone Speech, Stephens no longer distances 
himself from the sentiments, and repeats his comments as a means of explicating 
their supposedly timeless quality: “With us, all of the white race, whether high or 
low, rich or poor, are equal in the eye of the law. Not so with the negro. 
Subordination is his place.”60 Institutions and even governments might be 
transient, but not principles. An incredulous Judge Bynum finally interrupts 
Stephens during yet another reiteration of a Southerner’s speech: “How can you 
say any of this? ‘Liberty and Equality’ seems to me but a mockery…when we know 
that what he meant was, not the advancement of Liberty at all, but the 
perpetuation of slavery.” Rising in defense of his own foil, Stephens avowed the 
central object of the Confederate States “the perpetuation of that liberty and 
equality which was established by the Constitution of the United States.”61 What 
Bynum interprets as a mockery, Stephens explains as the white South’s 
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paramount conviction - the immutable grant of liberty afforded by race. Although 
the government and the institution that white Southerners had sought to 
perpetuate failed, the ideological racial principle sustaining them remained.  
Stephens’ literary exertions did not result in critical acceptance of his 
revisionist renderings. Judge S.S. Nicholas, one of the many legal critics who 
reviewed A Constitutional View, dismissed Stephens’ indulgences as a feeble 
attempt at covering the past. Unmoved by his arguments Nicholas granted, “Mr. 
Stephens has a perfect right to use his time and talents in self-justification as an 
aider of the rebellion.” Stephens, however, had a problem with credulity. Chiefly, 
if the South seceded because it felt separation the only recourse to avoid federal 
usurpation, then reunification was a false sentiment. And if the South sought 
reunification in order to legitimize secession as a demonstration of their fidelity 
as Americans, then they ought to be halted in their tracks.62 He explained, “No 
hearty restoration…of the Constitution can be rationally expected so long as it is 
even suspected that, in the pursuit of constitutional restoration, Southern men 
are looking to it as a means for the ultimate recognition of the right of secession.” 
Conversely, “If Southern men of influence concur that the right of secession is the 
only barrier against Federal usurpation, then they can have little motive for 
aiding Constitutional restoration.”63  
As Nicholas argued, the South had failed in its quest to assert a rival 
understanding of the Constitution. The Union’s victory invalidated secession. 
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Southerners could accept this fact and reclaim their citizenship, or they could 
sustain the fiction of secession as legitimate recourse to federal power. But they 
could not logically do both as Stephens attempted. Despite Nichol’s logical 
destruction of Stephens’ argument, Little Aleck returned to the United States 
Congress in 1873, resuming his familiar seat. His return to national politics 
represented his rehabilitation. He renewed his pledge of fidelity to the United 
States Constitution, but never distanced himself from his racial sentiments and 
the notion that government ought to preserve such distinction. Alexander 
Stephens passed away in 1883 at the age of seventy-one, having won the 
governorship of Georgia the year previously. 
 
In defeat the ambitious Joseph Brown refashioned his political identity. To 
thrust off the malodor of his previous obstinacy, Brown commissioned a 
campaign biography in 1879 to offer voters a fresh perspective of the four-time 
governor. With the advent of the postwar South Brown embraced commerce and 
industry by transforming himself into a banking lobbyist - a notable feat since he 
had begun his career as a critic of banks. His newfound attitude also resulted in a 
post as a railroad executive and coal promoter. But Brown went even further than 
an economic transformation. Joining men like former General James Longstreet 
to raise his as attractiveness as a candidate, Brown left behind the defeated 
Southern Democrats to join the triumphant Republican Party in an astonishing 
yet revealing exhibition of ambition. Although Brown’s effort at transformation 
resulted in an initial electoral defeat, he received an appointment to the state 
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supreme court and from the bench returned to the fold of Democratic Party 
politics through ingratiating efforts in the disputed election of 1876. His dizzying 
revolution as a public figure nearly complete, Brown sought a return to political 
power.64 
On the eve of his desired return to public life in 1878, Brown received word 
of the untimely passing of Linton Stephens. A wistful Brown wrote to Robert 
Toombs, “You & Alec & I have each but a short time to remain here.” The 
melancholy Brow reminisced about the men’s past political battles. Eventually 
touching on the subject of Jefferson Davis’ forthcoming memoir, Brown feared 
that if Davis were given the final word, he will “assail us with a good deal of 
bitterness & stab with a Joab blade whenever he can.” Concerned about his 
particularly disputatious role, Brown dreaded that Davis’ revenge, which will 
“attribute much of the failure to what he will term the hostile movement in 
Georgia & elsewhere &…blacken as far as he can our reputation.”65 
Looking to counteract a wrathful Davis, Brown solicited Toombs to 
coauthor a history of Georgia. He called his project essential to “preserve all the 
facts of history necessary to our vindication.” But the past had been hard enough 
on the political career of Toombs and the once formidable Georgian evinced little 
interest in revisiting the painful period. Promising Brown that his “conduct 
during the war will fully vindicate you from all aspersions of Mr. Davis,” Toombs 
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doubted Davis’ desire for recrimination. “I do not think he will assail you and I 
am sure he will never assail me while I live,” the still bellicose Toombs crowed. 
His assurance did little to assuage Brown’s fears and he pushed ahead with his 
project, placing an amateur biographer, Herbert Fielder, under contract in 
1879.66 Brown earnestly desired to place his version of history in the hands of the 
public before Davis’. Fielder’s amateurish inexperience, however, delayed 
publication and Davis’ memoir’s own arduous path reached conclusion in 1881. 
Davis’ desired rendering revealed Brown’s concerns warrantless. The former 
president earnestly sought absolution rather than slander. He wanted to be 
favorably remembered by history, and not to settle former scores.  
Despite the fact that he escaped Davis’ censure, Brown still desired to 
settle the past on his own terms. He acquired Fielder’s incomplete manuscript 
and set to work culling and editorializing by excising most mentions to slavery.67 
When Brown did cover slavery’s abolition he did so with such astonishing 
insouciance that the peculiar institution’s finality is presented as a change of 
legalese. “At the time this constitution was framed” permitting Georgia’s 
reunification, “the idea of African slavery in this country was a thing of the 
past.”68 With this breezy acceptance, the Confederate past is quickly sanitized and 
the sketch never looks back. Brown also did not linger over states’ rights. 
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Although he had subsisted on its agitation throughout the war, in peace Brown 
championed Georgia’s contribution to the national effort and proclaimed his role 
in partnering with the federal government. Seeking to correct his record, Brown 
wrote: “It is not true, in fact, that the civil administration of this State obstructed 
the Confederacy or hindered its plans or enterprises….”69 He desired, in 
retrospect, to be remembered as a champion of the Confederate state, not the 
obstacle to its efficient functioning. As such, he offers but a few prefatory remarks 
on the correspondence with Davis. In hindsight, the episode is relegated to a 
repress, for his row constituted nothing more than a “difference in opinion 
between men who were each intent on independence for the South.”70 Brown’s 
desire to be seen as an advocate of national independence and an indispensible 
contributor to the national effort is remarkable for demonstrating how much the 
Confederacy’s rehabilitation owed to its ability to provoke nostalgic sentiments.71 
Sentiments which Brown adroitly desired to capture to carry him to political 
victory. 
In turning the figurative page, Brown’s capital qualities triumph in the 
New South. Having dispatched his record, Fielder’s ostensible prose gushes over 
Brown’s character, highlighting his business success and his “mental habit; that 
is, one thing at a time.”72 Unwittingly, although Fielder meant to highlight 
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Brown’s business acuity, he hit upon a key insight into Brown’s longevity and 
success. Brown was not a figure who lived by abstract virtue. He did not linger of 
principle, nor did he inhabit a world of absolutes. Brown accorded his 
Confederate past and his championing of state’s rights two chapters of reprinted 
material in the biography, all of which is prefaced by Brown’s convoluted 
protestations of loyalty and dedication to the South. Brown desired to be seen as 
an unyielding champion of his state and his region, and at the collision of both he 
sought to smooth over the memory of his quarrels with palliating appeals to 
patriotic nostalgia. Brown moved ever onward, and only dealt with his past when 
it threatened the future. Brown’s postwar conduct underlined his suspect 
attachment to the political issues that defined his Confederate career, 
demonstrating Brown’s adroit understanding of a situation and his unique ability 
to turn a moment to his advantage. With the Lost Cause ascendant, Brown 
hitched his future to its rising fortunes. 
 
Nearly a decade passed after the end of the war before Jefferson Davis 
returned to public life with the publication of his vast apologia. Jefferson’s 
brother Joseph had broached the subject upon Jefferson’s release from prison in 
1867, but the defeated leader begged off claiming, legitimately, ill health. Davis 
also did not wish to immediately revisit such painful times. With publishing 
houses urging Davis to write and a family needing his support, Davis eventually 
hired an assistant and set to work. At a decade removed from the war’s end he 
began the project of reassembling his scattered papers. Jefferson Davis conceived 
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of his memoir in much the same vein as Stephens, to rescue the legitimacy of the 
Confederacy. Before setting ink to the page Davis proclaimed, “My motive in 
writing is the Justification of the South in the act of Secession and in the 
prosecution of the war.”73 He was no traitor, but a preserver of principle. 
To create a political legacy of which to be proud, Davis denied Confederate 
culpability in inaugurating the Civil War. Davis took to a favorite metaphor of 
Abraham Lincoln’s, whose parable of the shepherd, sheep, and wolf imparted the 
difficulty with defining American liberty. Twisting the meaning, Davis advanced, 
“The attempt to represent us as the aggressors in the conflict which ensued is as 
unfounded as the complaint made by the wolf against the lamb….”74 Davis 
countered, “He who makes the assault is not necessarily he that strikes the first 
blow or fires the first gun.”75 The Confederacy constituted the aggressive party at 
Sumter, but Davis offered that the North’s repeated violations of Constitutional 
obligations constituted the true first blow against the government, and any such 
conclusion that rested on Confederate culpability offered only the narrowest 
appreciation for history. 
Davis joined in the effort to sidestep the issue of slavery. Taking a line 
from Stephens’ book, Davis too penned that while “slavery may have served as an 
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occasion, it was far from being the cause of the conflict.”76 For Davis slavery, like 
Sumter, constituted a superficial distraction, “operating as a lever upon the 
passions, prejudices, or sympathies of mankind” with the result that 
misimpression “has been spread, like a thick cloud, over the whole horizon of 
historic truth.”77 To achieve clarity and to arrive at a substantive appreciation for 
the events surrounding the war and the Confederacy’s purpose necessitated 
taking a long view. In particular, Davis intently focused on the decade preceding 
secession to elucidate the justification for Southern and Confederate motives. In 
particular, Davis decried the North’s unwillingness to abide by constitutional 
obligations over slave protection in the territories. “No power was ever given to 
the General Government to interfere with [slavery]” Davis thundered in his 
memoir, still harboring resentment over this issue. Rather, he affirmed that the 
Constitution contained “an obligation…to protect it.”78 Even in retrospect federal 
power remained desirable, indeed vital to proving the equality and institutions of 
the South. Despite the passage of nearly a decade, Davis still resented the lack of 
federal enforcement to protect slavery. All along, he admitted, the South wanted 
the federal government’s powers exercised for their benefit. The real first blow lay 
not in government overreach, but paralysis. 
Davis, like Brown, sidestepped the chief political division of his 
presidency. In his chapter on the two men’s divisions, Davis similarly diminished 
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his collision with Brown. Offering an unoriginal reprinting of their well-known 
correspondence, Davis’ prefatory comments on conscription granted that the 
governor’s objection constituted an “unexpected criticism.” Writing that while 
Brown raised “a constitutional issue of high importance,” Davis contented 
himself with acknowledgement, calling the governor’s protests an issue over the 
“harmony of cooperation,” before brusquely setting the issue aside to speak of 
General Robert E. Lee’s sanction and the policy’s enactment.79 The issue with 
Brown owed to questions of harmony, not legitimacy. Davis’ postwar silence 
signaled his continued belief that the execution of federal power constituted an 
intentional and legitimate constitutional grant. In the era of redemption, 
however, it was not politic to speak of the sovereignty of national power, so the 
expression remained incomplete. 
In the closing pages of his memoir, Davis turned to the most controversial 
and divisive topic of his presidency, the prospect of arming enslaved persons for 
military service. Hinting at the discord sparked by Confederate slave enlistments, 
Davis claims to have told a former Confederate senator: “If the Confederacy falls, 
there should be written on its tombstone, ‘Died of a theory.’”80 It is an ambiguous 
statement and one that historians have interpreted as a lament that Confederates 
remained more devoted to local identity than to an independent nation. With his 
final policy proposal, Davis threatened to push the Confederate state in a 
potentially radical direction. In memoriam Davis fell silent, unwilling to offer 
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insight into how he proposed to execute the policy and the reason for his 
amending order, which accorded slave enlistees the rights of freedmen and the 
promise of emancipation. The portent of a radical future remained closed off 
from reconsideration. Davis desired to be remembered for his struggles on behalf 
of the Confederacy and its fundamental conviction in the immutable nature of 
American democracy’s racial grants, not his last attempt at challenging such 
fundamental convictions. 
 
The Confederacy spent the final year of the war testing the limits of its 
identity and federal power. Davis, the military, political leaders, and state 
governors all pushed the nation to embrace slaves as soldiers, a controversial 
policy for a nation predicated upon fixing eighteenth-century standards of racial 
exclusivity and republicanism. The trajectory of Confederate politics suggested 
the ways in which the final federal reach was not out of step with its tradition of 
legislating, for the Confederacy preempted the Union government in every major 
policy decision except slave emancipation. That the eventual policy resulted from 
the calls from the field and state governors demonstrated the general congeniality 
with which federal control was accepted, even desired, among a sufficiently 
recognizable Confederate constituency. 
With collapse arriving mere weeks after the enlistment bill, the 
Confederacy avoided the ramifications of its last-ditch designs. To hoist off the 
burdens of defeat, to regain their political careers and resurrect their legacies, the 
Confederacy’s chief politicians joined in a literary movement aimed at recasting 
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the Confederacy as a principled, heroically Sisyphean endeavor. For politicians 
like Brown, the specific recall of Confederate endeavors was best left in the past. 
But through hazy exhortations, Brown appealed to the sentiment, nostalgic 
emotions to further his career once more. His biography served in part to turn 
the page on specifics, and in place of actual history to redefine his legacy by its 
many contributions to the war effort. Brown recast row with Davis and his long 
correspondence over states’ rights as a principled partnership defending the 
Confederacy’s goal of self-government. 
Alexander Stephens also sought to come to terms with the legacy of the 
Confederacy through a retelling of history. His lengthy publications stretched 
into the thousands of pages, and yet for all of Stephens’ desire to impart a 
principled motive to avoid the epithet of traitor, his most absorbing moments 
involved defending the Confederacy and its perpetuation of racial inequality. 
While Stephens accepted the transience of the South’s institutions, Stephens 
retained his belief in racial inequality. His postwar writing conflated the 
Confederate struggles with those of the Reconstruction white South, the endeavor 
of both he cast as essentially preserve self-government. The maintenance of his 
underlying racial ideology provided a lasting measure of consolation. 
Jefferson Davis proved the most reluctant in defeat. Never seeking office 
nor desiring a return of his citizenship, Davis maintained to the last the 
righteousness of the Confederacy. As president he had overseen a powerful, 
centralized, federally robust government and had done his best to preserve 
independence and affix eighteenth-century definitions of liberty. Striving to 
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sustain the racial grants of republicanism involved, in the end, a wager to hazard 
the strict color lines of the white republic. In 1865 Davis believed Confederate 
ideology strong enough to sustain the admission of free slave soldiers, but in the 
postwar period he took to memorializing that failed to consider how the 
Confederate future might have looked upon the success of his last policy. The last 
chapter of Confederate history faded, leaving Davis free to memorialize his 
desired representation of the past. Davis exhibited unrepentant pride in his 
Confederate exhortations, and remain convinced in the fitness of the 
Confederacy’s purpose to the last of his days. 
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CONCLUSION 
Speaking to an audience in Baltimore in the spring of 1864, Abraham 
Lincoln expressed the problem of describing liberty. “The world has never had a 
good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much 
in want of one. We all declare for liberty; but in using the same word we do not 
all mean the same thing.”1 Lincoln explained his sentiment by calling upon the 
parable of the wolf and the sheep. “The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's 
throat, for which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf 
denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as the sheep 
was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition 
of the word liberty; and precisely the same difference prevails to-day among us 
human creatures.”2 Agreeing with Alexander Stephens, Lincoln presented white 
Southerners’ conception of liberty as inextricably defined by white supremacy, 
which afforded economic prosperity and political advantage.  
Jefferson Davis continued to stand by the role of the wolf in defeat, 
convinced in the fitness of the antebellum South and the Confederacy’s definition 
of liberty. In this manner, the effort to preserve American liberty constituted the 
first genuine political conservativism in American life. In order to affix the 
Founders’ selective constitutional definitions of liberty and racial inequality, 
Confederates laid claim to the nation’s heritage. Sustaining a government of their 
own, and one strong enough to defend and project the Founders’ immutable 
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definitions and institutions, required a central state. In setting out to begin anew, 
the Confederacy affixed purportedly timeless definitions of American democracy 
bound by racial identity. The Constitution protected and indeed incentivized 
slave ownership. Its presence, Confederate politicians repeatedly avowed, created 
a virtuous, homogenous society. Preserving that definition of liberty required a 
robust federal republic. 
Historian William Novack’s persuasive article, “The Myth of the Weak 
American State” offers an equally suggestive pattern for the Confederacy.3 As 
Novak argues, the course of American history reveals the strength and central 
role of the central state in nearly every major episode of national expansion. As a 
direct imitation of the United States Constitution, it should come as no surprise 
that federal power played a central role in the Confederacy. Indeed, to sustain 
and advance its convictions, Confederate leaders embraced federal power, replete 
with its powers to tax and raise armies. As Davis maintained in his 
correspondence with Brown, the Founders had done so with a mind toward 
national expansion. The Confederate framers at Montgomery retained such 
provisions for like-minded expansionist purposes as well.  
Just as the Founders had envisioned an empire of liberty, the Confederacy 
envisioned its own national expansion. As Davis expressed in his inaugural, his 
administration promised to pursue an energetic policy, one that exercised federal 
power for the benefit of sustaining and expanding and protecting the state and its 
homogenous society. Having created a society of “one flesh,” the Confederates 
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proclaimed to have rescued an essential component of American government. 
Having affixed the body politic by a racial grant, the Confederacy proclaimed to 
have rid itself of the troubling divisions of the antebellum era. Free from sectional 
antagonism, Davis promised to pursue the general welfare with vigor. 
Although scholars traditionally treat the existence of federal power in the 
Confederacy as an unintended irony, as evidence of the national project’s 
unfitness, the creation of a sovereign, supreme federal government constituted 
the desire of the delegates at the secession convention in Montgomery, Alabama. 
With Alexander Stephens at the helm, the delegates usurped the fire-eaters’ 
intended purpose and set forward an avowedly imitative, conventional 
government. Preserving the United States Constitution with as few moderations 
as possible enjoyed overwhelming support. And the few changes adopted did not 
make the state more southern, but made it more functional, less divisive, and 
ultimately more responsive to the needs of its exclusive democracy.  
 A necessary component of defining the Confederate nation included 
sustaining slavery. White supremacy constituted the clear ideology and central 
purpose of the Confederate government. Indeed, the Confederacy’s true novelty 
lay in embracing governmental institutions to support racially exclusive ends. 
Robert Barnwell Rhett arrived at the convention in Montgomery desiring just 
such a slave republic, but at every turn he found his schemes for a resplendent 
empire of slavery frustrated. The delegates had not come with desires to remake 
the American government, but rather to clarify and fix its grants of liberty 
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The Confederate comportment with federal power proved a defining, 
enduring, and desirable feature of its government. As Richard Bensel wrote, the 
Confederacy embraced a more state-centric approach to fighting the Civil War 
than even the North, although he felt that the demands of wartime explained this 
development. Rather, as the Confederate Constitution and the debates over its 
ratification revealed, the Confederacy sought an imitative government, replete 
with strong federal instrumentalities. Slaveowners were not afraid of 
government, but covetous and desiring of its authority. Throughout the 
antebellum era, Southern politicians repeatedly hailed the beneficial applications 
of federal power when it cleared Indian lands and turned them over to public 
auction. As historian Adam Rothman notes, the federal government played an 
indispensible role in the construction of the antebellum Deep South.4 Similarly, 
Southern political leaders bemoaned the obstruction of federal power, specifically 
the lack of equal applications of federal power to protect slavery in the territories 
and to return purportedly fugitive slaves. To preserve the American Republic, the 
Confederate States of America seceded from the Union, laying claim to the 
Constitution and the nation’s heritage.  
The exigencies of war did not warp the purpose of Confederacy, but rather 
made its grants of federal power evident. As Davis’ correspondence with Joseph 
Brown revealed, the Confederate government was not one that viewed its 
national purpose in limited fashion. His line of argument intimated that the 
Confederacy, much like the American Republic, adopted a sovereign federal 
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government so as to permit the military the means by which the Confederate 
republic might expand, projecting into the southern and western hemispheres. 
Indeed, one of the chief elements that provoked such discord in antebellum 
politics was the suggestion that slavery ought to be limited, confined to its 
geographical borders in the South. To limit slavery’s ability to expand diminished 
its future, offering nothing but the promise of political dependency and ultimate 
subjugation. Fearful and refusing to abide by such portent, the Confederates 
retained a powerful government and the right to expand their nation and 
institutions. As the legal history of the Confederacy revealed, all such grants 
enjoyed clear, intended legal sanction. 
In defeat, the denial of the South’s right to expand slavery into the 
territories still remained a subject of considerable scorn for Davis and Stephens. 
But with the Confederacy rendered asunder, the former Confederate elite 
reconciled themselves to the loss of their independent nation and its institutions. 
The underlying ideology of white supremacy, however, remained an important 
and continued benediction. Highlighting the Confederacy’s struggle as one aimed 
at self-government helped to make the memory of the Confederacy safe for 
veneration by removing the stain of its failure and its embrace of slavery. The 
Confederacy had ended the war attempting a bold scheme that promised to 
upend its hold on racial supremacy. In defeat, Confederate leaders turned away 
from any discussion of their exercise of federal grants, and the portent of a 
diverse society by conflating the cause of Confederacy and the Reconstruction 
South as equally vital efforts to sustain control over government. Southerners did 
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not seek to repudiate the legitimacy of the federal government, but rather to 
harness its power to their own purposes.
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